The Latino Mayors:
San Antonio Politics and Policies

Sharon Navarro

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The Midwest’s premier Hispanic center undertaking research on issues of relevance to the Hispanic community in the social sciences and economic and community development. JSRI is a unit of University Outreach and Engagement at Michigan State University.
ABSTRACT

San Antonio, Texas is the seventh largest city in the U.S. and the second largest city in Texas with a minority majority Latino population. It is the fastest growing of the top 10 largest cities in the U.S. Despite its Latino demographic dominance, San Antonio has only had three modern Latino Mayors: Henry Cisneros, Edward Garza, and, Julian Castro. This essay examines why this city has had only a few Latino mayors and what it takes for such candidates to win the mayoral office. This essay concludes with the following findings. First, time and opportunity are critical to winning an election. Second, for a minority candidate to win the mayoral office, a coalition is necessary. Third, serving on the city council is a necessary apprenticeship for winning office. This report is significant for understanding the political incorporation of Latino mayors into American politics. All three Latino mayors highlight the importance of consensus building, cooperation, and the absence of a confrontational spirit, which is key for Latinos to have a place at the table.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Sharon Navarro

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Introduction

One might think that in a city like San Antonio, home to Henry B. Gonzalez (the first Hispanic Congressman in Texas) and Henry Cisneros (the first Hispanic mayor of a modern-day city, then Secretary of Housing and Urban Development under President Clinton), a city with a Hispanic population of nearly 60%, that these would be just a few of many Hispanic politicians. Not so. Before Cisneros, there was a long string of losing mayoral bids. According to Heywood Sanders, professor of public administration at the University of Texas-San Antonio, “San Antonio’s electorate is much divided along racial and ethnic lines. Anglo districts vote for Anglos; Hispanics vote for Hispanics (Zars, 2001, p. 6). However, because of what Sanders calls the “turnout differential,” an Anglo can more easily win a mayoral election because Anglos are more likely to vote than Hispanics. If you are a Hispanic candidate, you’ve got to win the Anglo vote, or at least a good chunk of it. Conventional wisdom has it that in the past, some mayoral hopefuls were too stridently Hispanic and thus failed to gain enough votes from the predominately Anglo north side. This essay examines the maturation and evolution of Latino politics in San Antonio through the city’s Latino mayors. The framework consists of the following themes: theory of representation, background on mayoral elections and re-elections; the role of minority coalitions; the mayors’ relationships with city council, other government institutions, and the city’s business community; and finally, major policy and governing challenges and successes.

Theory of Representation

A largely untold story in American politics is the ascension of Latinos to elected office nationwide. The election of Latinos to office creates the potential for different types of representation. Hanna Pitkins (1967) posits four levels of representation. The first level is formal representation, where officials are empowered to act on behalf of other by a process that enables the representative to attain more authority than those being represented. This takes place through the institutional arrangement such as elections. A second level, descriptive representation, the elected representative reflects the social characteristics of the people he or she represents. At the third level, symbolic representation, a representative is accepted and supported by the community that elected him or her to office. This is important to study because elected Latino officials often become role models in their communities. If a candidate or officeholder is identified by the community not just as a symbol of individual achievement but also as a representative of the community’s values and aspirations, then symbolic representation has been achieved. A fourth level is substantive representation. At this level, an elected representative is expected to act “in the interests of the represented in a manner responsive and to them” (Pitkin, 1967, p.209). There is a perceived close connection between the representative and represented. Mayors Cisneros, Garza, and Castro mastered these four types of representation.

SAN ANTONIO

San Antonio is the seventh most populous city in the U.S. and the second most populous city in the state of Texas, with 1.3 million residents. It is the fourth-largest city in the country with a majority minority Hispanic population (Koehler, 2013, p. 56) Of the 1.3 million people living in San Antonio, 62.5% are Hispanic, 27.4% are White, 6.5% are African American, 1.9% are Asian, 1.3% are two or more races,
.1% are American Indian, .09% are Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander, and .07 identify as Other (Mackun and Wilson, 2011).

San Antonio was the fastest growing of the top 10 largest cities in the country from 2000–2010, and the second from 1990–2000 (Mackun and Wilson, 2011). The city is located in the American Southwest, the south-central part of Texas, and the southwestern corner of an urban region known as the Texas Triangle. San Antonio has a strong military base and is home to five Fortune 500 companies and the South Texas Medical Center, the only medical research and care provider (“Who We Are,” 2014) in the south Texas, which is a region famous for Spanish missions, the Alamo, the River Walk, the Tower of the Americas, the Alamo Bowl, and SeaWorld and Six Flags Fiesta Texas theme parks. The city is visited by approximately 26 million tourists per year (“San Antonio Convention and Visitor’s Bureau,” 2013) and home to the NBA champion San Antonio Spurs, Valero PGA Golf, and the annual San Antonio Stock Show and Rodeo, one of the largest in the country.

The City of San Antonio runs under a council-manager form of government. The city is divided into ten council districts designed to ensure equal population distribution between all districts. Each district elects one person to sit on the city council with the mayor elected on a citywide basis. All members of the city council, which includes the mayor, are elected to two-year terms and limited to a total of four terms. All positions are elected on non-partisan ballots as required by Texas law.

The mayor and the city council are the community’s key decision makers. They focus on the provision and efficiency of basic services; their districts’ growth; capital improvement projects; land use and development; the city’s financial growth and economic development; as well as other important issues. A council member must become a “Mayoral Apprentice.” A term or two as a council member can be invaluable as a political apprenticeship. First, it gives a person name recognition. Second, since 1975, all mayors of San Antonio have first served on the council (Wolff, 2008, p. 21).

The mayor has only one vote on the city council and very little other structural power (the city manager is institutionally powerful), but because the mayor’s office is the only city-wide, elected office, it carries a certain weight (Zars, 2001, p.9). The mayor presides over council meetings, has limited or no veto power and for the most part has only the same legislative authority as members of the council. The mayor has important ceremonial powers such as signing proclamations and issuing city keys to dignitaries. According to the city charter, the mayor and each member of the council is paid $20 per attended meeting. The mayor is paid an additional $3,000 annually. Although the office is institutionally weak, a high-profile mayor can wield considerable political influence.

**MAYORS, ELECTIONS, AND RE-ELECTIONS**

Henry Gabriel Cisneros was born in 1947 to George and Elvira (Munguia) Cisneros in San Antonio, Texas, in a neighborhood that bordered the city’s predominantly Mexican west side barrio (now the city’s inner west side). Cisneros received a Catholic school education, first at the Church of the Little Flower, followed by attendance at Central Catholic Marianist High School in San Antonio. He entered Texas A&M

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[1] South Texas Medical Center consists of 75 medically related institutions, one higher education institution, 12 major hospitals and more than 45 clinics, other offices and non-medical businesses see “Who We Are,” South Texas Medical Center. Retrieved December 20, 2014 from http://southtexas.med.com/who-we-are
University in 1964. In his sophomore year, he switched his major from aeronautical engineering to city management. In 1967, Cisneros was selected to attend the annual Student Conference on United States Affairs at West Point where he first learned that U.S. cities were in serious trouble (Gardner, 1993, p. 167). Relating what he heard at the meeting to the problems of his largely poor hometown, plus a visit to New York City, was a personal and professional turning point for him. Graduating from Texas A&M with a Bachelor of Arts in 1968, he went on to earn a Master of Arts in Urban and Regional Planning in 1970 from Texas A&M. He earned an additional master’s in public administration from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in 1973, studied urban economics and conducted doctoral research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1974, and capped his graduate education by receiving a Doctor of Public Administration from George Washington University in 1976 (Gardner, 1993, p. 167).

Cisneros’ community-building career began in urban public service, setting in motion a focus he would maintain throughout his entire career and beyond. The summer after earning his undergraduate degree, he worked in the office of the City Manager of San Antonio. While earning his master’s degree from Texas A&M, Cisneros worked in the office of the City Manager of Bryan, Texas, and later as the assistant director of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Model Cities program for urban revitalization in San Antonio (Suro, 1992, 1A-2A).

When Cisneros arrived back home, he discovered the old order: a stagnant political and economic climate in a city experiencing growing socio-ethnic discontent. Since the 1950s, the Anglo-dominated Good Government League (GGL) had run the city in which council members were elected at-large and the majority came from wealthy neighborhoods in the Anglo-populated north side (Echrenbach, 2008, 11B) Mexican-American community residents believed they had been neglected for too long by a government that paid more attention to city growth in their residential areas than to grievances about drainage and infrastructure in lower-valued neighborhoods. The GGL tried to offset this by assurances to members and by recruiting Hispanics in their slates for city council (Rosales, 2000). Displaying his gift for working within the system, Cisneros ran as a city council candidate of the GGL. Only eight months after his return to San Antonio and a whirlwind campaign, 27-year-old Henry Cisneros was elected in 1975, the youngest city councilman in the city’s history. Now entrenched in city politics, Cisneros assumed a hands-on approach to governing that he had promised in his campaign. He set off on a plan to learn firsthand about life in the city, manually emptying garbage cans to understand the problems of the sanitation department, walking a beat with a police officer, and administering first aid with ambulance attendants. Cisneros also visited families in public housing units, and assured them that they would no longer be ignored (Rosales, 2000). As a city council member, Cisneros took assorted populist positions on issues such as labor, water, education, and housing, among others. All the while he endeared himself to the Latino community, especially in the city’s predominantly poor Mexican-American neighborhoods on the west side, where he resided.

Because of the GGL’s continued authority, the city council was still roundly criticized for not being adequately representative. During the civil-rights furor of the 1960s, the Voting Rights Act signed into law in 1965 required that racial groups be given direct representation by political districts to assure the election of a member. Significantly, in a split vote on the city council on whether to accept a Department of Justice order to establish an election plan that would provide more access to the Latino community
with direct representation or challenge the order in court, Cisneros voted to accept the order. San Antonio thus moved to single-member, directly represented districts in 1977. This presented Cisneros with an opportunity for two reasons: first, it signified the beginning of the end for the GGL, and second, it provided an increased chance of an election of a minority candidate—namely, himself—to mayoral office.

Cisneros was re-elected to the city council in 1977 and again in 1979 as a representative of San Antonio Council District 1. During this time, Cisneros formed a relationship with Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS), a powerful Latino grassroots-advocacy group founded in 1973 whose focus was to push for development funding into the city’s Latino communities. His attention to the need for infrastructure to the lower-income, Mexican-American neighborhoods further elevated Cisneros’ standing in the Latino community. Yet at the same time, Cisneros also looked forward to building a greater San Antonio and the socially redeeming power that comes with economic growth. As a city councilman from 1975 to 1979, Cisneros formed a political bridge between the pro-growth business interests and the underrepresented Mexican-American community. He “enjoyed the resources and visibility of the GGL establishment without being confined to its agenda,” and “built an image of an articulate, smooth, Harvard and MIT educated man” (Harrigan, 1987, p. 136). Cisneros was also a local boy who “cared about the problems of the common person” (Diehl and Jarboe, 1985, p.20). He served for six years (three terms) on the City Council before announcing himself as an independent candidate for mayor in 1981. All across the city, Cisneros was rallying people around a comprehensive blueprint for change. In his initial speech as a mayoral candidate, “the message came across: Forget ethnicity, forget youth, forget ambition. Henry had a program, one you could subscribe to and his opponent did not” (Wolff, 2008, p.17-18). He based his campaign on five position papers. Leading with his long suit, he emphasized economic development, including a plan to create more and better-paying jobs by diversifying San Antonio’s economy and enhancing education. The other four positions included budget and fiscal policy, crime and neighborhood services, streets and drainage, and energy development. Although he did not say where he would garner the power to accomplish the plan, he promised that he would take personal responsibility to make it happen (Wolff, 2008, p. 3).

His campaign of a hopeful vision for the future of the city was able to unite the wealthy conservatives of San Antonio and the increasingly vocal Mexican-American community. On April 4, 1981, Cisneros became, at age 33, the second Hispanic mayor of a major U.S. city, and the first Mexican-American Mayor of San Antonio since 1842, when Mayor Juan Seguin resigned. He was elected with 62% of the vote. At the time of his election, San Antonio was the tenth-largest city in the country. Cisneros was re-elected to three more terms as Mayor by overwhelming margins, including an unprecedented 94.2% of the vote in 1983, a 73% margin of victory in 1985, and 67% in 1987. A significant factor in Mayor Cisneros’ elections was the formulation of Target ’90, a citywide coalition, in 1983 (Wolff, 2008, p.20). This is discussed in greater detail later in the essay.

Edward Garza was born in 1969 to Martin and Evangelina Garza in San Antonio, Texas. He is a third-generation San Antonian. At age 32, he became Mayor of San Antonio. Both parents were active in school and civic affairs and involved their sons in neighborhood work for local candidates at an early age. Garza began block walking at the age of eight. His first foray into politics came when he ran and lost a race for student council president at Woodlawn Elementary School. Years later, he was elected president of the 1986 graduating class at Jefferson High School. Garza said he became involved in politics because the
process intrigued him and offered opportunities to meet people. The transitioning Jefferson neighborhood where he grew up in the 1980s also played a role in his interest in changing the status quo (Casey, 2001, p. 3A).

Shortly after his mother’s death, when Garza was 18, he became involved in his neighborhood association. He organized his block on West Magnolia Street to protest its exclusion from the neighborhood association plan that was under development. His efforts led to its inclusion. It also led to a job as an aide to former District 7 Councilwoman Yolanda Vera. In 1993, after graduating from Texas A&M, he received an internship from the Shell Oil Company and the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials that allowed him to work for State Representative Pete Gallegos, and then U.S. Representative Frank Tejeda in Washington DC (Casey, 2001, p. 3A). In 1994, he obtained a master’s degree in land development and went to work for Baxter Southwest, a local commercial real estate firm. He was allowed time off when Gallegos called him back to Austin to be his aide in 1995. After the legislative session, Garza returned to San Antonio, where he was elected president of the Jefferson Neighborhood Association later that year (Casey, 2001, p. 3A).

Garza next set his sights on the San Antonio City Council. In his first stab at public office in 1997, Garza faced six opponents and won without a runoff by claiming more than twice as many voters as his nearest competitor. At age 30, Garza was one of the youngest San Antonians ever elected from City Council District 7 and went unchallenged when he won re-election two years later. The reforms he sponsored or helped shape while serving on the council include a process to link revenues from annexations to inner-city revitalization activities, reorganization of the city’s housing delivery system, initiation of a comprehensive neighborhood planning process, establishment of tax increment financing zones that brought quality housing to homeowners in Edgewood School District, and park improvements in District 7. This platform allowed him to build support from Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS).

Garza decided to run for mayor because the city’s two-term limit forced him to step down from his council seat; however, he was not ready to resign from political office. In May of 2001, Garza engaged in his first mayoral run. His political message, “leadership that can be trusted,” de-emphasized ethnic and class differences while reaching a wide constituency (Sylvester, 2001, p. 1A). He defined key campaign issues that included balanced growth and neighborhood revitalization. He believed in education, higher-paying jobs, and quality of life issues such as traffic congestion. He was able to garner donations from a diverse group of supporters, including the business community, labor unions, and trial lawyers (Sylvester, 2001, p. 1A)-raising $638,000 for his first mayoral run. Garza used the money to do something no other Hispanic candidate had done: he beat a major north side candidate on his own turf. In Henry Cisneros’s first mayoral race in 1981, he ran an ambitious citywide campaign, but did not carry the north side (Casey, 2001, p.3A).

Cisneros won by a slightly higher margin than Garza, approximately doubling the turnout among Hispanics in older parts of the city (Casey, 2001, p. 3A). Garza carried the north side by running a north side campaign; that is, appealing to the Anglo voter. He chose not to hire Joann Ramon, a Democratic consultant, as his campaign manager and one of the most experienced political operatives in town, whose

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2 In 2008, San Antonio voters relaxed these terms limits to four two-year terms. See Josh Baugh. (2011, April 7). “Effects of New Term Limits are beginning to Take Hold.” San Antonio Express News, pp.1B.
base is on the southeast side of the city (Casey, 2001, p. 3A). Instead, Garza hired Trish DeBerry, who had a background in public relations rather than politics (Casey, 2001, p. 3A). Garza carried the politically prized northern Districts 8, 9, and 10, which comprise 45% of voter turnout in the city. “I think Hispanic mayors can now go to the north side and preach to voters there,” said Henry Flores, a St. Mary’s University political scientist (Castillo and Sylvester, 2001, p. 1A).

Redistricting numbers from the 2000 census show that the north side is not what it used to be demographically. While still a stronghold of predominately Anglo voters, the fastest-growing area of the city became more diverse, particularly Hispanic, than it was ten years previously (Castillo, 2001, p. 1A). In the heavily Hispanic District 5 on the west side, 87% of voters supported Garza over his primary opponent, Councilman Tim Bannwolf. In Garza’s own District 7, which runs from the west to the northwest side of the city, he garnered 74% of the vote (Castillo, 2001, p.1A). With all ballots counted, Ed Garza had 59,039 votes to 28,562 for Councilman Tim Bannwolf and 8,055 for Art Hall (“San Antonio Elects Mayor,” 2000, p. 9A).

Both Garza and Cisneros insist that San Antonio and its politics have changed dramatically in the 20 years since Cisneros was first elected. Cisneros’ victories involved a deft touch of reaching out to the business community while remaining entrenched in the grassroots organizing strategy of getting barrio voters to the polls. Garza garnered virtually every Hispanic voter as well, but he pulled out his big victory with an aggressive and expensive television-media strategy that was doggedly pragmatic. He targeted voters who were most likely to go to the polls—both Anglo and Hispanic. Where Cisneros succeeded through the force of charisma, Garza used a million-dollar media strategy to convey a message to the city that he was a nice guy (Sylvester, 2001, p. 5B). This same election strategy propelled him to a second term, and in May of 2003, Garza was re-elected with 68% of the vote. His opponent, Shirley Thompson, received 25.5%, followed by Michael Idrogo with 6.2% (Anderson, 2003, p. 1A).

Julian Castro was born in San Antonio, in 1974, to Maria "Rosie" Castro and Jessie Guzman. He was raised on the west side of San Antonio and, like Ed Garza, attended Jefferson High School. He is the identical twin brother of US Congressman Joaquín Castro. His mother was a Chicana political activist who helped establish the Chicano political party, La Raza Unida. She ran unsuccessfully for San Antonio City Council in 1971. His father, Jessie Guzman, was a community activist in the 1970s, and a retired math teacher. Castro credits his mother for introducing him and his brother to politics and has said, "My mother is probably the biggest reason that my brother and I are in public service. Growing up, she would take us to a lot of rallies and organizational meetings and other things that are very boring for an 8-, 9-, 10-year-old" (Fernandez, 2012, p.10).

In college, Julian majored in communications and political science and tied his brother for the most votes in the student senate election during their junior year. During the summer of 1994, he was a White House intern. Julian joined Alianza, a Hispanic organization at Harvard Law School and served on the Law School Council, but his thoughts were on San Antonio politics (Chafets, 2010, p. 38-43). In 2000, Castro held his first political fundraiser while still a student at Harvard—his classmates ponied up $2,000. He was elected to the San Antonio City Council less than a year after returning home from Cambridge, MA (Romano, 2013, p. 1-9).

Castro was elected to the San Antonio City Council in 2001, winning 61% of the vote against five challengers. He was the youngest city councilman in San Antonio history, beating out former Mayor and
Housing and Urban Development Secretary Henry Cisneros, who won his council seat in 1975 when he was 27 years old. Castro represented District 7, a precinct on the city’s west side with 115,000 residents. The population was 70% Hispanic and included a large number of senior citizens. As councilman from 2001 to 2005, he cast two votes that earned him a reputation as anti-business and anti-development. This negative label would later haunt him during his first mayoral run.

Castro ran for Mayor of San Antonio in 2005 and was widely viewed as the front-runner in a field that also included retired judge Phil Hardberger and conservative City Councilman Carroll Schubert. This first run for mayor was unsuccessful after a few amateurish mistakes—a shoddy contributions report, an ethics reprimand, a “Parent Trap” incident in which Joaquín was accused of standing in for Julián at a local event (Romano, 2013, pp. 1-9). Moreover, Castro’s mother, Rosie, cast a shadow: Julian found it hard to raise money in the Anglo business community, and he had to work hard to reassure voters that he was not just a barrio candidate. It was not just the Rosie factor that hurt his candidacy; Former Mayor Ed Garza was widely regarded as lackluster, and voters were not in the mood for another graduate from Jefferson High School like Garza (“San Antonio Mayor Julian Castro Shares Goals for Third Term,” 2013, Retrieved from http://www.ksat.com/news.castroreadyforthirdterm). In the end, Castro lost his first mayoral bid because San Antonio’s moneyed players thought he was too young, too ambitious, and too loyal to his activist Hispanic roots. As an inner-city council member from 2001 to 2005, Castro opposed a PGA-approved golf course and large-scale real estate development on the city’s outer rim which aroused so much suspicion that the business community supported Hardberger, his opponent (Russell, 2010, p.83). Castro received a plurality of the vote in the May 2005 primary election, but was defeated by approximately 4000 votes by Hardberger who received 51.47% of the votes in the June 2005 runoff (see Table 1) (Romano, 2013, pp. 1-9).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Mayoral Election 2005 Results</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phil Hardberger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julian Castro</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once Hardberger was termed out of office, Castro ran for mayor of San Antonio again in 2009, announcing his candidacy on November 5, 2008. He won the May 9th election with 56.23% of the vote, his closest opponent being Trish DeBerry Mejia (Table 2) (Fernandez, 2012, p. 10).

The mayor of San Antonio is not nearly as powerful by law as the mayor of, for example, New York, but since taking office Castro has maximized his impact by mastering the bully pulpit and redirecting city resources toward reform. One of the first moves that earned him the label of a “trusted leader” was his initial interaction with City Public Service (CPS). When Castro learned that CPS Energy had concealed a $4 billion cost overrun, he went public, making transparency another part of his playbook. He forced the resignation of high-level staff members and the chairman of the CPS board. He also initiated the filing of a lawsuit against the city’s managing partner, NRG Energy, which owned a 50% stake in a nuclear energy project. In the end, the parties reached an out-of-court settlement that reduced San Antonio’s cost of
investment to a little more than 7% and reduced ratepayers’ risk of exposure to cost overruns. Castro’s approach to the nuclear energy issue was firm but not antagonistic. Unlike Cisneros, who played offense, Castro let the fight come to him while building alliances across Hispanic and Anglo lines. In the end, he forged consensus (Russell, 2010, p.88).

**Table 2: Mayoral Election 2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Votes in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Napoleon Madrid</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lauro Bustamante</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhett Smith</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julie Iris Oldham</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiela McNeil</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julian Castro</td>
<td>56.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diane Cibrian</td>
<td>8.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trish DeBerry Mejia</td>
<td>28.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: San Antonio Bexar County Elections Department at [http://elections.bexar.org/reports/reports.html](http://elections.bexar.org/reports/reports.html)

In the fall of 2010, Mayor Castro announced the creation of SA2020, a replica of then-Mayor Cisneros’ Target ’90, an urban planning project for the entire city. A diverse group came together to decide what issues were important for San Antonio to address over the next ten years (Santos, 2010, p. 1B). After collecting community input for six months, Castro unveiled a sweeping progressive initiative designed to “transform San Antonio into a world-class city by the year 2020” (Romano, 2013, pp. 1-9). It was a Democratic wish list that called for less driving, “more public transportation, less pollution, more green jobs, less sprawl, more growth downtown, and a stronger public education system” (Russell, 2010, p.83). The coalition of diverse interests, SA2020, was key to propelling Castro to a second and third term. In 2011, he was re-elected with almost 81.4% of the vote and, in 2013, he won by 66.51% of the vote (Tables 3 and 4) (Julian Castro Re-Elected as San Antonio Mayor for 3rd Term,” 2013). Similar to Cisneros, Castro seized a political opportunity to propel him and the city of San Antonio by delivering the

**Table 3: Mayoral Election 2011 Results**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Votes in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Julian Castro</td>
<td>81.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Rodriguez</td>
<td>3.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William McLeod</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael &quot;Commander&quot; Idrogo</td>
<td>2.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhett Smitt</td>
<td>5.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: San Antonio Bexar County Elections Department at [http://elections.bexar.org/reports/reports.html](http://elections.bexar.org/reports/reports.html)
keynote address at the 2012 Democratic National Convention in Charlotte, North Carolina. He was also the first Hispanic to deliver a keynote address at a Democratic National Convention (Lilley, 2012, p. 1B). Since that address, he continues to utilize the media at every opportunity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Votes in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Julian Castro</td>
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Source: San Antonio Bexar County Elections Department at http://elections.bexar.org/reports/reports.html

BUILDING BRIDGES ACROSS THE CITY: THE DELICATE BALANCE

Henry Cisneros’ tenure as mayor was a time of historic transformation that began in 1981 and ended in 1989. Cisneros took the city of San Antonio from the political elitism of a closed Anglo-dominated system to a structure of pluralism in which minorities gained parity. He changed the ceremonial office of mayor into a powerhouse and used this power to build community consensus from diverse interests through the Target ’90 initiative (Wolff, 2008, p. xiii).

Cisneros learned an important lesson. Minority groups represented a comfortable majority of San Antonio’s total population and therefore could control a majority of the district council seats. But Anglos were still the majority of the city’s voters and therefore controlled any issue that required a citywide vote. These issues included who would become mayor, whether a bond issue would pass, and whether the city charter could be amended (Wolff, 2008, p.15). Cisneros won the mayor’s race because he had built bridges to north side Anglos while maintaining his established ties with the inner-city neighborhoods he represented as a councilman. He built those bridges by pushing for economic development that would benefit every demographic segment and by restraining his rhetoric on issues that were racially divisive (Wolff, 2008, p.21).

To execute this play, Cisneros published a first-draft agenda and organized a series of public forums to gather feedback. The draft was called “San Antonio: Target ’90—Goals and Decisions for San Antonio’s Future.” It was a compilation of 148 specific program initiatives that he wanted the city to achieve by 1990 (Wolff, 2008, p.25). “Cisneros’ Target ’90 was a very strategic and diverse coalition. People who knew about each other, who had occasionally read about each other in the newspaper, now came to know each
other. Business leaders sat next to tenants in housing projects, and neighborhood activists dealt directly with the leaders of the police and firefighters unions” (Wolff, 2008, p. 28) Cisneros knew that a community consensus must be developed to move a city forward. That consensus should be expressed in an agenda with specific goals that connect all areas of the city (Wolff, 2008, p.43). “Set plenty of places at the table. People must feel that they helped developed the ideas that become part of a community consensus. One will always fight harder for one’s own idea than for another’s,” said Nelson Wolff, former Mayor of San Antonio (Wolff, 2008, p. 43).

In building his coalition, Cisneros applied his political theory of “balanced forces.” To achieve fairness and equity in the distribution of city funds and to stop any one group from becoming dominant, he had to make the weak strong and the strong weak. “Cisneros’ extraordinary application of his ‘balance of forces’ theory during eight years as mayor is what kept San Antonio on a pro-growth road. Cisneros’ coalition was the first one in modern San Antonio history that established a true sharing of power among Anglos, Hispanics and blacks, and between the rich and the poor”(Wolff, 2008, p. 32).

Ed Garza’s coalition building, on the other hand, centered on garnering Anglo support through Republican political operatives. His campaign prospects on the north side (Anglo dominant) got a boost when veteran Republican campaign operative Anne Whittington decided to work for him. The most active GOP organizer and fundraiser in Bexar County, Whittington was in Garza’s corner. Public relations professional Trish DeBerry, on leave from a firm that usually handles Republican clients when it does politics, was Garza’s campaign manager. Mayoral races are nonpartisan but partisan activists are the experts at running campaigns in San Antonio. Most municipal campaigns are laden with partisans doing off-season work (Davidson, 2001, p. 5B). For a candidate, having an expert on the other party’s landscape is a big advantage. The key for Garza to become the city’s second Hispanic mayor in modern times was getting a significant piece of the heavily Anglo north side vote. Almost 50% of the citywide vote in most elections comes from Districts 8, 9, and 10 on the north side (Davidson, 2001, p. 5B).

Garza kicked off his race in November of 2000 by standing outside a suburban election site to hand out fliers to voters in the presidential election. He used Spanish language media sparingly, and did little to appeal in any specialized way to voters in the west side and south side barrios (Casey, 2001, p. 3A). He positioned himself not as the champion of the group that has suffered discrimination but as a candidate who wanted to make the whole city work better. Garza’s election results said several things about San Antonio. First, ethnic prejudice, while hardly eradicated, was not as virulent as it once was. Second, class was a bigger factor now than race. Candidates must come across as well-educated members of the middle class (Casey, 2001, p.3A). The suburbs had changed. As census numbers were examined, San Antonio’s northern suburbs were much more of a rainbow than they once were. The fact that Garza carried the suburbs is indicative of an end to traditional ethnic voting patterns and signaled a change in politics. The problems that concerned Garza the most—deterioration of inner city and the worst kind of urban sprawl—could be solved only with suburban support (Casey, 2001, p. 3A). “There were no polarizing issues in this [Garza’s] election. The Mexican American West Side is not afraid of Tim Bannwolf [Garza’s opponent] and the Anglo North side isn’t afraid of Garza,” said Andy Hernandez, former President of the Southwest Voter Registration Education Fund and Head of Latino outreach for the Democratic National Committee. “The belief that simply because a Mexican American candidate is perceived as anti-Anglo will win the Hispanic vote is a fiction” (Zars, 2001, p. 9). Neither Garza nor Bannwolf were running campaigns with
appeals to ethnic pride. Their respective platforms shared more similarities than differences. Both pushed an agenda of balanced growth, cooperative ventures between the business community and neighborhood organizations, job training programs, and diversifying the city’s economic base. “With this political approach, Garza raised money from big Anglo businessmen, not as much as his opponent but enough to start a hum of approval” (Zars, 2001, pp. 6-10).

Julian Castro’s second mayoral campaign in 2009 meticulously portrayed him as more seasoned and ready than in his previous effort to take on the city’s highest elected office. He had two female challengers: Diane Cibrian, a then-sitting councilwoman, and Trish DeBerry Mejia, the PR genius. Castro admitted making more of an effort to attract the business community in 2009 than he had in 2005. “I took the time to develop relationships with people in the business community. I think they better understood my approach, my outlook for San Antonio’s future, and they became comfortable with it. We just didn’t have enough of those conversations before the 2005 race,” Castro recounts (Smith, 2009, pp.1-5). “I just laid out the facts as they are in 2009,” he said in a March 2010 interview (Jefferson and Garcia, 2009, p. 1A). With this approach, he lined up some of the business supporters who had eluded him in 2005, including H-E-B’s Charles Butt (the largest grocery chain in San Antonio) and Zachry Corporation’s Bartell Zachry, both ranked among the wealthiest (#47 and #147, respectively) entities, according to Forbes Fortune 500 (Kroll and Dolan, 2013, retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/list).

Not only had Castro evolved into a seasoned politician, the political landscape of San Antonio had changed. “In 2009, San Antonio was much more comfortable with its "multicultural reality,” Cisneros said. “Castro also benefits in that Hispanics have held key posts, including county judge, university president, archbishop and president of the University of Texas Health Science Center, among others. There’s much less of what might be called racial antagonism, racial skepticism or doubt,” he continued (Ayala, 2009, p.1B). Diversity was now seen as a virtue.

Cisneros advised Castro to pinpoint what he wanted to accomplish. “The key discipline, I believe, that divides those who are successful from those who are not, is the ability to have a plan, test it, coalesce people around it, stick to it and deliver on it” (Ayala, 2009, p. 1B) Castro took this advice and modeled SA2020 after Target ’90 (Davidson, 2010, 7B). Castro was frank about the potential for the success of SA2020. It hinges on the buy-in of residents, nonprofit organizations, governments and public agencies, and the business community. He successfully made collaboration part of his playbook, which kept controversies from flaring and collapsing along the old ethnic patterns of Anglos vs. Hispanics. “I took time after the last race to do that, and I set about creating a broader coalition of support. The difference was strong support from San Antonio’s business community and better support citywide, from every council district” (Baugh, 2011, p. 1A). “He doesn’t show his hand,” said Jim Dublin, a public relations adviser for many top executives in San Antonio. “But the business community likes the way he’s handling himself so far. We’re pulling for him” (Russell, 2010, p. 84).

Castro understands better than Garza the ties that the city manager has with the city’s business community. As a result, Castro’s strategy was to work closely with the city manager to solve budget crises. Cuts are made quickly and quietly without drama (Russell, 2010, p. 84). He positions himself as a centrist with a pragmatic stance. Relationship with City Council and Other Governmental Institutions

By the time Henry Cisneros ran for mayor in 1981, he recognized and plugged into the new power centers that had arisen from the dismantling of the Good Government League, the long-time political
machine. These new power centers included inner-city political organizations such as COPS, labor unions, newly formed Hispanic and black organizations, and neighborhood associations (Wolff, 2008, p. 21). Cisneros’ initial winning formula was to “balance his campaign carefully” (Wolff, 2008, p. 21). First, he needed a large turnout in the inner-city Mexican American neighborhoods, which was an easier task, as this was his natural constituency. But he also had to appeal to Anglo voters on the north side who turned out to vote in great numbers. To reach them he turned to the business leaders who had broken away from the Good Government League in 1973 (Wolff, 2008, p.18). These leaders felt Cisneros was the candidate who could best develop political consensus, heal racial tension, and push the city forward economically. Cisneros was preaching economic growth, which was just what they wanted to hear. They also recognized in Cisneros the potential to take San Antonio to a new level of national recognition and felt he would be a great salesman for the city. “This articulate, handsome mayor with unbounded energy could travel the country, actively soliciting companies to locate in San Antonio” (Wolff, 2008, p.18). Consequently, businessmen like automobile dealer Red McCombs and homebuilder Cliff Morton led the effort to rally north side support of Cisneros (Wolff, 2008, p.18). Cisneros’s brother, George, was in charge of the grassroots campaign. Volunteers “block walked” all over the city, campaign workers were at each polling place on Election Day, and telephones rang to get out the vote (Wolff, 2008, p.19).

Cisneros understood that the city charter did not bestow his influence as mayor. It arose from Cisneros’s self-appointed role as the city’s “agendameister.” No mayor prior to him had ever set an agenda. At the beginning of every year, he would pass out a 20-page agenda that contained a list of specific projects that were meant to be accomplished within that year. This agenda was key to Cisneros’s power (Wolff, 2008, p.92).

Incorporated within Henry Cisneros’s leadership style was his understanding of the relationship between him and the city manager and the power of perception. For the council-manager form of government to be progressive and action oriented, the mayor and city manager must be “in sync.” “Cisneros and then city manager Lou Fox were perfectly in sync: Fox was Mr. Inside; Cisneros, Mr. Outside” (Wolff, 2008, p.61). Cisneros also built support among key council members. If a major development issue arose, he would skip over it and turned to certain councilmen to line up the necessary votes (Wolff, 2008, p. 58).

Cisneros also understood the importance of political networks that reached beyond the Mayor’s office. Over time, he developed relationships with the speaker of the Texas House of Representatives, the lieutenant governor and key state legislative leaders. These relationships enabled him to succeed in passing funding for the Alamodome legislation, a major accomplishment during his tenure (Wolff, 2008, p. 66). The Alamodome is a domed 65,000 seat, multi-purpose facility used as a football and basketball stadium and convention center.

Finally, Cisneros understood the importance of the media and was a master at using the media to sell an agenda. He knew what news stories the media was looking for and how to make them interesting. He had a flair for sound bites and got to know the media people personally (Wolff, 2008, 43). This gave him leverage with the business community.

In contrast, Ed Garza’s leadership style was completely the opposite. Garza has been described by the media, the business community, and political supporters as “an enigma wrapped in contradiction” (Frye, 2005, p. 1A) He never mastered the power of the bully pulpit or how to skillfully use the media to his
advantage, and he resisted establishing a relationship with the business community. This was evident when Garza aggressively tried to force the resignation of the popular city manager, Terry Brechtel. He summoned her to his office at midnight on a weekday and tried to convince her to resign. Many in the community viewed this as a distasteful tactic, which also seemed to backfire as business groups rallied behind Brechtel and some citizens called for Garza's resignation. Bechtel was a pro-development city manager (Gonzalez, 2004, p. 1B). She eventually resigned.

Despite his leadership shortcomings with the business community, Garza maintained support among city council and county commissioners. “He always seemed laid back. Underneath, he is very, very determined,” said Robert Ross a former councilman in San Antonio. “I’ve found that he’s not going to give up on principle just to get consensus. That’s one thing I have admired about Ed” (Pack, 2001, p. 1A).

Bexar County Commissioner Paul Elizondo, a Garza backer and longtime friend, said Garza’s “Strength is his reasoned principle and willingness to think through a problem rather than fight for the sake of fighting. We need a cool head more than a hot head, a person with his hand off the trigger rather than a hair trigger.” (Pack, 2001, p.1A).

Castro, much like Cisneros, had built relationships with councilmen with whom he had served before assuming the office of mayor and understood the importance of having a working relationship with a city manager. He was confident that his relationship with the council would be collegial and even-keeled, without “too much of a showboat” from anyone. “We’re going to have a great group of folks,” he said. "I’m confident I'll be working with a first-rate City Council” (Baugh, 2011, p. 1A). He has always been careful in how he used the media to maintain his support with the city council.

RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY

Cisneros’s story is about how a mayor can join the public and private sectors in a partnership to build a stronger community (Wolff, 2008, p. xiv). Henry Munguia, Cisneros’s uncle, knew that to capture a significant percentage of the north side vote, he was going against historic odds. No Hispanic had ever been elected Mayor of San Antonio since Texas had joined the Union (Wolff, 2008, p. 2). Munguia enlisted the help of an old friend, Nelson Wolff, who provided a business connection to the north side. He represented the area in the Texas House of Representatives and then the Senate during the first half of the 1970s. With business and political roots in the area, he was in a position to help.

In his initial race for mayor, Cisneros knew he needed support from the business community. First, he needed to assure them that he was not their enemy; he had become suspect in a spectacular fight that followed a split council vote to rezone a site at the intersection of U.S. Highway 281 and Loop 1604 for a regional shopping mall. Concern over the possible pollution of San Antonio’s water supply provoked a successful referendum to overturn the council’s action. In response, the council imposed a moratorium on all new development over the recharge zone. The developers sued San Antonio for $1 billion in damages, and forced the city into a humiliating retreat. While Cisneros had opposed the original rezoning, he refused to vote for the moratorium on any new development over the recharge zone (Wolff, 2008, p. 14). Cisneros also led the fight to create a department of economic and employment development and spearheaded the creation of a “Centro 21” task force to be a catalyst for downtown development (Wolff, 2008, p. 14).
Amelia Ramirez, Ed Garza’s scheduling assistant, believed there was a struggle between the city business leaders and Garza. “He never followed their dictates. He’s got his own mind. I see their manipulation and strategies, treating him like he is a little boy—slap his hand and go tell him to stand in the corner and talk to Nelson Wolff. They were always leaving the mayor out of the loop” (Frye, 2005, p. 1A) Mike Novak, former chairman of the San Antonio Greater Chamber of Commerce, said, “I think the mayor had a very difficult time setting priorities. Everybody was always trying to figure out his agenda. And he had an even more difficult time executing his agenda. Why? Because he had a difficult time building a consensus. The business community would offer its assistance. We’d tell him, we are here to help you. What is your agenda? But very seldom would he get a call back” (Frye, 2005, p.1A). Garza shrugged off friends’ suggestions that he be more engaged (Frye, 2005, p. 1A). Garza created the perception that he was “a bad leader and a bad communicator” (Castillo, 2005, p. 3B).

In Castro’s camp, his newfound business backing comes with the burden of maintaining his demonstrated grassroots power without being perceived as a business-as-usual candidate. Castro noted that among the three contenders, he has the highest number of contributors giving less than $100 and that his Website has already attracted 125 grassroots volunteers. “I think we’ve struck the right balance,” Castro said (Castillo, 2009, 1B). Since his election to office in 2009, Castro has been pro-business and pro-growth. His use of the media has helped him maintain the support of the business community as they view him as someone who can showcase San Antonio on a national level.

**MAJOR POLICIES, CHALLENGES, AND SUCCESSES**

In his eight years as Mayor of San Antonio, Cisneros attracted national attention for his success in developing new economic growth in the city’s business sector and used his diplomatic skills to promote cooperation among the city’s various ethnic groups. He exercised a developmental expansion strategy that led the city to unprecedented levels of economic and cultural growth. Cisneros brought federal money to San Antonio that further developed the downtown business district. He courted Fortune 500 companies and technology firms to set up shop locally to create jobs, enlarge the city’s reserves with local business taxes, and to cement San Antonio’s reputation as a leading city for technology, skilled work, and economic output. His efforts brought additional investments to San Antonio, such as Sea World and Fiesta Texas, two major theme parks and tourist attractions and economic engines for the city. In his signature accomplishment, the Alamodome, Cisneros convinced residents to vote for the city-financed construction of the facility. He also paved the way for a visit from Pope John Paul II during the pontiff’s ten-day tour to the U.S. in September 1987. More than one million people saw the Pope during his 22-hour visit to San Antonio, which was longer than he spent in any other city on his tour. Cisneros’ mayoral success for elevating San Antonio’s reputation and economic base as a leading city in the nation led to *Texas Monthly* naming him its “Texas Mayor of the Century” in 1999. The publication pointed to such achievements as a downtown riverfront redevelopment that drew many tourists and contending that he had “changed San Antonio’s image from a poor and somewhat sleepy town to a culturally and economically vibrant model for the future of urban America” (Wolff, 2008, p. 45). During Cisneros’ tenure as mayor, San Antonio was named an All American City for 1982–1983, a prestigious honor awarded by the National Civic League (Wolff, 2008, p. 48).
Cisneros’ populist positions on issues favored the poor and the working class. He funneled more than $200 million to the city’s long-neglected Hispanic west side for streets, gutters, libraries, and parks. His improvements also alleviated that area’s long-standing flooding and drainage problems. Cisneros’ ties to business helped him establish an education partnership that brought together the city, the local colleges and universities, local business, and various community organizations that provided financial aid for college to young people in the poorest school districts of San Antonio.

Twelve years later, Ed Garza believed there was unequal development occurring in San Antonio and that that city officials needed to consider the interest of all constituents throughout the city. Many inner-city residents, Garza believed, felt that economic development had passed them by with the development of the San Antonio International Airport, the South Texas Medical Center, and the main campus of the University of Texas at San Antonio, which were all on the north side of city. "We have to work on balanced growth in the city," said Garza, who used inner-city redevelopment as one of his campaign platforms before he was elected in 2001. "We have to ask, how does it compare with the city's master plan of balance in the community." (Castillo, 2003, p. 1A).

Garza’s effort to balance development was seeded in his South Side Initiative. This was a concentrated effort to redirect development from the north side. City South, as it was later renamed, is a 57-square-mile area with deep roots in San Antonio's history that is undergoing robust growth and has abundant natural resources, scenic terrain, and development potential (Rodriguez, 2005, 3A). The development of City South was Garza’s legacy. The area is a diverse mix of land uses including manufacturing, agriculture, education, recreation, housing, and small business. City South is the home of Toyota Motor Manufacturing plant (a major economic engine for the south side), as well as Southport Business Park (available for light industrial land use), La Espada subdivision (which is a blend of mixed-income housing, office buildings, churches, parks, and schools), and Texas A&M University – San Antonio (Rodriguez, 2005, 3A).

Garza is also credited with bringing the PGA Village to San Antonio despite having almost lost the deal because of inexperience. When Garza first became mayor, he irritated business leaders and environmentalists who wanted a jackrabbit and not a tortoise on the PGA Village issue. One of the major criticisms of Garza’s first term revolved around communication problems (“Planning by Mayor: A Good Sign,” 2003, p. 2H). Environmentalists, concerned that the location of the new resort would have a negative impact on the recharge zone, were the biggest opponents. The recharge zone is a strip of land located in North Bexar County and adjacent counties that supplies groundwater to the Edwards Aquifer, which provides most of the drinking water for San Antonio (Dalton, 2002, Retrieved from http://www.GolfTexas.com). Early on in the process, Lumbermen Investment Corporation (the PGA developer) committed to carefully monitoring and controlling the water quality in the resort. Lumbermen pointed out that the city could have imposed more rigid development restrictions and environmental controls on the golf resort but chose not to do so. The environmentalists weren’t satisfied. Instead, they took an almost unprecedented approach. Following the approval of the initial development plan by the San Antonio City Council, and despite reassurances from Lumbermen, several groups started a petition drive against the development. The drive, which took three months, concluded with over 77,000 signatures, which were enough to force the city council to rescind its support for the deal or put the matter to a public vote. Neither happened, however, as PGA had enough of San Antonio’s lack of leadership and became less
interested in the project. After much negative media attention, Mayor Garza was compelled to seek public support from Nelson Wolff to salvage what was left of PGA’s interest in San Antonio (Frye, 2005, p. 1A). “I think what hurt him was [sic] delays and indecisions,” said County Judge and former Mayor Nelson Wolff. “He stalled, asking for more time to study options.” Years of wrangling followed, and in the end, Garza angered not only the business community but environmentalists as well. Wolff replied, “He went through a terrible ordeal with PGA and he has been criticized a lot. But the bottom line is that he delivered.” The PGA Tour committed to a Tournament Players Club with a minimum of two 18-hole golf courses, and the Marriott built an 800-room luxury hotel (“Mayor Garza Launches New Name for San Antonio’s South Side Initiative,” 2004, p. 1). In an interview conducted by San Antonio Express News, Garza believed his youth affected his credibility when he first questioned the initial PGA plan (Castillo, 2003, p. 3B). Garza had a later opportunity to redeem himself.

When Wolff was first told about Toyota’s interest in San Antonio’s southern sector, Garza bristled because his redevelopment plans for the south side did not include a heavy industrial site. Wolff calls the deal “the single most important economic issue the city has ever undertaken.” He went on to say, “Ed, the Toyota plant would be a magic bullet for your plan. It’s one of the most environmentally sensitive companies in the world. You need industrial development on the South Side to create good-paying jobs. People will never live there unless they had that” (Wolff, 2008, p.94). The deal ushered in more than $2.7 billion in direct and indirect capital investment, and about 5,700 jobs from Toyota and its suppliers. Fully aware that rumors were swirling about how Bexar County Judge Nelson Wolff had outdone him in negotiations with the PGA Golf sports organization, Garza stepped out of character to snuff the supposed existence of a “shadow” mayor (Zars, 2011, p. 6). “It wasn’t what I envisioned, but when else will you get an investment like this?” Once Garza signed on, he and Wolff started rallying several dozen city, county, state, and business leaders and created what informally became known as “Team Toyota” (Morton, 2013, p.1C). Toyota held its grand opening in San Antonio in November 2006.

In his first speech as mayor in 2009, Castro delivered a 30-minute discourse on what he called a "three-legged stool of success" that defines great cities: job creation and education, quality of life, and delivery of basic services (Garcia, 2009, p. 1B). Within his first four years as mayor, Castro has chipped away at this three-legged stool. Shortly after becoming mayor, he was instrumental in negotiating a complex deal between the City Public Service of San Antonio and the University of Texas at San Antonio that was a progressive public policy initiative amid a recession. City Public Service of San Antonio agreed to provide funding up to $50 million to propel UTSA’s College of Engineering into the first ranks of alternative energy research. Castro called the creation of the Texas Sustainable Energy Research Institute at UTSA a "game-changing partnership" between a university and a city-owned utility that is unlike any other in the country. "This is a bold step," said Castro. "Ratepayers will get a more efficient utility, the city will get the economic development value of robust research and development in San Antonio, and the university will spiral ever more quickly to Tier One status" (Rivard, 2010, p. 3B).

As a result of his SA2020, Castro began to implement some of its goals. The first was education. He pushed a Pre-K4 SA campaign by proposing a one-eighth-cent sales tax that would pay to extend full-day pre-kindergarten classes to four-year-olds. The city would open four education centers with classrooms, rooms for parental use, and teacher training space. Castro proposed the pre-K4 SA initiative after a task force he commissioned recommended that expanding early learning would have the biggest impact on
raising education levels in the city. Latino children have lower preschool-attendance rates than both African American and White children. The recent Kids Count Study, from the Annie E. Casey Foundation, found that between 2008 and 2010 about 63% of Latino children did not attend preschool. On November 6, 2010, voters responded by approving Pre-K4 SA 53.5% to 46.5% (Baugh and Cesar, 2012, 1AA, 4AA).

The second item continued to address education but focused on young adults. Castro created Café College, which was a center that offers free guidance to San Antonians preparing for and applying to higher education institutions. Trained staff members work with middle school through senior high school students, parents and guardians and college dropouts—students who for one reason or another stopped attending college before completing their course plans. Assistance for transfer students and Spanish-speaking visitors is also provided (City of San Antonio, 2013, Retrieved from http://www.sanantonio.gov/mayor/cafecollege.asp).

Castro also promised to address job creation for the city. He launched Café Commerce, a clearing-house aimed at becoming a one-stop-shop incubator for small companies. Café Commerce gives business owners access to resources, market data, and other assistance needed to launch businesses as well as a physical location for collaboration. The program is located in the city’s Central Library. San Antonio committed up to $1 million in funding and approximately 10,000 square feet of space at the City’s central library for the business resource center (Bailey, 2013).

In February 2010, the San Antonio City Council approved Mission Verde Center (Green Mission), a multi-purpose complex integrates education, training, research, and technology to address a market demand for a green-skilled workforce and advance the city’s sustainability objectives (Alamo Colleges, 2013, Retrieved from http://www.sanantonio.gov/oep/SustainabilityPlan/Mission%20Verde.pdf).

Castro has learned well from Cisneros. He has selected and implemented key policies, publicly staked his political career on them, and put them into practice.

**Conclusion**

The political experiences of Cisneros, Garza, and Castro teach us some lessons about Latino politics and representation in San Antonio. The first lesson is that timing and opportunity are very important. Cisneros would not have entered into political office if it were not for a combination of opportunities: the political machine of the GGL was imploding, the business community that was long excluded from the fruits of the GGL was progressive enough to support a minority, and the Hispanic community, tired of being an afterthought when it came to job creation, economic development and infrastructure improvement, were searching for a leader. Cisneros was savvy enough to recognize that was his moment to rise. Garza ran for mayor without an incumbent. Castro learned about timing and opportunity the second time he ran for mayor.

Lesson number two: if you are a Latino candidate, you need a coalition that includes the business community and the working class. The Latino candidate has to display leadership that de-emphasizes ethnicity and broadens the base by focusing on class (i.e., economic issues) for all citizens. Political issues should never come down along ethnic lines. The Latino leader needs to be able to balance competing interests and provide a vision of collective fate; in other words, a sense that “we are all in this together.” To do this, a Latino leader must energize the base/voters. Mastering the media is key to his/her success.
Third, in San Antonio, which has a majority-minority Hispanic population and where voter turnout is lackluster, elections can depend on a small cluster of districts, thus serving on the city council is an important apprenticeship for a Latino aspiring to mayoral office. During this apprenticeship, a Latino elected official should strive to build name recognition, support from fellow councilmen and women, and make it known that he or she is pro-development as long as minorities are equal partners. Cisneros and Castro proved that this delicate balance was necessary to move their agenda forward. Finally, all three Latino mayors constructed an image of themselves as post-ethnic candidates focused on the economic well-being of the city. Cisneros, Garza, and Castro embodied all four types of representation--formal, descriptive, symbolic, and substantive. These Latino mayors highlight the importance of consensus building, cooperation, and the absence of a confrontational spirit, which are key for Latinos having a place at the political tables of public leadership.
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