

**White Exodus, Latino Repopulation,
and Community Well-Being: Trends
in California's Rural Communities**

by

Elaine M. Allensworth and Refugio I. Rochín
Julian Samora Research Institute, *Michigan State University*

Research Report No. 13

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SUGGESTED CITATION

Allensworth, Elaine M., and Refugio I. Rochín. *White Exodus, Latino Repopulation, and Community Well-Being: Trends in California's Rural Communities*, JSRI Research Report No. 13, The Julian Samora Research Institute, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, 1996.

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White Exodus, Latino Repopulation, and Community Well-Being: Trends in California’s Rural Communities

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OVERVIEW

Rural California is becoming increasingly Latino¹. At the same time, the economic well-being of California's agricultural communities is becoming increasingly defined by the race and ethnicity of residents. A number of studies have noted that communities with high concentrations of Latinos tend to have greater economic and social problems.² Most studies have focused on immigration from Mexico and other parts of Latin America as the cause of both the increasing concentration of Latinos, and decreasing community well-being. However, these studies have neglected the concurrent changes that are occurring with the non-Latino white population. Therefore, this paper examines both the out-migration of non-Hispanic whites and the in-migration of Latinos in rural California, to better understand the relationship between ethnicity and the economic well-being of California's rural communities.

The first part of the paper uses a database of 126 rural California communities to compare and contrast demographic changes (over 1980-90) in Latino and non-Latino population, and to examine the degree to which White out-migration and Latino in-migration correlate with community socio-economic indicators. The second part of the paper uses in-depth qualitative data to examine several communities in the San Joaquin valley. Through analysis of community social capital, intergroup conflict and cooperation, and local perceptions of economic opportunities, we examine some of the dynamics underlying the broader migration, settlement, and economic trends discussed in the first part of the paper.

THE CHANGING ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF CALIFORNIA'S AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITIES AND COMMUNITY WELL-BEING: EMPIRICAL QUESTIONS

Ethnic Transformation

California's population, which increased by some 6 million in the 1980's, is continuing to grow by a net amount of about 600,000 a year, or 1,644 every 24 hours. Most of this growth is in metropolitan areas, but a large "spill-over" of population is moving to rural communities. Many of the rural bound are Mexican immigrants and Latinos from other parts of Latin America (SCR 43 Task Force 1989; Rochín and Castillo 1995).

In 1950, rural California communities were largely populated by non-Hispanic white persons. But beginning in 1970, and especially during the 1980's and 1990's, the white/Latino proportions changed in all rural communities, so that some communities became almost completely composed of Latino residents. While Latinos have lived as numerical minorities within "barrios" of rural California communities for many decades, they are now becoming the numerical majorities in many locations (Rochín and Castillo 1995).

Most of the changing ethnicity of rural California has been attributed to the increasing Latino population. Many of the Latino residents are immigrant agricultural workers. In the University of California Task Force on Latinos (SCR 43 Task Force 1989) it was noted that at least a half million Latinos in rural areas were immigrant settlers, and that most were clustered in some 100 communities where they could get jobs in agriculture. However, changes in the ethnic composition of rural communities could also be attributed to changes in the non-Latino population. While the population of most rural communities grew during the 1980's, the numbers of non-Latino white people decreased in absolute and relative amounts. Non-Latino population change has varied greatly from community to community, increasing in some but decreasing in others. Therefore we ask:

- * What is the most important cause of the relative changes in ethnic composition in rural California communities, increasing Latinization or White Exodus?
- * What are the factors underlying community patterns of growth and loss in Latino and non-Latino White population?

The first of these questions is studied through comparison of 1990 and 1980 census data in Part I of this paper. The second question is studied through qualitative analysis discussed in Part II.

Community Well-Being

Comparison of the socio-economic indicators of rural communities by their ethnic composition reveals disturbing socio-economic conditions in communities with higher proportions of Latino residents. Underclass conditions are strongly associated with greater concentrations of Latinos in rural communities. Both the 1980 and 1990 census showed that communities with higher percentages of Latino residents were significantly more disadvantaged than communities with low percentages of Latino residents in terms of educational attainment, unemployment, self-employment, and poverty (Rochín and Castillo 1995; Allensworth and Rochín 1995). Furthermore, the relationship between ethnicity and community well-being was stronger in 1990 than in 1980. Rural Latino enclaves often lack essential housing, health and social services, due to a lack of appropriate community infrastructure to request or receive them (SCR 43 Task Force). *Colonias** also lack local businesses covering such needs as legal services, pharmaceuticals, medical services, and recreational activities (Rochín and Castillo 1995).

This leads to our next set of questions:

- Is the relationship between community well-being and ethnic composition associated only with increasing Latino population, or is it related to changes in both Latino and non-Latino population?
- What are the implications for the future well-being of California's rural Latino Communities?

The first of these questions is studied with 1980 and 1990 census data in Part I of this paper. The second question is explored through qualitative data analysis in Part II.

**This term is Spanish and literally means "colony." It is used to refer to rural communities with high percentages of Mexican-origin residents, as most of these communities have strong ties to Mexico.*

THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR ETHNIC TRANSFORMATION AND COMMUNITY WELL-BEING

Ethnic Transformation

Why are some communities becoming almost completely composed of Latino residents, while others are experiencing little or no change in their ethnic composition? Most scholars have focused on the increase in rural Latinos, especially immigrants from Mexico, when describing ethnic changes in rural California (e.g., Palerm 1991; Rochín 1995; Taylor 1995). Such perspectives view the changing demographics as resulting from immigration-related factors, such as low-skill job availability resulting from agricultural and industrial restructuring, lack of economic opportunity in Mexico and Central America, and social networks among migrants. The change in Latino population is, however, only one side of the picture. We must also ask why the non-Latino population is declining in almost half of the communities where Latinos are settling, while growing in others. Such changes could be viewed as developing from changes in job availability (i.e., agricultural and industrial restructuring), but also from ethnic conflict between whites and Latinos and/or U.S. citizens and immigrants.

Agricultural and Industrial Restructuring

The growth in Latino population in agricultural communities is generally believed to be a direct result of changes in California's agricultural production (e.g., Krissman 1995; Palerm 1991). Although past studies predicted a reduced demand for immigrant labor and a greater use of farm machinery in California agriculture, use of both machinery and farm labor increased during the 1970's and 1980's. In fact, the need for more specialized seasonal farm workers led California's farm lobbyists to convince the United States Congress to make special farm worker provisions within the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986. Since the passage of IRCA, over 1.2 million workers from Mexico have registered to work in agriculture as SAWs (special agricultural workers). Many of these workers have settled with their families in rural communities (Rochín and Castillo 1995).

The relationship between agriculture and Latino settlement is further shown by changes in the ethnic composition of specific areas of California. In 1950, the highest concentrations of Latinos were in towns along the United States - Mexico border. However, by 1980 the highest concentrations of Latinos in rural communities had shifted to the Central Valley of California, particularly in Kern, Fresno, and Tulare counties — among the richest agricultural counties in the United States. (Rochín and Castillo 1995)

The perspective that employment opportunities lead to migration is consistent with neoclassical economic models. This perspective views migration as a calculation of cost-benefit decisions, and has received considerable support (Massey, et al. 1994). However, while the assumption is that changes in agriculture have brought about the settlement of immigrants in rural communities, it is also possible that the availability of low-wage labor has encouraged the intensification of California agriculture.³ Greater availability of low-wage workers might encourage the use of hired agricultural labor, and the growth of large farms, through increased profits. While this perspective has not been directly stated by scholars, it has been implied through suggestions that cutting off immigration (or cutting down on the hiring of undocumented workers) would improve the situation of most rural Latinos by increasing job competition, and thus increasing farm wages (e.g., Krissman 1995; Martin 1995; Rochín and Castillo 1995). Such a perspective implies that the relationship between increased agricultural jobs and immigration is supply-driven (by immigration), rather than demand-driven (by jobs).

The emphasis on agricultural restructuring obscures the existence of other forms of economic production in rural California. While agricultural employment is very important in California's *colonias*, it is not the sole employer. The restructuring of agricultural labor use (i.e., changing from small family-run and operated businesses to large operations that rely on hired labor, and the increased use of farm labor contractors⁴) can be viewed as part of a general trend observed in industrial restructuring, in which production is becoming increasingly decentralized, contracted out to peripheral firms.⁵

Furthermore, the increasing informalization of work (both in agriculture and industry) might encourage the emigration of residents with medium levels of education, more work experience, and better opportunities in other areas. Lack of local opportunity encourages outmigration of better-educated residents (C. Flora, et al. 1992; James 1990; Summers 1991). Palerm (1991), for example, notes the loss of non-Latino population from two communities as opportunities for higher-paying jobs appeared elsewhere. Furthermore, informalization of labor can also result in the outmigration of the lowest-skilled native workers, as their jobs are those that are most strongly impacted by informalization. Frey (1995) has noted that metropolitan areas experiencing high immigration also show emigration of whites with low levels of education. He has hypothesized that this is due to competition for low-wage jobs and inexpensive housing.

Industrial restructuring could also be blamed for the decrease in rural to urban migration among California Latinos, which in the past held down the number of immigrant workers in the farm labor market. Mexican-Americans have been especially hurt by industrial restructuring, as the loss of middle-income jobs to low- and high-skill/wage jobs has primarily forced middle-income Mexican-Americans into low-wage jobs (Morales and Bonilla 1993). The urban labor market is getting saturated with migrants coming directly from Mexico and Central America, increasing competition for low-skill jobs. In fact, migrants can now be found coming from urban to rural areas in search of employment (Palerm 1991).

In sum, the relationship between immigrant settlement and restructuring seems to be reciprocal: i.e., the availability of low-wage labor encourages the intensification and peripheralization of agriculture and industry, while the availability of agricultural jobs encourages more permanent settlement of immigrant laborers and their families. At the same time, lowered wages for low-skill workers and fewer medium-skill jobs can encourage the outmigration of native-born workers. This perspective therefore focuses on both immigration and outmigration as causes for the increasing "Latinization" of rural communities.

Social Capital

Massey and Espinosa (1996) found that social capital was the most important predictor of both immigration from Mexico to the United States and remaining in the United States, rather than returning to Mexico. This results partly because of the reduced costs involved in migration, and partly out of the desire to be with friends and family members. From this perspective, the growth of Latino population in agricultural communities could be seen as resulting from increasing networks between the United States and Mexico. This perspective explains the continual supply of migrant workers, despite the decreasing availability of good-paying, stable jobs.

However, this perspective does not explain the migration of workers who do not have established networks. Increasingly, migrants are coming to California from Southern Mexico and Central America, places that traditionally have not sent migrants (Palerm 1991). While migration and settlement may primarily result because of social connections, economic push-pull factors remain salient (Massey and Espinosa 1996).

Ethnic Conflict

One possible outcome of increasing minority representation in an area is defensive discrimination, if majority group members feel that their economic and political positions are threatened (Tienda and Lii 1987). This has been seen to happen, as evidenced by California's anti-immigrant law (Johnson 1996). California voters say they have felt threatened by increasing immigration, and local governments have claimed that they provide more in services to immigrants than they get back in taxes.⁶

There is reason to believe that white migration from many of the rural communities where Latinos are settling is due, at least in part, to anti-immigrant or anti-Latino feelings on the part of white residents. Three of the four rural Latino communities profiled by Palerm (1991) indicate increased ethnic conflict between whites and Latinos as Latino population increased. In one community, the white population seemed to leave as the Latino population moved in. Two others divided into distinct ethnic neighborhoods, with conflict erupting based on ethnicity.⁷ Furthermore, the hypothesis that

increasing minority representation in a place encourages outmigration of majority group members is not new. "White flight" from urban areas, for example, has been consistently blamed on whites' fear of integration with Blacks, and their fear that property value will decline with greater numbers of minority residents (Fox 1985; James 1990).

Community Well-Being

Whether Latino immigration is a result of changes in agriculture, industrial restructuring, or growing social networks, many scholars blame immigrants for the increasing low wages and increasing poverty of rural Latino communities. From this perspective, disadvantage could be seen as resulting from at least one of the following: lowered wages through continuous and increasing competition (through a neoclassical economics view); lack of solidarity (through either a marxist or social capital perspective); or demographic effects that hide economic progress made by established Latinos. Another popular explanation for the disadvantage of *colonias* is the uneven economic growth that has accompanied agricultural restructuring, especially the low wages paid to farm workers. Lack of human capital among Mexican-Americans has also been seen as a cause of lower socio-economic well-being. Finally, the disadvantage of communities with higher percentages of Latinos can be viewed as resulting in some way from ethnic conflict — either the encouragement of inequality resulting from conflict, or the loss of both financial and human capital from communities that are losing non-Latino residents.

Immigration-Blame Perspective: Wage Competition

According to the subordination thesis of increasing minority group concentration, increases in a minority population can accentuate competition for particular jobs, so that minority workers are more easily exploited as a source of cheap labor (Tienda and Lii 1987). Such a perspective is consistent with a neoclassical economic view of labor supply and demand, that a constantly increasing supply of low-wage labor lowers wages for both new and established migrants. As a result, immigration has been blamed for the low earnings and unstable employment of California's farm workers (e.g., Krissman 1995;

Martin 1995; Rochín and Castillo 1995). Recent economic research has shown that immigration can have negative effects on local communities, slightly increasing underemployment, poverty, and public assistance use, although raising mean incomes (Taylor 1995). In other words, the employment opportunities and earnings of low-skill workers are slightly reduced with increased immigration, although the prospects for economic growth of the community as a whole (especially those who can take advantage of cheap and abundant labor) are increased.

Immigration-Blame Perspective: Demographic Effects

Immigration might also be obscuring the financial success of established Latinos in rural communities, by confounding the conditions of recent immigrants with those of established rural Latinos. The group we call “Latinos” contains U.S.-born individuals, recent immigrants to the United States, and first generation immigrants who have lived most of their lives in the U.S., as well as individuals from all parts of Latin America (although most rural California Latinos are of Mexican-descent). Hispanic scholars have noted that this distinction is often blurred, and as a result, the progress of U.S.-born Mexican Americans can be obscured (e.g., Chavez 1989). The low levels of education and limited employment options for recent migrants might make it appear that communities with greater percentages of Latino residents are doing poorly, when it is only the most recent immigrants who are economically disadvantaged. Additionally, the larger poverty rates associated with immigration could be a result of the larger families of immigrants (more people per family living on low incomes).⁸

However, while the much lower socio-economic status of recent migrants might explain part of the relationship between ethnicity and community well-being, it is not an adequate explanation. Research on the assimilation of Mexican-Americans, for example, shows that there are huge gaps in the education and earnings of U.S.-born Mexican-Americans and non-Hispanic whites (Ortiz 1995; Trejo 1995). Furthermore, correlations among community well-being variables and ethnicity (i.e., the percentage of Latino residents in a community) are stronger than correlations of community well-being with immigration (i.e., the percentage of Latino residents who are recent immigrants to the United States) (Allensworth and Rochín 1995). If immigration is the

primary source of colonia inequality, this pattern should be in reverse.

Agricultural Restructuring — Farmworker Exploitation

While rural Latino communities show high poverty and unemployment rates, most are located within one of the most profitable agricultural regions of the country. Crop industries within the top three California farm counties generate over seven billion dollars in annual agricultural revenues, but these same counties contain some of the poorest communities in California (Krissman 1995). Dependency theory explains that development or economic advantage of one area or group is achieved at the expense of another. From this perspective, the success of California’s food industry can be viewed as developing from the exploitation of farm laborers.

Goldschmidt in 1947 documented the social consequences of industrialized agriculture, suggesting that large farms with hired labor promote community inequality and lower community well being. He found that the socioeconomic relations in one small town (Arvin) had become more like those characteristic of a highly differentiated urban economy than an agricultural town, due to its dependence on large farms with hired labor. His comparison town (Dinuba) was supported by smaller, family-operated farms. Arvin farms were bigger and farm revenue was six times more, but Dinuba had twice the local commerce, 20 percent higher median incomes, over twice as much self-employment, more advanced community infrastructure, more and better schools, more democratic local institutions, and more civic organizations (Goldschmidt 1978).

Goldschmidt suggested that farm labor become professionalized, like manufacturing labor was. However, just as manufacturing work is becoming increasingly informalized through contract work, so agricultural labor in California is becoming even less formal through the use of farm labor contractors. Growers use labor contractors to undermine laws pertaining to documentation, wages, benefits, and unemployment insurance (Krissman 1995). Labor laws are consistently not extended to agricultural workers, and corporate agribusiness continues to have power to defy courts and government efforts to curb the use of undocumented workers (Krissman 1995; Martin 1995).

Human Capital

Many studies have noted that most of the earnings gap between Mexican-American and non-Latino white men can be attributed to differences in education levels and English proficiency (e.g., Trejo 1995; Verdugo and Verdugo 1985). The human capital perspective would therefore point to the lower education levels among Mexican-Americans, especially immigrants to explain the relationship between community well-being and ethnicity. From the human capital perspective, lack of human capital means less productivity, less business experience (and so less entrepreneurial activity), and less money coming into the community (Calo 1995).

While absolute numbers of Hispanic college students have risen over the last several decades, the percentage of Hispanic high school graduates enrolled in college has dropped since 1975 in all types of post-secondary institutions, especially among Mexican-Americans (Paul 1990). Reasons for the lower educational achievements of Mexican-Americans include lower mean SES (e.g., see Coleman 1968; Hurn 1978; Kozol 1991), the formation of oppositional (involuntary minority) identities (e.g., see Matute-Bianchi 1991; Ogbu 1991), lack of financial support for higher education (Hampton, Ikboir and Rochín 1995), and family obligations (Young 1992). However, Human Capital perspectives ignore the demand side of the marketplace. If there is no employment available for higher-skilled employees, increases in educational levels will encourage outmigration, rather than economic growth.

Ethnic Conflict — White Exodus

Description of ethnic conflict as noted in the previous section suggests that non-Latino residents may be moving from *colonias* as a result of perceived ethnic threat. In both central city and rural areas, outmigration of middle-class residents has been seen to cripple local communities. It can weaken a community's ability to sustain organizations and services, especially if the ratio of children and retired people to working-age people increases (James 1990; J. Flora, et al. 1992). White residents tend to be more affluent and better educated

than Latino residents, so that communities that experience outmigration of whites lose financial capital for potential community investment, and human capital for future growth. This is what seemed to happen in Guadalupe, Calif. (Palerm 1991).

However, this perspective assumes that Latino residents are unable to fill the employment and business gaps left by fleeing whites. Mexican-American rural self-employment is higher in communities with greater concentrations of Latinos, but these businesses tend to be less profitable, and are more likely to emerge because of lack of alternative employment options (Calo 1995; Hampton, Saenz and Rochín 1995). It is not clear why this is so. It could be that the remaining population lacks the necessary financial and human capital. But there might be underlying causes of white emigration that make it unprofitable for anyone to be in business in these communities. This hypothesis leaves many unanswered questions.

Ethnic Conflict — Lack of Social Integration (Horizontal Networks)

Multiple scholars have suggested that economic growth and equal economic development is fostered by horizontal social capital, i.e., the ability of community members to trust others and work together in new forms of organization (e.g., Fukuyama 1995; O'Brien, et al. 1991; Robinson and Schmidt 1991). Lack of horizontal social capital in communities encourages inequality and lower economic well-being (Warren 1978). In *colonias*, there is evidence that even when non-Latino residents do not leave communities gaining in Latino population, established whites do not recognize immigrants as part of their community and do not recognize their needs in community development efforts (e.g., see community profiles in Palerm 1991, Runsten, Kissam, and Intili 1995). The ethnic and class divisions between the local elites (Latino and non-Latino) and immigrants (the majority of the residents) have resulted in fractured communities, within which the elite tries to develop the local economy not through residents' demands for social equity, but through real estate speculation, and their own self interest (Krissman 1995).

The towns of Fillmore and McFarland are two examples of this process. While the Latino populations of both communities have grown, strict boundaries exist between the Latino and white sides of town, and community development monies have been spent predominantly on the white side of town (Palerm 1991). Parlier, another farm worker town, is another example of the divisions that exist in *colonias*. It is almost entirely Latino, and has been politically controlled by local Chicanos for 20 years. Economic power, however, is held by Anglo and Japanese growers, so that Chicano leadership in government led to increased community services, but not to economic growth, better wages, or better working conditions for Latino farm workers (Runsten, Kissam, and Intili 1995).

Furthermore, it should not be assumed that lack of trusting social networks, and resultant lack of power for disadvantaged groups, exists only between Latinos and Whites. Chicano leaders in Parlier, for example, have been accused of pursuing their own interests rather than those of the farm workers (Runsten, Kissam, and Intili 1995). Even among groups of recent immigrants, workers from different social networks fight against each other for jobs, housing and services, with immigrants from the North-Central states of Mexico (older networks) faring better than more recent immigrant networks (Krissman 1995).

DATA AND METHODS

The literature referred to above is rich in questions and poor in explanations with regards to *colonia* formation and well-being. Nonetheless, the question we raise constitutes the core of our concerns which we pursue with both quantitative and qualitative analysis.

Quantitative Data on Rural California Communities

Data for this paper are taken from a unique database consisting of cross-sectional and time-series data on over 365 rural California communities. This data base incorporates figures from the 1980 and 1990 United States Census of Population and Housing (STF3 files) for the state of California, as well as summary statistics on city revenues and expenditures. Data for 1990 was provided through CD-ROMS which contain information on all "places" in California⁹. Data for 1980, and data on city revenues

and expenditures, were copied by hand from books of summary statistics produced by the Census.

Because Latinos are concentrated in specific communities within the state, the well-being of non-Latino communities is less relevant to the Latino population. Therefore, a sample of 126 communities was selected to highlight the situation of most rural Latinos for this study. The 126 communities in the sample were selected because they each have an agricultural basis of employment, exhibit rural characteristics and histories, and were at least 15 percent Latino in 1980.

Qualitative Data on Rural Communities in the San Joaquin Valley

During September 1995 we visited and surveyed eight communities located between Bakersfield and Fresno, including: Wasco, Lindsay, Exeter, Ivanhoe, Woodlake, Cutler, Orosi, and Orange Cove. We profiled each in JSRI CIFRAS Brief No. 7, and conducted interviews with local city managers and business representatives. In March and April of 1996 we conducted an on-site study in the following places: Woodlake, Exeter, Cutler-Orosi and Orange Cove. This study was carried out through interviews with community leaders, organized focus groups, government officials, school principals, business leaders, and local residents in each place. A total of 54 formal interviews and focus groups were completed at that time.

In our qualitative analysis of communities, we addressed the following questions:

* How important are jobs, the community economic base, ethnic conflict, social capital, and discrimination in determining migration patterns, namely, peoples' willingness to stay where they are or to move?

* Is the relationship between ethnicity and community well-being strong and increasing? Are local residents forming new forms of positive "social capital," i.e. building social networks of friends and associations which support and abet the progress of community citizenship, local investments, and civic responsibility and pride?

* How important are the peoples' perceptions of immigrants, the changing composition of residents and the quality of life in their community? To what

degree are these factors important in the residents' feelings towards their community?


* In what ways have the employment structure, the human, social and financial capital in the community, and ethnic composition affected local community conditions?

Through in-depth study of these agricultural communities we hope to develop models of the processes effecting the movement of Latino and non-Latino population from individual communities to others. While analysis of our qualitative data is not yet complete, a preliminary model describing non-Latino white exodus is presented in this paper. Factors leading to different migration patterns among Latinos are also discussed, as well as the implications for the future well-being of California's agricultural places.

RESULTS: PART I

Demographic and Economic Change: A Quantitative Analysis

While almost all agricultural California communities are becoming increasingly Latino, the growth of both Latino and White population varies considerably from place to place. This dynamic is shown graphically in Figure 1, which displays a dot and a box for each of 126 rural communities. The horizontal axis spreads out the communities from a low to a high growth in total population between 1980 and 1990. The vertical axis measures the degree of population growth, in absolute numbers, of each community from 1980 to 1990. The dots show the growth in overall population of each community. The



boxes show the growth of non-Hispanic white population of each community. A few communities are named within the chart to illustrate how they changed in population. Gaps between the growth in total community population and the growth in the non-Latino white population indicate the amount of population growth due to changes in the Latino population.¹⁰ The gap is highlighted by “L” and “W.”

To understand Figure 1, notice the community at the far left with negative growth. Citrus lost 4003 non-Latino residents between 1980 and 1990. Citrus, however, gained 1,307 Latino residents over that decade, so that the total population change was -2969. At the other extreme, was Cathedral City. This place gained 25,955 new residents between 1980-90, of which 10,082 (almost half) were Latino. Gonzalez, the community to which the arrow points in the figure, is representative of an average rural California community. It experienced a slight decrease in non-Latino population (-90), but an increase in overall population (+1769) due to the increase in the number of its Latino residents (+1859). Notice that in over half of the communities there was no growth in non-Latino population, despite increase in total population.

As shown in Figure 1, most of the overall population growth in California’s Latino communities can be attributed to increases in Latino population. In these 126 communities, changes in Latino population account, on average, for over 100 percent of the population growth, making up for absolute losses in non-Latino white population. Without additions in Latino population, the overall population in most communities would have decreased between 1980 and 1990. Nonetheless, non-Latino Whites added significantly to the growth of many communities.

In Table 1 we summarize the general patterns of demographic change that can be seen in Figure 1.¹¹ There are 15 communities that experienced large gains in non-Latino population (greater than 50 percent growth) as well as gains in Latino population of more than 50 percent. Additionally, there are 45 communities (we added 13 and 32) that experienced moderate (1-50 percent) increases in non-Latino population while simultaneously experiencing moderate or large gains in Latino population. Most importantly, notice that 64 communities lost White (2+23+39) non-Latinos in absolute amounts. However, all but two of the communities that experienced decreases in non-Latino population simultaneously experienced increases in Latino population. In fact, most of the communities that lost non-Latino White population experienced very large increases (greater than 50 percent) in their Latino population (see the bottom row).

Table 1. Changes in Latino and Non-Latino Population Among 126 Rural Latino California Communities (1980-1990)

Number of Communities in which Latino Population:	Number of Communities in which Non-Latino Population:		
	<i>Decreased</i>	<i>Increased 1-50%</i>	<i>Increased 51%+</i>
<i>Decreased</i>	2	0	1
<i>Increased 1-50 %</i>	23	13	1
<i>Increased 51%+</i>	39	32	15

Focusing exclusively on the communities that grew in population and dropping those two that experienced decreases in Whites and Latinos, one can see three general types of population change in California's rural places. The first group consists of those 62 communities in which the Latino population is increasing, but the non-Latino population is decreasing or remaining the same. The second group (n=32) of communities is increasing in population size among both ethnic groups, but is also experiencing changing ethnic composition. The third group (n=28) of communities consists of those going through increases in population size without large changes in ethnic composition. Figure 2 displays these three types of communities (see Appendix A for a list of the communities used in this typology).

the percentage of Latino residents in a community than the Latino in-migration of the 1980's. This finding is shown in Table 2 where simple correlations are highlighted between the two phenomena of demographic change. Furthermore, change in Latino population is not significantly correlated with change in Latino concentration from 1980 to 1990, while change in non-Latino population is strongly correlated (r=-.55) with changes in Latino concentration.¹²

However, this does not mean that Latino population growth is an unimportant factor in the transformation of communities' ethnic composition. Rather, because almost all communities have experienced growing Latino population, it is non-Latino White population growth that explains which

Figure 2. Communities Grouped by Changes in Latino and White Population		
GROUP 1	GROUP 2	GROUP 3
+L -W Latinos Increasing Whites Decreasing 49% of communities n = 62	+L +W Large Increase in Latinos Small Increase in Whites 25% of communities n = 32	+L +W Proportional Increases in Both Populations 22% of communities n = 28

What is the most important cause of the relative changes in ethnic composition in rural California communities? Is it increasing Latinization or White Exodus?

If we compare changes in Latino and non-Latino populations from 1980 to 1990 with the current percentages of Latinos in rural communities, we find that change in the size of non-Latino White population in a community is much more predictive of current Latino population concentration than is the change in Latino population. In other words, White out-migration appears to be more strongly associated with

communities have experienced relatively larger increases in the percentage of their residents that are Latino, compared to other communities. Greater percentages of Latino residents are found in communities that have experienced the most White exodus and the least growth in White population, compared to other rural communities. This finding runs counter to studies that have suggested that Latinization (especially immigration from Mexico and Latin America) is the chief cause of demographic change in rural California. In our study, the influx of Latinos is only a part of the cause of ethnic concentration of rural places.

Table 2. Correlations Between Ethnic Composition and Latino/Non-Latino Population Change (1980-1990)		
Demographic Phenomenon	Current % of Population that is Latino	Change in % of Population that is Latino
Latino Population Growth	.11	-.04
Non-Latino Growth	-.41	-.55

Is the relationship between community well-being and ethnic composition primarily due to increasing Latino population, or is it related more to change in both Latino and non-Latino population?

It is unknown to what degree the strong correlations between community well-being and Latino population concentration are related to the out-migration of non-Hispanic whites, as well as the in-migration of Latinos. However, we make two sets of comparisons. The first uses ANOVA group comparisons to examine community socio-economic well-being according to the typology presented in Figure 2. The second presents correlations of changes in Latino and non-Latino population with socio-economic indicators to obtain a direct measure of the relationship between ethnic population change and community well-being. These comparisons allow us to infer the impact of changing population on community well-being both cross-sectionally (i.e., comparing the current conditions of communities by ethnic population growth) and longitudinally (i.e., comparing changes in community well-being from 1980 to 1990).

Anova Comparisons of Community Well-Being by Ethnic Population Growth

Table 3 compares the current well-being of communities (Rows 1-4), and changes in community well-being from 1980 to 1990 (Rows 5-8), based on the community typology of Figure 2. Those few communities that did not fit into one of the three groups were excluded from these analyses.

The first row of Table 3 shows large differences in poverty rates between the three types of communities, based on Latino and non-Latino population change. Communities that experienced decreases in non-Latino population (Group 1) have poverty rates that are eight percent higher than communities in which the ethnic composition changed, but both populations grew, and 13 percent higher than communities in which the ethnic populations grew more evenly. Poverty, therefore, seems to be tied to both increases in Latino population and decreases in non-Latino population. This finding is confirmed by row six, which compares changes in poverty with changes in population. Communities that experienced decreases

Table 3. Community Well-Being Variables by Changes in Latino and Non-Latino Population (1980-1990) n = 122

	<i>Group 1 Decrease in Non-Latinos, Increase in Latinos (n=62)</i>	<i>Group 2 Small Increase in Non-Latinos, Large Increase in Latinos (n=32)</i>	<i>Group 3 Similar Increases in Both Populations (n=28)</i>	<i>n[^]</i>
1990 % of the Community in Poverty***	26.6% ^{2,3}	18.4% ^{1,3}	13.8% ^{1,2}	118
1990 Median Income***	\$24,319 ³	\$24,625 ³	\$33,817 ^{1,2}	89
1990 % High School Graduates (Adults)***	39.4% ^{2,3}	60.4% ¹	65.1% ¹	118
1990 % College Graduates (among Adults)***	5.5% ^{2,3}	9.9% ¹	10.8% ¹	86
1980-90 Change in Percentage in Poverty ***	12.9% ^{2,3}	7.8% ¹	4.1% ¹	118
1980-90 Change in Median Income***	\$10,325 ³	\$10,896 ³	\$17,514 ^{1,2}	89
1980-90 Change in High School Graduates***	0.4% ^{2,3}	6.3% ¹	9.9% ¹	86
1980-90 Change in College Graduates*	-0.6% ^{2,3}	1.3% ¹	1.9% ¹	86

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 -- Asterisks indicate that at least two groups are significantly different, based on ONEWAY ANOVA tests. Superscript numbers indicate which groups each figure is significantly different from (p<.05), determined through post-hoc 2-tail t-tests. ^Data was not available on every variable for every community, and so the resulting sample sizes are noted.

in non-Latino population experienced significantly greater increases in poverty rates between 1980 and 1990 than communities that did not decline in non-Latino population.

Row 2 shows a slightly different pattern in terms of median income. Groups 1 and 2 both have significantly lower median incomes than communities in which Latino and non-Latino population grew at similar rates. However, the median incomes of the first two types of communities are not significantly different from each other. The same pattern is evident when we look at changes in median incomes from 1980 to 1990 (Row 7). The first two types of communities experienced median income growth of about \$10,000, while communities in which Latino and non-Latino population grew at similar rates experienced median income growth of about \$17,000. Places that are seeing disproportionately large increases in Latino residents are not experiencing mean income growth to the same degree as are places experiencing proportional ethnic growth.

The pattern for high school completion is different from the patterns for both poverty and median income. Communities in which non-Latino population decreased over the last decade show significantly smaller percentages of high school graduates than communities in which non-Latino population grew, regardless of changes in ethnic composition. On average, only 39 percent of adults in communities that lost non-Latino population have graduated from high school, while over 60 percent of the adults in communities that gained non-Latino population have high school degrees. The same pattern holds when we look at changes in the percentage of adults with high school degrees between 1980 and 1990. In communities that lost non-Latino population, the change in the percentage of adults with high school degrees over the last decade was less than one percent. Communities that gained non-Latino population experienced average increases in the percentage of adults with high school degrees of from six to nine percent. Similar patterns emerge regarding the percentage of adults with college degrees. Education levels are more strongly influenced by loss of non-Latino population than by increasing Latino population.

The association of lower community educational levels with loss of non-Latino population is consistent with previous studies that have found educational levels of Latinos to be much lower than those of non-Hispanic whites.¹³ However, it is odd that communities in the second group (those that have increased moderately in non-Latino population and greatly in Latino population) show education levels similar to those in group 3 (communities with similar increases in both populations), but median income levels similar to communities in group 1 (those with decreasing non-Latino population), and poverty levels between the other two groups. While these communities are attracting and keeping residents who have completed high school, these residents are not receiving earnings that match their skill levels.

Correlations of Community Socio-economic Indicators with Latino and non-Latino Population Growth

Table 4 displays correlations of Latino and non-Latino population growth with community well-being variables, measured both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. Rows 1 through 4 display correlations of Latino and non-Latino population growth with 1990 or 1991 figures of community well-being. Rows 5 through 8 show correlations of Latino and non-Latino population growth with changes in community well-being from 1980 to 1990. Population growth is measured as the percentage change in Latino or non-Latino population from 1980 to 1990.¹⁴ Latino population growth and non-Latino population growth are not significantly correlated with each other.

The most important aspect to note in Table 4 is that, with the exception of change in poverty rates (Row 5), the community well-being variables are correlated in the same direction with both Latino and non-Latino population growth. Increase in both Latino and non-Latino population are associated with smaller percentages of community residents in poverty, higher median incomes, more high school and college graduates, larger increases in median income between 1980 and 1990, and larger increases in the percentages of high school and college graduates.

Table 4. Correlations of Community Well-Being Indicators with Latino and Non-Latino Population Growth (n=126)

<i>Indicators of Well-Being</i>	<i>Latino Population Growth</i>	<i>Non-Latino Population Growth</i>
1990 Percent of the Community in Poverty	-.15	-.33
1990 Median Income	.16	.51
1990 % High School Graduates (Adults)	.21	.43
1990 % College Graduates (Adults)	.13	.40
1980-90 Change in Poverty	.01	-.15
1980-90 Change in Median Income	.21	.60
1980-90 Change in High School Graduates	.16	.64
1980-90 Change in College Graduates	.10	.56

Analyses are based on a sample of 126 rural California communities in which Latinos have tended to settle.

Two important conclusions can be made from this finding. First, those communities that are experiencing the most growth in population, both Latino and non-Latino, are doing the best in terms of economic health. It is likely that these communities are attracting migrants due to greater economic opportunities, and in turn spawning greater opportunities due to population growth. Second, increase in Latino population does not produce declining economic conditions in Group 3 rural California communities. Instead, increase in Latino population is associated with better community conditions. While the communities where Latinos are more concentrated are those that are doing more poorly, it is not increasing Latino population alone that is bringing community immiseration. White exodus is a partial cause. Increasing Latino population is associated with better community life in many places. The one concern to this pattern of Latino influx is the change in the community poverty rate from 1980 to 1990, which is lightly correlated with change in Latino population.

Notice also that the correlations associated with non-Latino population growth are much stronger than those associated with Latino population growth. Loss of non-Latino population means loss of better-educated, higher earning residents, and wealth. Gains in non-Latino population mean gains in higher-educated, higher-earning residents with more wealth. While gains in Latino population are a little bit associated with better community conditions, the relationship is not nearly as strong as with gains in non-Latino population.

Overall, communities that lose non-Latino population will have larger proportions of Latino residents, regardless of the magnitude of the increase in Latino population. Communities that experience greater increases in non-Latino population will have smaller proportions of Latino residents. Therefore, the increasing immiseration of communities with high proportions of Latino residents seems to be due more to changes in the non-Latino population, than to changes in Latino population size. Latinos are more likely to be located in communities that are doing poorly, but it is not necessarily increasing Latino population that has made them poor.

RESULTS: PART II

Communities in the San Joaquin Valley: A Qualitative Comparison

On the basis of the quantitative analysis we can infer certain relationships between community Latinization and socio-economic well-being. But examination of the macro conditions of 126 communities obscures the independent development of each place. Each community has individual traits, patterns and progressions of social change. Each community is evolving separately, according to the inherent forces of entrepreneurship, local government, social and human capital. Furthermore, the above analyses raise several questions that cannot be answered with census data: 1) Why are non-Latino Whites leaving some rural communities while settling in others, reportedly nearby? 2) Why are Latinos

showing different settlement patterns than non-Latino whites? Are residents merely “voting by their feet”, that is, changing locations because of differing social costs and benefits between communities, selecting those communities where the benefits of resettlement outweigh the social costs of staying where they are? Or, at another extreme, are people moving because of their ethnic prejudices and related forms of fear and resentment related to cultural conflicts and differences? And 3) what are the implications for the future of California’s rural Latino communities?

Why non-Latino Whites leave and often settle nearby

The migration of non-Hispanic whites, Latinos, and immigrants from Mexico/Latin America has created two very visible patterns within agricultural California: 1) Distinct differences between “Mexican” towns (those that have become almost completely Latino) and “mixed ethnicity” communities (those with a substantial Anglo population); and 2) Latino towns surrounded by mostly Anglo ranches. Anglo residents are moving almost exclusively to communities that contain a substantial proportion of Anglos, or to more remote housing outside of specific cities, while moving out of communities considered “Mexican” towns. Latino residents are also moving to “mixed ethnicity” and ranch areas, but they are not uniformly moving out of communities with large populations of immigrants. Within the geographic area of this study, Reedley, Dinuba, and Exeter are all small communities in which Anglos and middle-class Latinos are settling. These are communities to which non-Latino white people are going, while moving away from Orange Cove, Woodlake, and Cutler/Orosi.

One of the most important reasons for white exodus from high-Latino¹⁵ communities is the influx of immigrants from Mexico and Latin America. Part of this relationship can be simply attributed to prejudice. As one Anglo man in Orange Cove explained the loss of white population, “if you’re racial (i.e., racially prejudiced), you’re not going to live here.” Many respondents indicated that their friends or neighbors felt uncomfortable with the changing ethnicity in their communities, especially as Latinos gained more political and economic power. In one community, residents noted that the

election of a group of Hispanic city officials brought about negative feelings in the Anglo community, and encouraged people to leave. At an elementary school, one secretary noted that many Anglo parents transferred their children from that school with the installation of a new principal.

However, the relationship between immigration and white flight is not solely attributable to prejudice, but also to perceived changes in the quality of community life. Such feelings encourage migration of both Anglos and middle-class Latinos. In the minds of many community residents, immigrants from Mexico and Central America negatively affect community life because their presence brings about overcrowded housing, overcrowded schools, more drunk driving, greater numbers of police and emergency calls, and burdens on the welfare and MediCal systems.

The community changes associated with immigrants are based in observable changes, although their influence on community life depends on subjective interpretation. Overcrowded housing results from the lack of economic resources among immigrants, and the necessity to “double up”¹⁶ so that housing is affordable. Neighbors come to resent such crowded housing, complaining about property deterioration, the quantity of cars blocking the streets, noise, and fights as a result of overcrowding. In the schools, teachers, administrators, and parents discuss the difficulties in keeping up with increasing populations of students. And, in fact, many of the Anglo families who do live in high-Latino communities do not send their children to the local schools, but to private schools in neighboring mixed-ethnicity communities. Finally, problems with drunk driving, fights, and medical emergencies are attributed by many community members to excessive alcohol and drug use among male farmworkers. They note the encouragement of male farmworkers to drink and take drugs due to the stress of being away from their families, the difficult living and working conditions, peer pressure from other male farmworkers, and cultural norms. As a result of all of these factors, people complain that their towns look “dirty” and feel dangerous.¹⁷ Therefore, many of those residents who can afford to leave, do leave, and middle-class residents who are looking for a place to settle choose not to move into the high-Latino

communities.

Another possible explanation for the movement of non-Latino whites from high-Latino communities is the lack of economic opportunities. This was the most frequently mentioned reason for migration out of the communities and lack of settlement in the high-Latino communities. There are few opportunities for high-skill jobs in these communities. Almost all employment consists of fieldwork and packing house jobs. Furthermore, as people commute longer distances to do their shopping, local businesses have a difficult time staying solvent. As business people retire, it is often not profitable for their children to continue the business, and, as a result, their children move out of the community.


However, while lack of economic opportunity is frequently mentioned as a cause of outmigration, its relative importance appears weak. People who do hold high-skill jobs in high-Latino communities rarely live within those communities. Most of the teachers, hospital/clinic workers, police/emergency workers, bank managers, and even city employees in the high-Latino communities do not live within those towns. Instead, they commute from large cities such as Fresno or Visalia that are 30 minutes to two hours away, mixed-ethnicity communities close to their city of employment, or from a country ranch.

In mixed-ethnicity communities most of the high-skill employees do live within the community. In fact, mixed-ethnicity communities also contain many residents who hold high-skill jobs in large cities 30 minutes to two hours away, but who commute from the smaller town because they prefer to live in the country. While mixed-ethnicity towns serve as bedroom communities for commuting city workers, high-Latino towns serve as bedroom communities for commuting farmworkers. Mixed-ethnicity towns serve as homes to many Anglos and middle-class workers in Latino towns, while Latino towns serve as homes to many Latinos and immigrants who work in mixed-ethnicity communities. These communities are not far from each other. However, their ethnic and economic composition determine the types of people who live there, regardless of where their residents work.

Finally, it should be noted that non-Latino white outmigration is part of a cycle, encouraging further exodus through further ethnic concentration and loss of community income. Not only does immigration encourage the loss of non-Latino population, but the loss of non-Latino population encourages immigration. Outmigration of non-Latino population brings the availability of housing that can be rented to multiple families or individuals. Consistent with Fitchen's (1995) findings of settlement of the very poor among rural communities in New York State

movement to Latino communities was availability of affordable housing.

Figure 3 depicts our model of the circular dynamics related to Non-Hispanic White Exodus from particular communities. In general, Latino settlement (see Figure) induces white emigration from particular communities through perceptions of decreased community well-being (deteriorating housing, crowded schools, lowered public safety), increased conflict with increased Latino settlement,



with lower housing costs, migrants to Latino communities are often attracted primarily because of the availability of affordable housing. Fitchen noted that families on welfare were settling in rural communities with affordable housing, despite a lack of jobs, because very poor families were not active in the workforce, anyway. Unlike the families in Fitchen's study, Mexican immigrants to agricultural communities are very active in the labor force. However, because the location of their work varies from job to job, housing affordability is more salient than job proximity for settlement decisions. There is a lack of quality affordable housing for agricultural workers in most of the agricultural communities, and so residents are forced to live in substandard units. As a result, the most commonly mentioned reason for

and an associated ill-ease among Whites with the presence of greater numbers of Latinos. General prejudice seems to prevail against the new settlers of Latinos. White exodus, in turn, encourages further settlement of Latino immigrants, through the greater availability of housing that can be divided up and used to house greater numbers of individuals and families. Non-hispanic white exodus also encourages further exodus through a lowering of community SES, and, therefore, perceptions of greater deterioration in community well-being.

Why Latinos are not showing the same patterns as Whites.

For many of the same reasons that Anglos are moving,¹⁸ middle-class Mexican-Americans are also moving to larger, more ethnically-mixed communities. However, they are not moving out of Latino communities to the same extent as Anglos. In fact, several differences can be seen between Anglos and Mexican Americans that effect their migration patterns.

The first difference that exists is in their relations with immigrants from Mexico and Central America. Mexican-Americans who were born or raised in the United States seem to occupy a buffering position in rural California, between two very dissimilar groups: Anglos and recent immigrants. While there is acknowledgment among these latter two groups of their mutual dependence, there is also distrust and lack of communication. Few Anglos speak any Spanish, while few recent Latino immigrants speak any English. U.S.-born and U.S.-raised Latinos, however, have family and friendship ties with both groups, are economically mixed with both groups, and generally speak both English and some amount of Spanish. Politically, they tend to hold views that vary between Anglos' resentment of the economic burdens of immigrants, and sympathy towards immigrants' situation due to their own roots in the farmworker community.¹⁹ As a result, this group is much less threatened by increasing immigration into their communities. Furthermore, many have taken advantage of the changing ethnicity of their communities and have become successful business people and political leaders. Because of their ties to the immigrant community, and their education in the United States, they are uniquely advantaged in their communities.

Second, many Latinos, especially first generation farmworkers, face structural impediments to migration. Most of the housing in mixed-ethnicity communities is substantially more costly than that in Latino communities. Not only are housing units of the same size more expensive in mixed-ethnicity communities, but the type of housing that is available is of a higher price range. Because Latino families own less wealth, in general, than Anglo families, it is more difficult for them to move to areas with higher-priced housing.

There are also cultural differences between

Anglo and Mexican families that have been suggested to impact migration decisions. Many Latino community residents mentioned the close ties that exist within Mexican families as one reason children stay in the same communities as their parents, despite greater economic opportunities elsewhere. Adult Latinos, they suggest, maintain closer ties with their parents and siblings than do Anglos. Not only do they feel emotional ties, but they help each other economically with educational expenses, house maintenance costs, and general family support. Furthermore, because Anglo children do not stay in the communities in which they were raised, parents are less interested in remaining in these communities after they retire. In fact, some adult Anglo children even encourage their parents to move out of the Latino communities, because they view them as unsafe. Therefore, both younger and older Anglos are more likely to leave Latino communities because of the weaker economic and social ties among parents, children, and siblings.

Finally, it seems that some middle-class Latinos have decided to stay within their communities, despite economic opportunities elsewhere, because of their concern for their communities, and promotion of the well-being of future generations Mexican-Americans. Segura (1992) has noted the desire among many minorities to seek jobs in which they promote the needs of their ethnic community. By staying and working with their communities, Latino community leaders re-affirm their ethnic identities, and receive the satisfaction of knowing that they are contributing to something that is important to them. While a number of Anglo community members also work hard to promote their community, they do not have the ethnic motivation that inspires more of the Latino community members, and their visions for the community sometimes clash with the Latino-majority population, somewhat discouraging their involvement.

Implications for the future of California's rural Latino communities

It is likely that the Latino population in California's agricultural communities will continue to increase throughout the next decade. Interviews with residents of mixed-ethnicity and Latino communities indicated that non-Hispanic white residents are not moving into communities that are considered "Mexican towns." This is true even

among Anglos who find employment in high-Latino communities. Communities that are currently 80 to 90 percent Latino will probably be almost 100 percent Latino in the near future. Ethnically-mixed communities will likely see increased percentages of Latinos over the next decade, but the ethnic change will likely be slower than it has been in those communities that are now predominantly Hispanic. Non-Latinos continue to move into some ethnically-mixed communities, along with Latinos. These communities provide a middle-class, rural, sustainable environment that many people of all ethnicities say they appreciate.

In terms of economic well-being and community life, there are two possibilities for the future of Latino communities. The first is pessimistic. Many people look down on “Mexican towns,” and notice that they seem in continual decline. In fact, they do have problems with low sales and property tax revenue, lack of money for city services, and property deterioration. Unless the economic base of farm labor and packing house incomes increase, or more non-agricultural employment becomes available,²⁰ their economic situation will likely remain below that of mixed-ethnicity communities.

However, it is also possible that these communities will recover economically, once the social and community conflict that often accompanies ethnic transformation begins to heal. Two of the communities studied in-depth in this project showed signs of substantial improvement in terms of a lessening of community political conflict, improved housing, and greater availability of funds for economic development.²¹ In both cases these improved conditions occurred because of decisive victories of Hispanic political leaders, more aggressive city efforts to pursue federal and state grants, and more interest in community redevelopment projects. City employees, and many community residents, showed considerable optimism about the future, based on the city improvements they had accomplished within recent years. People in both places attributed the city improvements primarily to the activities of specific people within the city government, and secondarily to voluntary efforts of community members.

Workers in both cities also contrasted the recent improvements to periods of community stagnation, and remarked on the political conflict that has existed

in their communities. Finally, several business and political leaders mentioned the economic potential that exists in Latino communities, if the appropriate businesses and business climate could be developed. As one county government official remarked about a 95% Latino community, “the market now is second and third generation Mexican Americans. Already, this community has developed (one business) that attracts Latinos from all over the area. If similar businesses could be developed and expanded, the potential for this community is great.”

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Previous research has assumed that the relative differences in Latino population in varying rural communities are due to relative differences in Latino population growth resulting from low-skill job availability, lack of economic opportunity in Mexico and Central America, and social networks among migrants. However, we have shown that the relative differences in ethnic population concentration in rural California communities should, instead, be attributed to varying growth patterns among non-Latino whites, rather than to differing patterns of Latino population growth. Communities that are gaining in white population have smaller percentages of Latinos than do communities that are losing white population. This does not mean that Latino immigration is an unimportant factor in the ethnic transformation of rural California. Rather, it is because Latino population is increasing in all of these communities that its significance in determining the relative change in population composition is negligible. Furthermore, interviews with non-Latino residents in rural California indicate that it is often the increasing size of the Latino population that encourages migration from high-Latino places to places with a more even ethnic population composition. This white outmigration in turn encourages greater immigration of Latinos as well as further outmigration of non-Hispanic whites. In sum, theories that stress job-related factors to explain either Latino or white population growth are not as strongly supported as theories of changing socialization. Generally, social networks among Latinos, and the lack of social capital between immigrants and non-Hispanic whites, better explain the relative differences in ethnic population composition in the communities under study.

Because relative differences in ethnic composition are highly correlated with poverty rates, education levels, and median incomes, it has been assumed that increasing Latino population brings about decreased community well-being. However, we have shown that this is not always the case. Communities that experienced more growth in Latino population from 1980 to 1990 also experienced more growth in median income levels and in the percentages of residents with higher levels of education.

Such findings support multiple theoretical perspectives on community inequality, highlighting the interaction of multiple determinants of economic well-being. We find, for example, that the concept of uneven development accompanying agricultural restructuring is supported by the finding that poverty does not usually accompany increases in median income growth that accompanies increased Latino population in a community. While some community members benefit from immigration, increased community income does not, in general, reduce poverty levels. We also find that white and middle-class Latino exodus resulting from negative feelings about low-SES immigrants is a very important factor in determining the economic well-being of rural communities. As these community members tend to be more affluent and better educated, their loss significantly affects the overall well-being of a community. The creation of high-skill or high-pay jobs in high-Latino communities would not necessarily retain a greater number of high-skill residents, as they would likely commute to work from other places. Finally, lack of horizontal social networks between Anglo/Latino or middle/low SES residents seems to greatly hinder communities' abilities to take advantage of programs available for community improvement. The future of high-Latino communities is not entirely pessimistic. Nonetheless, we see the need for several communities to address social issues of ethnicity, incorporation of new settlers, sustainable employment, political conflict, and community leadership. Admittedly, our research may have barely touched the surface of other issues as well.

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Endnotes

¹Allensworth and Rochín 1995

²e.g., SCR 43 Task Force 1989; Rochín Monica Castillo 1995.

³see Swanson, 1990, for a discussion of the cause-effect debate regarding farm and community structure.

⁴More than 50% of the San Joaquin Valley's work force is now hired through farm labor contractors (Krissman 1995).

⁵Martin (1995) makes the connection between these trends by noting the irony in the fact that there is so much debate over low-wage manufacturing jobs leaving the U.S., while an expanding fruit, vegetable and horticultural agriculture that depends on low-wage immigrant labor is expanding in California!

⁶In the 1980's, Texas lost a lawsuit in which it tried to refrain from educating undocumented workers (McLemore and Romo 1985). In 1994 California passed a similar proposal (Proposition 187), and Florida is presently experiencing a movement for similar policies.

⁷Many California communities are physically segregated by roads, railroad tracks and rivers (Chacon 1986; Acuna 1984).

⁸Latino and immigrant families are, on average, larger, with more dependent children, than white and non-immigrant families (Allensworth and Rochín 1995; Castillo 1991; Palerm 1990).

⁹"Places" include all incorporated places and census designated places. Census designated places are densely settled concentrations of population that are identifiable by name, but are not legally incorporated (Census of Population and Housing, 1990: Summary Table File 3 Technical Documentation prepared by the Bureau of the Census. — Washington: The Bureau, 1993).

¹⁰Over 95% of the population of these rural communities are either "white, non-Latino" or "Latino." Throughout rural California there is rarely a significant number of Asian, Black and other racial/ethnic groups.

¹¹Notice, however, that the chart displayed population growth in absolute numbers, while the table displays percentage growth of each ethnic population. Percentage growth is figured as the percentage increase in population from 1980 to 1990. For example, a community that grew from a population of 1000 Latinos in 1980 to 2000 Latinos in 1990 would have a 100% increase in Latino population. A community that decreased from a population of 1000 non-Latino whites in 1980 to 500 whites in 1990 would have a -50% population growth in non-Latino population.

¹²1980 - 90 change in Latino and non-Latino population are not significantly correlated with each other.

¹³e.g., Trejo, Stephen. 1995. "Why Do Mexican-Americans Earn Low Wages?" Paper presented at the conference "Latinos in California," in Riverside, CA, Oct. 20-21.

¹⁴For example, a community that grew from a population of 1000 Latinos in 1980 to 2000 Latinos in 1990 would have a 100% increase in Latino population. A community that decreased from a population of 1000 non-Latino whites in 1980 to 500 whites in 1990 would have a -50% population growth.

¹⁵We call communities that are over 80 percent Latino "high Latino" communities.

¹⁶Many of the people interviewed remarked on the high number of immigrants that live together in single dwellings. One Orange Cove woman who works for the census noted that she found as many as 17 people living together in a one-bedroom apartment when she was collecting data in 1990.

¹⁷However, it should be noted that crime in these communities is not high. Most Latino community members and police/emergency workers do not report a significant problem, compared to larger communities. Furthermore, the perception of towns as "dirty" seems to differ remarkably depending on the person who is speaking, and involves more than the actual appearance of the communities.

¹⁸i.e., better shopping, more activities, higher-quality housing, less poverty, less crowded schools

¹⁹Almost all of the U.S.-born or raised Latinos with whom we spoke picked fruit as children with their parents.

²⁰Many of these cities are searching for alternative employment by trying to attract tourism, prison development, or non-agricultural manufacturing. However, opposition is generally met by growers who worry about water availability and labor costs.

²¹Development monies in both of these cities were used for low-income residents, rather than for business-owners, or higher-income residents as in other communities studied. City governments in both of these communities seemed to show a greater commitment to helping low-income farm worker families than did the employees of ethnically-diverse communities. They attributed this concern to their own backgrounds as farm workers.

Appendix A. Communities Used in Community Typology

Community	Group	Growth in Non-Latino Population (1980-90)	Growth in Latino Population (1980-90)	1980 Population	1990 Population	Percent Latino in 1980	Percent Latino in 1990
Arbuckle	2	9%	123%	1,306	1,912	33%	50%
Armona	2	1%	81%	2,644	3,122	21%	32%
Arvin	1	-19%	75%	6,863	9,286	58%	75%
August	2	3%	68%	5,445	6,376	22%	31%
Avenal	3	100%	181%	4,137	9,770	45%	53%
Avocado Heights	1	-9%	45%	11,721	14,232	56%	67%
Banning	2	38%	86%	14,020	20,570	18%	23%
Barstow	3	19%	28%	17,690	21,472	30%	31%
Beaumont	2	34%	73%	6,818	9,685	20%	24%
Bloomington	1	-7%	106%	12,781	15,116	23%	40%
Blythe	3	10%	44%	6,805	8,428	40%	46%
Borrego Springs	2	45%	128%	1,405	2,244	17%	25%
Brawley	1	-7%	51%	14,946	18,923	58%	69%
Buttonwillow	1	-30%	47%	1,350	1,301	35%	52%
Calexico	1	-3%	31%	14,412	18,633	94%	96%
Calipatria	1	-21%	13%	2,636	2,690	67%	74%
Calistoga	2	6%	57%	3,879	4,468	18%	25%
Carpinteria	2	16%	51%	10,835	13,747	31%	37%
Caruthers	1	-6%	45%	1,514	1,603	23%	32%
Castroville	1	-6%	29%	4,396	5,272	74%	79%
Cathedral City	3	526%	904%	4,130	30,085	27%	37%
Citrus	1	-46%	40%	12,450	9,481	26%	48%
Coachella	1	-19%	98%	9,129	16,896	89%	95%
Coalinga	2	2%	141%	6,593	8,212	16%	32%
Colusa	2	2%	98%	4,075	4,934	20%	32%
Corcoran	3	107%	107%	6,454	13,364	52%	52%
Cutler	1	-38%	51%	3,149	4,450	89%	95%
Del Rey	1	-32%	5%	1,126	1,150	92%	95%
Delano	3	22%	50%	16,491	22,762	57%	62%
Dinuba	1	-1%	60%	9,907	12,743	49%	60%
Dixon	3	34%	48%	7,541	10,401	27%	28%
Dos Palos	2	6%	119%	3,123	4,196	25%	41%
Earlimart	1	-14%	45%	4,578	5,881	73%	82%
East Blythe	1	-22%	15%	1,660	1,511	36%	45%
East Porterville	1	-10%	53%	5,218	5,790	33%	46%
Easton	1	-9%	52%	1,710	1,877	31%	43%
El Rio	1	-5%	27%	5,674	6,419	57%	64%
Esparto	3	13%	16%	1,303	1,487	29%	30%
Exeter	2	15%	107%	5,606	7,276	16%	26%
Fallbrook	2	42%	119%	14,041	22,095	20%	28%
Farmersville	1	-20%	57%	5,544	6,235	42%	58%
Fillmore	1	-2%	55%	9,602	11,992	48%	59%

Appendix A. Communities Used in Community Typology (continued)

Community	Group	Growth in Non-Latino Population (1980-90)	Growth in Latino Population (1980-90)	1980 Population	1990 Population	Percent Latino in 1980	Percent Latino in 1990
Firebaugh	1	-24%	37%	3,740	4,429	70%	81%
Fowler	2	3%	55%	2,496	3,208	48%	58%
Freedom	1	-12%	83%	6,416	8,361	44%	62%
Galt	3	52%	100%	5,514	8,889	20%	25%
Garden Acres	2	1%	75%	7,361	8,547	21%	31%
Gonzales	1	-10%	94%	2,891	4,660	68%	82%
Greenfield	2	21%	107%	4,181	7,464	67%	77%
Gridley	2	3%	78%	3,982	4,631	17%	26%
Grover City	2	27%	57%	8,827	11,656	17%	20%
Guadalupe	2	2%	68%	3,629	5,479	75%	83%
Hamilton	1	-10%	64%	1,337	1,811	62%	75%
Hollister	3	63%	71%	11,488	19,212	55%	56%
Holtville	1	-22%	44%	4,399	4,820	48%	62%
Home Garden	1	-12%	34%	1,495	1,549	35%	45%
Home Gardens	1	-5%	93%	5,783	7,780	40%	58%
Hughson	1	-2%	47%	2,943	3,259	27%	36%
Huron	1	-30%	82%	2,768	4,766	91%	96%
Imperial	1	-13%	77%	3,451	4,113	36%	53%
Ivanhoe	1	-17%	120%	2,684	3,293	29%	52%
Kerman	2	3%	92%	4,002	5,448	37%	53%
Kettleman City	1	-59%	52%	1,051	1,411	84%	95%
King City	1	-10%	91%	5,495	7,634	49%	67%
Lake Elsinore	3	176%	342%	5,982	18,285	18%	26%
Lamont	1	-33%	58%	9,616	11,517	58%	77%
Las Lomas	1	-17%	54%	1,740	2,127	55%	69%
Lathrop	3	68%	119%	3,717	6,841	32%	38%
Laton	2	5%	63%	1,100	1,415	41%	51%
Lenwood	3	7%	9%	2,974	3,190	28%	28%
Lincoln	3	86%	49%	4,132	7,248	29%	25%
Lindsay	1	-21%	68%	6,924	8,338	47%	65%
Live Oak City	2	18%	99%	3,103	4,320	26%	37%
Livingston	1	-5%	65%	5,326	7,317	61%	73%
Lockeford	2	45%	56%	1,852	2,722	17%	18%
London	1	-46%	94%	1,257	1,638	55%	81%
McFarland	1	-4%	49%	5,151	7,005	76%	83%
Mecca	1	-52%	25%	1,698	1,966	88%	95%
Mendota	1	-46%	50%	5,038	6,821	85%	94%
Mira Loma	3	61%	180%	8,707	15,786	17%	26%
Moorpark	3	959%	161%	4,030	25,494	53%	22%
Morgan Hill	3	42%	36%	17,060	23,928	24%	23%
Muscoy	1	-5%	116%	6,188	7,541	22%	40%
Needles	3	27%	20%	4,120	5,191	18%	17%

Appendix A. Communities Used in Community Typology (continued)

Community	Group	Growth in Non-Latino Population (1980-90)	Growth in Latino Population (1980-90)	1980 Population	1990 Population	Percent Latino in 1980	Percent Latino in 1990
Niland	3	5%	31%	1,042	1,183	31%	36%
Oakley	3	771%	240%	2,816	18,374	41%	21%
Oceano	2	28%	58%	4,478	6,169	32%	36%
Orange Cove	1	-30%	66%	4,026	5,604	72%	86%
Orosi	1	-4%	59%	4,076	5,486	61%	72%
Pajaro	1	0%	158%	1,426	3,332	85%	93%
Parkwood	2	39%	55%	1,146	1,659	36%	39%
Parlier	1	-12%	192%	2,902	7,938	91%	97%
Patterson	3	141%	103%	3,908	8,626	53%	48%
Perris	3	185%	284%	6,827	21,460	29%	36%
Piru	0	-16%	-8%	1,284	1,157	74%	75%
Pixley	1	-14%	32%	2,488	2,457	28%	37%
Planada	1	-8%	60%	2,406	3,531	81%	88%
Poplar-Cotton	2	18%	112%	1,295	1,901	31%	45%
Port Hueneme	3	4%	50%	17,803	20,319	23%	30%
Porterville	2	30%	112%	19,707	29,563	25%	35%
Rainbow	0	160%	-1%	1,092	2,006	47%	25%
Richgrove	3	21%	39%	1,398	1,899	83%	85%
Riverbank	2	34%	80%	5,695	8,547	35%	42%
Rubidoux	2	13%	183%	17,048	24,367	18%	35%
San Jacinto	3	116%	159%	7,098	16,210	30%	34%
San Joaquin	1	-26%	50%	1,930	2,311	60%	75%
San Juan Bautista	3	24%	22%	1,276	1,570	46%	45%
Sanger	3	7%	49%	12,542	16,839	66%	73%
Seeley	1	-33%	73%	1,058	1,228	46%	69%
Selma	2	3%	67%	10,942	14,757	50%	61%
Shafter City	1	-10%	82%	7,010	8,409	33%	50%
Soledad	1	-26%	30%	5,928	7,146	83%	89%
St. Helena	1	-4%	30%	4,898	4,990	16%	21%
Strathmore	1	-9%	103%	1,955	2,353	26%	44%
Tehachapi	2	37%	52%	4,126	5,791	20%	21%
Terra Bella	2	2%	89%	1,807	2,740	57%	71%
Tipton	1	-3%	69%	1,185	1,383	27%	39%
Tracy	3	88%	67%	18,428	33,558	27%	24%
Walnut	3	124%	167%	12,478	29,105	21%	23%
Walnut Park	1	-59%	51%	11,811	14,722	76%	92%
Wasco	1	-9%	70%	9,613	12,412	48%	63%
Weedpatch	1	-48%	58%	1,553	1,892	66%	86%
Westmorland	0	-29%	-5%	1,590	1,380	66%	72%
Williams	1	-1%	210%	1,655	2,297	19%	42%
Woodlake	1	-6%	51%	4,343	5,678	65%	75%
Woodville	1	-44%	44%	1,507	1,557	54%	75%