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*JSRI's mission is to generate, disseminate,
and apply knowledge to serve the needs of
Latino communities in the Midwest and across
the nation.*

MICHIGAN STATE
UNIVERSITY

University Outreach
and Engagement
Julian Samora Research Institute

NEXO

The Official Newsletter of The Julian Samora Research Institute
The Midwest's Premier Latino Research Center



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NEXO

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JSRI at Michigan State University is committed to the generation, transmission, and application of knowledge as it relates to Latinos and Latino communities throughout the Midwest and the nation.

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American Democracy at the Crossroads



Rubén O. Martínez
Editor

In 1935, Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi propagandist and promoter of violence, gave a speech at the Annual conference of the Nazi Party in which he took issue with an anonymous writer of an English newspaper who compared National Socialism to Bolshevism and identified their commonalities. The commonalities included attacks on the media, literature, and the intelligentsia, as well as the mass display of arms by their respective members. Goebbels emphasized the differences between the two regimes, attacking Jewish-led communism as the "world's greatest enemy" while promoting the virtues of Nazism. He further emphasized that

Bolshevism was a Jewish-led threat to the world. In retrospect the world knows that Nazism was a fascist regime grounded in scientific racism, antisemitism, and authoritarianism that caused WWII and killed millions of people, including the state-sponsored murder of 6 million Jews.

In his speech Goebbels used what today are well worn rhetorical techniques such as disparaging communism, emphasizing its injustices and failures, and casting it as an amoral regime led by political maniacs who made up atrocity stories about the Third Reich in order to bring about its downfall. In contrast, he cast National Socialism as believing in God, warning Europe of the threat of communism, knowing how to cope with the Jewish-led communist movement, and saving Western civilization. In simplistic terms, he cast National Socialism as good and communism as evil. These are standard rhetorical techniques used by authoritarian regimes, and there is little question that the author against whom Goebbels railed was correct.

We have seen similar techniques used in recent times by Trump (2016-present) and by Putin. Trump and his followers in the "Grand Ole Party" have attacked the press, promoted anti-intellectual views, disparaged critics, censored public education, promoted public violence and displayed arms, and scapegoated Latino and Asian immigrants as menaces that threaten America. All of these taken together have engendered what is termed a crisis in American Democracy. A central factor that has contributed to the present crisis is propaganda.

Similar tactics were used by Putin to justify the invasion of Ukraine. He claimed Ukraine was infested with neo-nazis and had to be "denazified." He also asserted that far-right nationalism in Ukraine had given rise to Russophobia and that Russia was forced to invade. Following the invasion, as protests against the invasion arose, he cracked down on independent media and banned any rhetoric that called the "special military operation" an invasion. Thousands of anti-war protestors have been arrested and organizers threatened. All of these actions are "legitimized" by propaganda.

Propaganda is the technique of using biased views, symbols, and selective information to manipulate public opinion in the pursuit of an agenda. It is suggestive, appeals to sentiments, and intensifies attitudes toward a particular purpose with the aim of closing off other options. In today's political environment it is sometimes called political gaslighting. As with all political and social movements there are many threads or sub-movements that are brought together by a charismatic leader. Such is the case with what has come to be known as Trumpism, which has brought together different political groups under a conservative nationalist agenda. But what are the purposes of the propaganda that is undermining American Democracy under Trumpism? There are many,

but an obvious one is the installation of Donald Trump as the authoritarian leader of the nation. Another is to openly restore a racial hierarchy with White Americans at the apex. Still another is the establishment of a theocracy as envisioned by radical Evangelicals who desire a Christian nation.

To achieve any of these visions for the nation a multitude of activities and messages are used by their respective adherents. These include scapegoating immigrants, promoting anti-government sentiments, politicizing the use of masks and vaccines to secure public safety and control the pandemic, claims of a fraudulent 2020 election, and voter suppression policies, among others. More recently, steps to censor public education have been taken as an extension of the Trump Administration's attack on diversity training. It started as an attack on Critical Race Theory but has expanded to censoring library holdings in public schools.

Critical Race Theory (CRT) is a framework that examines institutionalized racial dimensions and practices in the nation's major institutions. Some of these were highlighted in the recent trials of Derek Chauvin, the former Minneapolis police officer charged with the murder of George Floyd; Kyle Rittenhouse, the self-appointed guardian of private property in Kenosha, Wisconsin, charged with reckless and intentional homicide in the deaths of Joseph Rosenbaum and Anthony Huber and the shooting of Gaige Grosskreutz; and that of Travis McMichael, Gregory McMichael, and William Bryan, convicted of the murder of Ahmaud Arbery in Brunswick, Georgia. The arguments presented by the attorneys and the judges in those trials reveal major differences in how they view our system of criminal justice. Those are not the issues highlighted by attackers of CRT who tend to distort its contents in their propaganda.


They present CRT to the public as a Marxist ideology rather than a legal theoretical framework developed by academic theorists. Presenters at a Goldwater Institute event on Critical Race Theory, for example, distort CRT for political purposes. These are Jonathan Butcher, a senior fellow at the Goldwater Institute, and Kevin Jackson, CEO of Educational Excellence and conservative syndicated radio host of the Kevin Jackson Show, who are introduced as experts. Butcher says CRT is a "theory, it's a world view, a philosophy, a way of seeing public and private life...through the lens of race. And so...everything can be explained by...what it means for your skin color and your racial identity. [CRT] is coming home through the backpacks and in homework assignments." He goes on to say that proponents of CRT are trying to change culture and are being discriminatory. He further implies that intersectionality, a concept that emphasizes the interconnectedness of social categories and the overlapping of systems of discrimination, is part of the problem yet fails to provide a meaningful critique.

Jackson claims that CRT is used to divide and conquer Americans through identity politics and to attack the "humanity of people to just live their lives as individuals, because at


the end of the day I don't think most people care if their drycleaner is black or gay." He goes on to say that CRT proponents do not accept that "we are judging people by the content of their character" and implies that it is problematic that we are still having a discussion about race, because "CRT doesn't believe in meritocracy." Both of these two so-called experts want us to believe that the United States is no longer a country steeped in systemic racism, but they are not the only ones. Others include writers such as Mike Gonzalez, a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation, and Pedro L. Gonzalez, associate editor at *Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture*, a conservative publication by the Charlemagne Institute, a non-profit organization that seeks to protect and promote Western civilization, and assistant editor of *American Greatness*, a blog that features conservative writers on American politics. He also hosts *Contra*, a conservative podcast. Mike was born in Cuba and Pedro in Spain. Both, like Butcher and Jackson, are pseudo experts on CRT and seemingly intentionally distort what it is.

Mike Gonzalez defines CRT as a movement and claims that it has impacted all of American life and drives decision-making on the basis of race. Much like Goebbels incessantly attacks Jews, Mike, who sometimes writes with Butcher, incessantly claims that CRT is a Marxist-grounded theory that seeks to overturn American society by portraying everyday life in terms of systemic racism. He opposes the Federal Government's use of racial categories (as in the census) and its support of diversity training, while supporting parental review of curricular resources in schools, local control of student discipline, and the use of punitive measures to protect free speech on public college campuses.

Pedro Gonzalez, who identifies as a pro-White minority, claims that CRT is an anti-White perspective that declares Whites to be the 'cancer of human history'. Instead, he asserts that liberals are the cancer. Like most people, he wrongly uses the term "ethnics" to denote non-Whites, not realizing that all people are ethnic. He makes the strange statement that "CRT often comes wrapped in the crimson bow of Christian theology and ethics" without providing any evidence or source for it. On his Twitter account he claims that the attack on the Capitol on January 6, 2021 was not an insurrection but a historical event that is being used as a pretext to crack down on establishment opposition. He further claims that Whites suffer ungrateful foreigners despite being the ones who built, maintained, and defended this country "that their ancestors built, maintained, and defended before them."

Propaganda is at the center of the crisis in American Democracy. Communications technology, initially thought to promote democratic participation, has become the vehicle by which the uninformed are motivated to engage in irrational anti-democratic behaviors that noted scholars believe are taking the country toward fascism. Goebbels would have loved living in these times. 

The Plot to Change America: How Identity Politics is Dividing the Land of the Free



by Mike Gonzalez.
2020. NY, NY:
Encounter.

Reviewed by
Rubén Martínez

Every now and then a book is published that has the appearance of a scholarly work. This book, *The Plot to Change America* by Mike Gonzalez, is such a book. The author has a threefold purpose: to provide an intellectual chronology of the rise of identity politics and discuss its impact on American society and the threat that it poses to American liberties. He provides scholarly footnotes to buttress his arguments. As readers can tell, his purpose is political rather than scholarly, which tends to seek accurate interpretation and/or explanation of a particular aspect of reality. He falls short in each component of his purpose when the book is assessed from a scholarly perspective. In keeping with his goal to change how Americans think about identity groups and identity politics, he has produced a conservative political argument that assumes the best of American society and ignores all its forms of domination and oppression.

The book consists of an Introduction and eight chapters which are equally divided between two parts of the book. The four chapters in Part I “describe how the main ethnic and sexual categories were created” (p. 4). The three in Part II “explain the ideological basis for such category creation” and the final chapter offers “policy and political solutions for ending identity politics” (p. 4). In Chapter 1, Gonzalez provides an account, however distorted it may be, of how the label Hispanic was used by scholars, militants, and political leaders to promote a sense of victimization to generate political influence and get a fair share of federal funds. Chapter 2 is devoted to a similar account

of Asian Americans. Chapter 3 focuses on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), an invented ethnic category, he argues, to claim, as have Hispanics and Asian Americans, special benefits from governments. In Chapter 4, titled “Sex,” the author provides a similar account as in the previous chapters, this time focusing on feminism, the construction of gender, and “LGBT” identities.

In Chapter 5, the author “traces” the roots of critical theory and postmodernism to Marxism and communism and links the movements of the Sixties to Marxist thinkers. Strangely, he tosses Julian Samora in the lot with Gramsci, Marcuse, and others. Frankfurt School scholars and their adherents are presented as having launched a “systematic attack on Western democratic societies and their cultural norms,” promoted moral and cultural relativism, rejected universal truth and objectivity, and extended the conflict between “oppressors and subordinates” from economics to culture. The aim being to replace the hegemonic narrative with a socialist hegemonic narrative. Gonzalez goes on tirades against Wirth, who defined the concept minority group sociologically rather than numerically, Horkheimer, who promoted critical theory, and Adorno, his colleague who studied “the authoritarian personality” following the conclusion of WWII. Remarkably, he claims that Adorno “pathologized a respect for authority, tradition, religion, and honor as a psychological type especially susceptible to fascism” (p. 130).

In Chapter 6, Gonzalez claims that the Census Bureau has been captured by ethno-racial minority scholars and leaders in their pursuit of political goals. He criticizes scholars who use official racial categories to promote political and social projects to line their pockets and to resist assimilation and ethnic attrition, and implies that the “twilight of ethnicity” would likely be up on us were it not for these activists who have institutionalized these categories in government bureaucracies. The author then criticizes the use of the term “diversity” and corporate practices that use it to produce what he calls “coercive group proportionalism.” He disagrees with the view that we must take into account race in order to get

past racism. While preferences were to last until they were no longer needed, he claims, their use has led to the “balkanization of America.”

In Chapter 7, Gonzalez tells readers why all of his concerns matter, namely that school work settings have been transformed into “reeducation camps” where employees are forced to undergo training to not only stamp out implicit bias and White supremacy culture but also “individualism,” ‘objectivity,’ ‘perfectionism,’ ‘either/or thinking,’ a ‘sense of urgency,’ and worship of the written word” (p. 178) as a way of introducing socialism. The ultimate aim, he says, is to “destroy the free enterprise, liberal system that best offers protection for man’s natural rights” (p. 179). White supremacists, he asserts, “are numerically small and have little to no impact on policy or politics” (p. 191). He goes on to cite Huntington and Schlesinger, conservative scholars concerned with the “disuniting of America.” Grievance mongering and a “culture of victimhood,” he says, have become the ways by which to attain moral status and material rewards.

In Chapter 8, the final chapter, Gonzalez argues against preferential treatment on the basis of race, national origin, and/or sex. The plot, the central theme of his book, is “to transform the country, upend the culture, abolish the family, and replace it all with a totalitarian system that eliminates the individual, his agency and his rights” (p. 199). He proposes a civil rights movement 2.0 that eliminates the distortions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and proscribes preferences based on race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, gender, and sexual orientation. He cites the ideas of conservative social commentators and conservative justices such as Scalia, who claimed that Americans are one race. To instill grievances to disempower individuals, he says, is the “devil’s work” (p. 214). Schools must stop poisoning students’ minds. We need new schools, he says, and points to charter schools to break the stranglehold that proponents of Critical Race Theory have on the curriculum. Ultimately, he wants to eliminate economic benefits on the basis of group identities.

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Immigration Matters: Movements, Visions, and Strategies for a Progressive Future



by R. Milkman,
D. Bhargava, and
P. Lewis. (Eds.). 2021.
NY, NY: The New Press.

Reviewed by
Richard C. Davila

In naming how immigration came to be one of the “most hotly debated” political issues of the new millennium, Ruth Milkman, Deepak Bhargava, and Penny Lewis, editors of *Immigration Matters*, do not mince words: “Right-wing demagogues have deployed it as the leading wedge issue to rally their base, put the Left on the defensive, and speak to the cultural and economic anxieties of those in the middle” (p. 1). Working from this premise they argue that a necessary first step toward progressive immigration reform—and the primary goal of the book—is to defang nativist arguments for restrictive immigration policy. To this end, they gather together 16 chapters from scholars and activists who “offer alternative visions that directly counter the ethno-nationalist, anti-immigrant agenda promoted by [Donald] Trump and his counterparts around the world” (p. 24).

The book is divided into four thematic sections: “Historical Perspectives,” “Lessons of Organizing Campaigns,” “Future Immigration Policy,” and “Strategies for Change.” In the first two chapters of “Historical Perspectives,” Mae N. Ngai and Ruth Milkman challenge oft-repeated restrictionist narratives. Ngai traces the historical antecedents of 21st Century nativism through previous waves of nativist furor to argue that such waves often emerge alongside periods of economic expansion, rather than contraction, particularly during periods of sectoral change. She further challenges the idea of nativism as “a ‘human’ reaction to ‘difference’ or ‘others,’” defining it instead as a form of political discourse theorized by “intellectuals and pundits”

and weaponized by politicians “for political gain” (p. 41). Milkman similarly counters the “immigrant threat narrative,” which frames declining living standards of non-college-educated U.S.-born workers as a consequence of immigrant labor, arguing instead that neoliberal deregulation and attacks on organized labor “degrade[d] formerly well-paid blue-collar jobs” and created demand for low-paid immigrant labor (p. 57). Both Ngai and Milkman regard nativist discourse as a means to shift blame away from neoliberal economic policies that caused declining living standards and prevent working-class solidarity between immigrant and native-born workers. Much of the work that follows in the book seeks to name and therefore neutralize such divide-and-conquer tactics.

The next section, “Lessons of Organizing Campaigns,” features reflections from a number of organizers on the successes and shortcomings of their campaigns. Cristina Jiménez Moreta, cofounder of United We Dream, identifies two issues that recur throughout the book. First, she notes that many undocumented youth came to reject the frequently deployed narrative that highlighted the achievements of “exceptional immigrants” that reinforced a binary between supposedly “deserving” and “undeserving” immigrants (p. 111). Further, she argues that many immigrant rights advocates and policy makers believe that comprehensive immigration reform, to garner support from conservatives and moderate Democrats, requires a compromise between a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants and increased immigration and border enforcement. Regarding the Obama administration’s failure to pass comprehensive immigration reform, she states, “His administration failed to pass legislative immigration reforms that would provide a pathway to citizenship, while the enforcement regime steadily grew in resources and power. This exposed the false logic that victories for immigrants are possible only if our movement publicly accepts increases in enforcement” (p. 114).

The chapters in “Future Immigration Policy” take up Jiménez Moreta’s challenge to envision immigration policy

that does not depend upon increased funding for immigration enforcement agencies. Marielena Hincapié, for instance, proposes an immigration system rebuilt from the ground up based on “the five freedoms”—freedom to stay, freedom to move, freedom to thrive, freedom to work, and freedom to transform. In this system, taxpayer funds would be redirected from the Department of Homeland Security to legalization and naturalization services, and to government agencies concerned with employment rights and workplace safety. While much immigrant rights discourse is concerned with paths to legalization for undocumented immigrants, Amaha Kassa calls attention to policies put in place by the Trump administration to decrease legal immigration and naturalization. He therefore proposes a “future flow” agenda “that advances an expansive notion of citizenship and takes seriously our obligations not only to immigrants currently in the United States but also to those who seek to be Americans and those who will come after us” (p. 187).

Chapters in the book’s final section, “Strategies for Change,” address some of the difficulties of putting in place the kinds of policy suggested in the previous section. Both Cecilia Muñoz and Deepak Bhargava note the difficulty of moving progressive immigration policy through a deeply divided legislature and argue for reform efforts that do not depend on Congressional action, such as agency-level internal policy changes where allowable as well as executive action. The authors in this section also stress the importance of publicly articulating progressive solutions to immigration issues that can, as Muñoz argues, “convince the public that there is a way out of the morass that brings order, fairness, and humanity” and neutralize nativist messaging (p. 262).

Altogether, the book offers an informed, well-reasoned, and optimistic vision for a progressive immigration system and immigrant rights movement. This optimism, though, is perhaps the book’s central flaw. Though published in 2021, the 16 chapters of the book seem to have been written prior to the 2020 presidential election when then-candidate



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Latino Population Growth: Community Racial-Ethnic Makeup and Socioeconomic Well-Being in the Midwest

Jean Kayitsinga, Ph.D.

Introduction

Data from the 2020 Census in the United States show that the Latino population in the U.S. numbered about 62.1 million, representing 18.7% of the total population. Latinos are the second largest ethnic population in the country, next to White Americans. They are also the largest ethno-racial minority population, surpassing African Americans in over half of all U.S. metropolitan areas. The Latino population increased from 50.5 million in 2010 to 62.1 million in 2020, reflecting a growth rate of 23%.

In the Midwest, the Latino population in 2020 was about 6.0 million, or 8.7% of the total population. By comparison, Latinos comprised 15.3% of the population in the Northeast, 18.8% in the South, and 30.0% in the West. Between 2010 and 2020, the Latino population grew in all regions of the country. The Latino share of the growth of the population was highest in the Northeast (78.7%) followed by the Midwest (64%), and then the South (46.7%), and West (45.4%).

Although much has been written about Latinos in the Southwest and West, less is known about Latino recent

migration and settlement in the Midwest. Latinos have settled in non-traditional metropolitan cities, suburbs, and in rural areas (Kandel & Parrado 2006). Kandel and Parrado (2006) found that the Latino population growth in nonmetropolitan county destinations represents one of the more profound social transformations affecting rural places, altering not only their social, economic, and political profiles, but also the broader national perception of rural and small-town America.

The objectives of this article are twofold: 1) To determine how the Latino population has changed over the last five decades in the U.S. and in the Midwest region, and 2) To determine how the increase of the Latino population has affected the ethnic makeup and community socioeconomic well-being of the Midwest.

Background

Historically, Latinos in the United States have concentrated in the largest metropolitan areas in the Southwest (Mexican Americans) and the Northeast (Puerto Ricans). The majority of Latinos have traditionally resided in five states: California, Texas,

New York, Florida, and Illinois. Within those states, Latinos have tended to concentrate in gateway and ethnic hub cities such as Los Angeles, Houston, Dallas, New York City, Miami, and Chicago. More recently, Latinos have settled in new destination sites outside of traditional gateway metropolitan areas, particularly in the Midwest and Southeast, and in both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas. They were attracted by, or recruited for, employment opportunities in agriculture, meat packing, other food processing jobs, timber harvesting and processing, and other industries.

According to the 2020 Census, 47.4% of U.S. Latinos resided in 12 metropolitan areas with at least one million Latinos, including Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA; New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA; Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL; Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX; Riverside-San Bernadino-Ontario, CA; Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI; Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX; Phoenix-Mesa-Chandler, AZ; San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX; San Diego-Chula Vista-Carlsbad, CA; Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV; and San Francisco-Oakland-Berkeley, CA. In 2020, Latinos were also residing in other non-traditional metropolitan destination areas outside of the Southwest such as Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Alpharetta, GA.

The influx of Latinos in new destination communities does not occur by chance. They are pulled by employment opportunities in those areas, such as working on fruit and vegetable farms, dairy farms, and meat processing industries in the rural Midwest and Southeast (Kandel & Parrado 2005). Economic restructuring nationwide and globally and associated regulatory processes, including employment discrimination, layoffs, and community resistance are primary factors that push Latino workers to migrate to different regions in the United States, including the rural Midwest, in search of better opportunities. Other factors include lower housing costs and safer communities.

In the rural Midwest, increased mechanization and consolidation of farms, loss of union and skilled agricultural jobs, decline in local small businesses, and withdrawal of local state services (Sassen, 1990), and persistent poverty of rural communities contribute to the increased availability of low-wage and unprotected jobs. New agricultural businesses, such as the meat processing industries, tend not to hire local residents. Instead, they pursue the strategy of actively recruiting workers from other areas, including Latino, Asian, and African immigrant workers. Latino workers and their families have relocated to communities in the Midwest and have been becoming permanent members of those communities.

Data and Procedures

Data

Data come from the 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2020 decennial censuses, the 2019 one-year American Community Survey, and the 2015-2019 5-year American Community Survey produced by the U.S. Census Bureau. Data were retrieved from IPUMS-NHGIS (<https://www.nhgis.org/>) or from the U.S. Census Bureau (www.census.gov).

Analytic Strategy

First, the analysis provides a description of the population size by race/ethnicity, highlighting the share of the Latino population in the United States and the Midwest. Second, the analysis describes Latino population growth and the change in its share from 1980 to 2020. Third, an analysis of the age and sex composition of Latinos is compared to that of non-Hispanic Whites. The final analysis focuses on the Midwest region, mapping the concentration of Latinos in different communities of the Midwest, and linking the Latino share to community well-being and employment opportunity structures. That analysis uses descriptive statistics (means, standard deviations, and median) of demographic, socioeconomic well-being, and opportunity structures of four different community types: Established Latino counties, Rapid Growth Latino counties, Rapid Growth Non-Latino counties, and Slow Growth/Loss counties. For similar groupings of nonmetropolitan counties in the United States see Kandel and Parrado (2006).

We classify both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties in the Midwest using three factors: 1) The Latino proportion of county population in 2010, 2) the percent change in Latino population between 2010 and 2020, and 3) the overall total county population change between 2010 and 2020. Following definitions by Parrado & Kandel (2010), we create a county typology as follows: 1) *Established Latino Counties* are those in which the proportion of the Latino population in 2010 was at least 6.5% (mean + ½ SD); 2) *Rapid Growth Latino Counties* are those that had less than 6.5% Latino population in 2010, but their percent of Latinos increased by 2.1% between 2010 and 2020 (mean + ½ SD); 3) *Rapid Growth Non-Latino Counties* were less than 6.5% Latino in 2010, their percent Latino increased by less than 2.1% between 2010 and 2020, and experienced overall population growth between 2010 and 2020 of at least 3.3% (mean + ½ SD); and 4) *Slow Growth or Loss Counties* were less than 6.5% Latino in 2010, their percent Latino increased by less than 2.1% between 2010 and 2020, and experienced overall population growth between 2010 and 2020 of less than 3.3%. Our Midwest County typology is specified in Table 1.

Table 1. Classification Criteria for Midwest County Typology

County Type	2010 Latino Population	Latino Population Growth Rate, 2010-2020	Percent Total Population Change, 2010-2020
Established Latino	≥ 6.5%		
Rapid Growth Latino	< 6.5%	≥ 2.1%	
Rapid Growth Non-Latino	< 6.5%	< 2.1%	≥ 3.3%
Slow Growth & Declining Non-Latino	< 6.5%	< 2.1%	< 3.3%

Findings

Population Size and Racial/Ethnic Composition, 2020

According to the 2020 U.S. census, the U.S. population count was 331.4 billion as of April 1, 2020. The Latino population count was 62.1 million, representing 18.7% of the total population. In the Midwest, the total population count in 2020 was 69.0 million, and the Latino population count was 6.0 million, representing 8.7% of the total population in the region (Table 2). The non-Hispanic White population count in 2020 was 191.7 million (57.8%) in the U.S. and 50.1 million (72.6%) in the Midwest. The African American population count in 2020 was 39.9 million (12.1%) in the U.S. and 7.1 million (10.3%) in the Midwest. The Asian population count, including Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islanders, was 20.2 million (6.1%) in the U.S. and 2.4 million (3.6%) in the Midwest. The American Indian or Alaska Native count was 2.3 million (0.7%) in the U.S. and 382.8 thousand (0.6%) in the Midwest.

Table 2: Total Population by Race and Ethnicity for the United States and Midwest Region: U.S. Census, 2020

Race and Ethnicity	United States		Midwest	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Total	331,449,281	100.0	68,985,454	100.0
Hispanics or Latino	62,080,044	18.7	5,978,786	8.7
Non-Hispanic White	191,697,647	57.8	50,082,552	72.6
Black or African American	39,940,338	12.1	7,111,553	10.3
American Indian and Alaska Native	2,251,699	0.7	382,776	0.6
Asian	19,618,719	5.9	2,385,691	3.5
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander	622,018	0.2	38,022	0.1
Some other race	1,689,833	0.5	242,361	0.4
Two or more Races	13,548,983	4.1	2,763,713	4.0

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, 2020). Data retrieved from IPUMS-NHGIS (<https://www.nhgis.org/>).

Population Size by Latino Specific Origin, 2020

Latinos are not a monolithic group. In 2019, 61.7% of Latinos in the U.S. were of Mexican origin, 13.3% were Central Americans, 9.7% Puerto Ricans, 7.8% South Americans, 3.8% Cubans, and 3.6% were Other Latinos. In the Midwest in 2019, 71.1% of Latinos were of Mexican origin, 10.8% were Puerto Ricans, 7.6% Central Americans, 5.6% South Americans, 3.3% Other Latinos, and 1.7% were Cuban Americans (Table 3).


Table 3. Latino Population by Specific Origin, 2019

Specific Origin	United States		Midwest	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Mexican	33,697,519	61.72	3,629,830	71.05
Puerto Rican	5,281,053	9.67	552,509	10.81
Cuban	2,090,824	3.83	84,454	1.65
Central American	7,268,909	13.31	386,776	7.57
South American	4,281,322	7.84	287,526	5.63
Other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino	1,973,648	3.62	167,911	3.29
Total	54,593,275	100.00	5,109,006	100.00

Latino Population Change, 1980 to 2020


The U.S. Latino population increased steadily over the last five decades, increasing from 14.6 million in 1980 to 62.1 million people in 2020 (Figure 1). As a share of the U.S. population, Latinos continuously increased from 6.4% in 1980 to 18.7% in 2020 (Figure 2). Another way to look at the Latino population change is to compare the Latino share of the U.S. population growth in each decade. The Latino share of the growth of the U.S. population was 35.0% between 1980 and 1990, 39.6% between 1990 and 2000, 55.5% between 2000 and 2010, and 51.1% between 2010 and 2020 (Figure 3).

Figure 1: U.S. Latino Population Change, 1980 to 2020




Source: U.S. Census Bureau (1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, 2020). Data retrieved from IPUMS-NHGIS (<https://www.nhgis.org/>).

Figure 2: Percent of U.S. Population Latino, 1980 to 2020



Source: U.S. Census Bureau (1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, 2020). Data retrieved from IPUMS-NHGIS (<https://www.nhgis.org/>).


Figure 3: Latino Percentage share of U.S. Population Growth



Source: U.S. Census Bureau (1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, 2020). Data retrieved from IPUMS-NHGIS (<https://www.nhgis.org/>).


The Latino population in the Midwest region also increased steadily over the last five decades, increasing from 1.3 million in 1980 to 6.0 million in 2020 (Figure 4). The percent of the Midwest Latino population increased from 2.2% in 1980 to 8.7% in 2020 (Figure 5). In 2020, the percent of the Latino population in the Midwest is highest in the state of Illinois, followed by Kansas, Nebraska, Indiana, and Wisconsin (Figure 6).

Figure 4: Midwest Latino Population Change, 1980 to 2020




Source: U.S. Census Bureau (1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, 2020). Data retrieved from IPUMS-NHGIS (<https://www.nhgis.org/>).

Figure 5: Percent of Midwest Population Latino, 1980 to 2020



Source: U.S. Census Bureau (1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, 2020). Data retrieved from IPUMS-NHGIS (<https://www.nhgis.org/>).


Figure 6: Percent of Midwest Population Latino by State 2020



Source: U.S. Census Bureau (1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, 2020). Data retrieved from IPUMS-NHGIS (<https://www.nhgis.org/>).

The Latino share of the growth of the Midwest population was 56.9% between 1980 and 1990, 29.6% between 1990 and 2000, 60.7% between 2000 and 2010, and 64.0% between 2010 and 2020 (Figure 7).

Figure 7: Latino Percentage share of Midwest Population Growth



Source: U.S. Census Bureau (1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, 2020). Data retrieved from IPUMS-NHGIS (<https://www.nhgis.org/>).

U.S. and Midwest Population Change by Race/Ethnicity, 2010 to 2020

This section focuses only on the population change by race/ethnicity in the last decade (2010–2020). U.S. population change in the last decade is mostly attributable to, on one hand, the growth of Latino and Asian populations and, on the other hand, the decline of the non-Hispanic White population. The Latino population in the U.S. grew from 50.5 million people in 2010 to 62.1 million in 2020, or a gain of 23.0%. The Latino percentage share of U.S. population growth was 51.1%. The Asian population, excluding Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander, increased from 14.5 million in 2010 to 19.6 million in 2020, an increase of 35.6%. The Asian percentage share of the U.S. population growth was 22.7%. In contrast, the non-Hispanic



White population decreased from 196.8 million in 2010 to 191.7 million in 2020, a decrease of 2.6%. The non-Hispanic White percentage share of the U.S. population growth was -22.6% (Table 4).

Table 4: U.S. Total Population Change by Race/Ethnicity, 2010-2020

Race and Ethnicity	2010		2020		Change 2010-2020		
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	% Change	% Share
Total	308,745,538	100.0	331,449,281	100.0	22,703,743	7.4	100.0
Hispanics or Latino	50,477,594	16.3	62,080,044	18.7	11,602,450	23.0	51.1
Non-Hispanic White	196,817,552	63.7	191,697,647	57.8	-5,119,905	-2.6	-22.6
Black or African American	37,685,848	12.2	39,940,338	12.1	2,254,490	6.0	9.9
American Indian and Alaska Native	2,247,098	0.7	2,251,699	0.7	4,601	0.2	0.0
Asian	14,465,124	4.7	19,618,719	5.9	5,153,595	35.6	22.7
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander	481,576	0.2	622,018	0.2	140,442	29.2	0.6
Some other race	604,265	0.2	1,689,833	0.5	1,085,568	179.7	4.8
Two or more Races	5,966,481	1.9	13,548,983	4.1	7,582,502	127.1	33.4

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, 2020). Data retrieved from IPUMS-NHGIS (<https://www.nhgis.org/>).

In the Midwest region, population change is mostly attributable to the decline of the non-Hispanic White population and the increase of Latino and Asian populations. Between 2010 and 2020, the Midwest population increased from 66.9 million in 2010 to 69.0 million in 2020, representing a gain in population of 2.1 million (3.1%). The Latino population in the Midwest increased from 4.7 million in 2010 to almost 6.0 million in 2020, representing a gain of 1.3 million Latinos (28.3%). The Latino percentage share of the Midwest population growth was 64.0%. The Midwest region also experienced an increase in Asian populations of about 672.2 thousand (+39.2%). In contrast, the non-Hispanic White population decreased from 52.1 million in 2010 to 50.1 million in 2020, a population loss of 2.0 million non-Hispanic Whites, or 3.9%. The vast majority (97.8%) of population loss in the Midwest was due to non-Hispanic Whites (Table 5).


Table 5: Midwest Total Population Change by Race/Ethnicity, 2000-2010

Race and Ethnicity	2010		2020		Change 2010-2020		
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	% Change	% Share
Total	66,927,001	100.0	68,985,454	100.0	2,058,453	3.1	100.0
Hispanics or Latino	4,661,678	7.0	5,978,786	8.7	1,317,108	28.3	64.0
Non-Hispanic White	52,096,633	77.8	50,082,552	72.6	-2,014,081	-3.9	-97.8
Black or African American	6,843,367	10.2	7,111,553	10.3	268,186	3.9	13.0
American Indian and Alaska Native	388,068	0.6	382,776	0.6	-5,292	-1.4	-0.3
Asian	1,713,429	2.6	2,385,691	3.5	672,262	39.2	32.7
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander	24,932	0.0	38,022	0.1	13,090	52.5	0.6
Some other race	73,096	0.1	242,361	0.4	169,265	231.6	8.2
Two or more Races	1,125,798	1.7	2,763,713	4.0	1,637,915	145.5	79.6

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, 2020). Data retrieved from IPUMS-NHGIS (<https://www.nhgis.org/>).

Migration plays the most important role in redistributing the Midwest region population. The natural increase (births minus deaths) remained almost constant (an annual average above 3 per 1,000 population) from 2010 to 2016 but declined thereafter (an annual average below 3 people per 1,000 population). The rate of international migration also remained constant from 2010 to 2016 (an annual average of close to 2 people per 1,000 population) and then continually declined thereafter. The rate of internal migration has continuously been negative, suggesting that overall the Midwest region continues to lose population (Figure 8). Most people moved out of the Midwest between 2014 and 2016 (an annual average loss of about 3 people per 1,000 population). The internal migration of population in the Midwest can be attributable to changes in economic conditions over the last decade (Figure 8).

Figure 8: Components of Midwest Population Change, 2010-2019




Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Population Estimates: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019.

Age and Sex Composition

The age-sex composition of the Latino and non-Hispanic White populations is similar in both the United States and the Midwest region. The following section only presents the age-sex composition for the U.S. The Latino population is younger than the non-Hispanic White population. In 2020, 30.8% of the Latino population in the U.S. was under 18 years of age, compared to 18.6% of the non-Latino White population. Few Latinos were 65 years of age and older (7.7%) compared to non-Latino Whites (20.2%) (Figure 9).

Figure 9: U.S. Latino and non-Hispanic White Population by Age Groups, 2020



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey 1-year Estimates, Data retrieved from IPUMS-NHGIS (<https://www.nhgis.org/>).

Table 6 displays the median age by sex, race, and ethnicity in 2020 in the United States. The median age in 2020 for Latinos was 29.8 years (29.3 years for males and 30.3 years for females), compared to the median age for non-Hispanic Whites of 43.7 years (42.3 years for males and 45.3 years for females).

Table 6: Median Age of Population by Race/Ethnicity, United States, 2020

	Both sexes	Male	Female
<i>Latinos or Hispanics</i>	29.8	29.3	30.3
Non-Hispanic White	43.7	42.3	45.3
Black or African American	34.8	32.9	36.5
American Indian and Alaska Native	33.9	32.6	35.3
Asian	37.9	36.4	39.2
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander	32.7	32.1	33.3
Some other race	30.5	30.3	30.8
Two or more Races	20.8	20.4	21.3


Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2019 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, Data retrieved from IPUMS-NHGIS (<https://www.nhgis.org/>).

The age and sex distributions for the Latino and non-Latino White populations for 2019 in the United States are displayed in the population pyramids (Figure 10). The shapes of the pyramids indicate a much younger Latino population compared

to the non-Hispanic White population, which is top heavy. The Latino population pyramid shows larger proportions at younger ages and progressively smaller proportions at older age. The wider base of the pyramid reflects relatively higher proportions of young Latinos. In contrast, the non-Hispanic White pyramid has a much more rectangular shape, which indicates an older population. The base of the non-Latino pyramid is narrower, reflecting relatively fewer young people. The non-Hispanic White pyramid also reveals a larger proportion of older age groups.

The Latino pyramid also reveals a larger proportion of individuals under 10 years of age for Latinos (16.7% for males, 15.7% for females) as compared to non-Hispanic Whites (10.5% for males, 9.6% for females). Whereas 18.7% of males and 17.3% females of the Latino population were ages 10 to 24, only 11.3% of males and 10.2% of females for the non-Hispanic White population were within this age group. About 29.5% of males and 29.8% of females for the Latino population were ages 25 to 44 as compared to 24.7% of males and 24.1% of females for the non-Hispanic White population in this age group. Among Latinos, 20.4% of males and 21.2% of females were 45 to 64 years of age, while 28.4% of males and 28.5% of females of non-Hispanic Whites were in that age group. Relatively few Latinos (7.0% of males and 8.8% of females) were age 65 and older compared with non-Hispanic Whites (19.9% of males and 22.8% of females) (Figure 10). The younger age composition of the Latino population likely reflects the continued migration to the United States. The non-Latino White pyramid reveals the aging of the baby-boom generation with a much greater proportion of older groups (65 years and older) than Latinos.

Figure 10: U.S. Latino and Non-Hispanic White Population Pyramids



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2019 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates.

The Spatial Distribution of Latino Population in the Midwest by County, 2020

Figure 11 shows a map of the Midwest that displays the total Latino population by county in 2020. The map displays the concentration of Latinos in each county in the Midwest. The largest concentration of Latinos in the Midwest is in Cook County, Illinois (1,382, 778), a long standing Established Latino area in Chicago metropolitan areas. Other metropolitan counties in 2020 with over 100,000 Latinos include Lake, Illinois (171,962), Kane, Illinois (169,595), Milwaukee, Wisconsin (153,017), DuPage, Illinois (144,291), Will, Illinois (130,851), Marion, Indiana (129,286), and Wayne County, Michigan (117,649). The map also shows nonmetropolitan counties with substantial numbers of Latinos (over 10,000), including Finney, Kansas (19,883), Ford, Kansas (19,666), Seward, Kansas (14,406), Walworth, Wisconsin (12,550), and LaSalle, Illinois (11,456) (Figure 11).

Figure 11: Map of the Latino Population in the Midwest, 2020




Table 7 (next page) provides descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) of demographic characteristics by county type. The total population in 2020 and population change in the last decade in the Midwest were significantly different in the four types of counties. The average total population in 2020 in Established Latino counties was 164,281, compared with 35,306 in Rapid Growth Latino, 119,747 in Rapid Growth Non-Latino, and 36,578 in Slow Growth or Loss counties. The total population in the Established Latino counties decreased on average by 0.72% compared with 2.7% in Rapid Growth Latino and 9.0% in Rapid Growth Non-Latino counties. Slow Growth or Loss counties decreased in their population by almost 4%. As expected, based on the definition of these county types provided above, Established Latino counties had the largest average

Latino population in 2020 (27,824) of any county type. The Rapid Growth Latino and Established Latino counties experienced about 3% Latino increase compared with Rapid Growth Non-Latino and Slow Growth or Loss counties that experienced 1% or less increase between 2010 and 2020. In 2020, Established Latino counties had the highest proportion of foreign-born populations than in other county types (8.5%). By comparison, Rapid Growth Latino and Rapid Growth Non-Latino counties had 3.4% while Slow Growth or Loss counties had 1.7% foreign-born populations. Established Latino counties have the highest percentage of Blacks than any other county type. On average, the percent Black in Established Latino counties was 4.2% in 2020 compared with 2.0% in Rapid Growth Latino, 3.0% in Rapid Growth Non-Latino, and 2.0% in Slow Growth or Loss counties. The percent Asian was also highest in Established Latino counties. On average, the percent Asian was 1.9% in Established Latino counties, 1.8% in Rapid Growth Non-Latino counties, 1.0% in Rapid Growth Latino counties, and 0.6% in Slow Growth or Loss counties.

Established Latino counties on average had lower percentages of non-Latino White populations (72.7%) than Rapid Growth Latino (85.5%), Rapid Growth Non-Latino (85.9%), and Slow Growth or Loss counties (88.5%). Established Latino counties have on average a greater percentage of their population under 18 years of age (24.5%), whereas the Slow Growth or Loss counties had the lowest (22.0%). Both Rapid Growth Latino and Rapid Growth Non-Latino counties had about 23.0% of their populations under 18 years of age. In sharp contrast, Slow Growth or Loss counties had the highest percentage (20.6%) of people 65 years of age and older of any county type. Rapid Growth Latino counties had on average 19.3% of people aged 65 years and older, followed by Rapid Growth Non-Latino counties (17.1%) and Established Latino counties (16.7%).

Most counties in the Midwest are overrepresented in nonmetropolitan (71.4%) than in metropolitan (28.6%) areas. Rapid Growth Latino counties were overwhelmingly nonmetropolitan counties (86.5%), followed by Slow Growth counties (78.8%). By comparison, 65.3% of Established Latino counties and only 33.6% of Rapid Growth Non-Latino counties were in nonmetropolitan areas.

The next analysis highlights differences in socioeconomic and employment opportunity structures of Midwest counties by county typology (Table 8 on page 14). The average unemployment rate in 2020 was 4.3% in Slow Growth or Loss counties, 4.1% in Established Latino, 3.4% in Rapid Growth

Table 7. Demographic Characteristics by County Typology, 2020

	Total (N = 1,054)		Established Latino (N = 144)		Rapid Growth Latino (N = 89)		Rapid Growth Non- Latino (N = 146)		Slow Growth/Loss (N = 675)	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Demographics										
Total population, 2010	63,485	210,378	158,428	472,322	33,327	66,836	109,227	176,949	37,312	106,348
Total population, 2020	65,438	216,241	164,281	483,766	35,306	72,589	119,747	192,469	36,578	105,183
Percent population change, 2010-2020	-1.00	8.52	-0.72	5.94	2.73	18.088	9.01	6.89	-3.85	4.61
Latino population, 2010	4,423	40,093	23,030	106,124	1,495	3,575	3,530	7,057	1,032	4,767
Latino population, 2020	5,672	45,084	27,824	118,583	2,590	5,585	5,491	10,923	1,392	6,151
% Latino, 2010	3.79	5.37	13.68	9.29	3.48	1.60	2.53	1.37	1.98	1.23
% Latino, 2020	5.15	6.39	16.88	10.71	6.83	2.17	3.63	1.67	2.76	1.50
Latino change, 2010 - 2020	1.37	1.44	3.19	2.18	3.34	1.44	1.11	0.48	0.77	0.56
% Foreign born, 2020	2.99	3.50	8.45	5.87	3.42	2.17	3.41	2.68	1.68	1.24
% non-Hispanic White, 2020	85.70	12.07	72.65	12.56	85.50	7.17	85.90	6.95	88.46	11.53
% Black, 2020	2.44	4.50	4.16	5.57	1.95	3.69	2.98	3.90	2.02	4.37
% Asian, 2020	0.96	1.52	1.93	2.48	1.00	1.67	1.83	2.01	0.56	0.74
% Native Americans, 2020	1.93	8.47	0.53	0.94	1.20	3.45	1.45	3.07	2.43	10.37
% < 18 years, 2020	22.58	3.07	24.46	2.43	23.04	2.70	22.99	3.14	22.02	3.04
% ≥ 65 years, 2020	19.48	4.20	16.71	3.15	19.33	4.29	17.11	4.29	20.60	3.87
% non-metropolitan, 2020	71.35	45.24	65.28	47.78	86.52	34.35	33.56	47.38	78.81	40.89

Non-Latino, and 3.2% in Rapid Growth Latino counties. This is consistent with the expectation that employment opportunities attract Latino population growth in these new destinations.

Rapid Growth Latino and Rapid Growth Non-Latino counties exhibited lower poverty rates (3.6%) than Slow Growth or Loss (13.5%) and Established Latino counties (12.1%). The percentage of households receiving public assistance on average was highest in Slow Growth/Loss counties (2.3%), followed by Rapid Growth Non-Latino counties (1.9%). Established Latino and Rapid Growth Latino counties had the lowest proportion of households receiving public assistance (1.8%). Housing ownership was lowest in Established Latino counties (70.5%) as compared to Rapid Growth Latino (71.5%), Rapid Growth Non-Latino (74.0%), and Slow Growth or Loss counties, which had the highest housing ownership rate (74.9%).

Rapid Growth Non-Latino counties had the highest average proportion of residents with a college degree or higher (30.0%). The lowest average college educational attainment was in Slow Growth or Loss counties (19.7%). About 23% of residents in Established Latino and Rapid Growth Latino counties had a

college degree or higher. In terms of high school diploma or equivalent, the highest average proportion was 37.3% in Slow Growth or Loss counties, followed by 33.8% in Rapid Growth Latino, 31.6% in Established Latino, and 29.7% in Rapid Growth Non-Latino counties.

The median household income was highest in the Rapid Growth Non-Latino counties (\$63,693), followed by that of Established Latino (\$56,274). By comparison, the median household income in Rapid Growth Latino counties was \$54,012 and the lowest was in Slow Growth or Loss counties (\$52,288). The median per-capita income was highest in Rapid Growth Non-Latino (\$32,040) counties, followed by that in Rapid Growth Latino counties (\$30,127). Established Latino counties had a median per capita income of \$28,709, while Slow Growth or Loss counties had a median per-capita income of \$27,951. On average, the highest average proportion of affluent residents (i.e., with a household income of \$75,000 or higher) was in Rapid Growth Non-Latino counties.

The opportunity structures of these four types of counties differ significantly. Employment in core industries was lowest in

Table 8. Socioeconomic and Employment Characteristics by County Typology, 2020

	Total (N = 1,054)		Established Latino (N = 144)		Rapid Latino Growth (N = 89)		Rapid non- Latino growth (N = 89)		Slow Growth/Loss (N = 675)	
	Mean/ median	Std. Dev.	Mean/ median	Std. Dev.	Mean/ median	Std. Dev.	Mean/ median	Std. Dev.	Mean/ median	Std. Dev.
Educational attainment										
% with a high school diploma or equivalent	35.17	6.39	31.61	6.16	33.75	5.82	29.67	6.23	37.30	5.37
% with a college degree or higher	21.93	7.66	23.26	8.13	23.10	7.08	30.05	9.99	19.73	5.47
Employment and Income										
% unemployed, 2020	4.08	2.28	4.05	1.50	3.18	1.64	3.43	1.22	4.34	2.59
% in poverty, 2020	12.62	5.25	12.10	3.56	11.37	3.59	9.81	3.80	13.50	5.73
% of households receiving public assistance, 2020	2.13	1.71	1.77	0.88	1.78	1.17	1.86	0.89	2.31	1.99
% Housing owner, 2020	73.86	7.00	70.51	7.15	71.49	7.39	74.02	8.00	74.85	6.37
% Affluent, 2020	34.47	8.06	36.33	7.50	35.00	7.64	43.02	8.64	32.15	6.62
Median household income (\$)*	54,194		56,274		54,012		63,693		52,288	
Per capita income (\$)*	28,842		28,709		30,127		32,940		27,951	
Occupation and Industry										
% core industries ¹	41.14	6.46	42.57	6.16	39.31	7.72	40.92	6.15	41.12	6.34
% periphery industries ¹	41.23	7.37	39.41	6.96	44.57	8.62	38.43	6.40	41.78	7.21
% primary occupations ¹	41.53	6.20	40.82	6.43	42.52	5.79	46.80	7.04	40.40	5.36
% secondary/farm Occupations ⁴	56.82	5.89	57.30	6.05	55.90	5.60	51.80	6.84	57.92	5.04

* Median.

¹ Core industries include: mining, quarrying, and oil extraction; construction; manufacturing; wholesale trade; transportation and warehousing, and utilities; information; finance and insurance, real estate, and rental and leasing; and professional, scientific, management, administrative, and waste management services.

² Periphery industries include: agriculture, forestry, and fishing and hunting; retail trade; education services; health care and social assistance.

³ Primary occupations include: management, business, and financial; and sales and related occupations.

⁴ Secondary/farm occupations include: service; office and administrative support; natural resources, construction, and maintenance; and production, transportation, and material moving occupations.

Rapid Growth Latino counties as compared to all other county types. Employment in core industries was, on average, 39.2% in Rapid Growth Latino counties, 40.9% in Rapid Growth Non-Latino counties, 41.1% in Slow Growth or Loss counties, and 42.6% in Established Latino counties.

In contrast, employment in periphery industries was higher in Rapid Growth Latino counties (44.6%), followed by Slow Growth or Loss counties (41.8%), Established Latino counties (39.4%), and Rapid Growth Non-Latino counties (38.4%).

In terms of occupation, Rapid Growth Non-Latino counties exhibited higher average proportions of civilian population 16 years of age and older employed in primary occupations (46.8%), followed by Rapid Growth Latino counties (42.5%), Slow Growth or Loss counties (40.4%), and Established Latino counties (40.8%). Secondary/farm occupations were highest in

Slow Growth or Loss counties (57.9%), followed by Established Latino counties (57.3%), Rapid Growth Latino counties (55.9%), and Rapid Growth Non-Latino counties (51.8%).

Discussion and Conclusion

The Latino population in the U.S. has increased significantly from 14.6 million in 1980 to 62.1 million in 2020, an increase of 325%. In 2020, Latinos represented 18.7% of the U.S. population, almost three times the Latino share of the U.S. population than in 1980 (6.4%).

In the last decade (2010-2020), over one-half of the share of the U.S. population growth is attributable to Latinos compared to 35% between 1980 and 1990. In 2020, the size of the Latino population was about 1.5 times higher than the African American population and almost one third of the non-Hispanic White

population. Natural increase is a vital component of Latino population growth. The other is international migration. The Latino population has become more diverse over time and is comprised of Mexican Americans and Mexican origin peoples (over 60%), Cubans, Puerto Ricans, Central Americans, South Americans, and Other Latinos. Compared to non-Latino Whites, Latinos are a much younger population. In 2020, 30.8% of the Latino population was younger than 18 years of age compared to 18.6% of non-Latino Whites. Relatively few Latinos were age 65 and older (7.7%) compared to non-Latino Whites (20.2%).

The Midwest region is one of the growing destinations outside of established Latino gateways and regional ethnic hubs in the Southwest, West, and Northeast regions of the country. The Latino population in the Midwest has steadily increased over the last five decades, growing from 1.3 million in 1980 to almost 6 million in 2020, having nearly quadrupled during those 40 years. In 2020, the share of the Midwest Latino population was highest in the state of Illinois, especially in the Chicago metropolitan area. Latinos also increased in nonmetropolitan counties in Kansas, Iowa, Nebraska, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan. The Midwest population change is mostly attributable to the increase of the Latino population.

How did the Latino population change in the last decade relate to the socioeconomic well-being of their new settlement communities in the Midwest? Rapid Growth Latino and Rapid Growth Non-Latino counties had lower poverty rates compared to Established Latino and Slow Growth or Loss counties. The median per-capita income was highest in Rapid Growth Non-Latino counties, followed in order by Rapid Growth Latino, Established Latino, and Slow Growth or Loss counties. These results suggest that Rapid Growth Non-Latino counties have, on average, relatively more prosperous communities than the other three other types of counties. This is evident when one considers the median household income, which is highest in the Rapid Growth Non-Latino Counties, followed by the Established Latino and Rapid Growth Latino counties, with the lowest median household income being in Slow Growth or Loss counties. Rapid Growth Non-Latino counties also have the highest average proportion of affluent and college educated residents.

Our analysis shows that Rapid Growth Latino counties, which are mostly rural counties, had lower unemployment rates, suggesting that employment opportunities generate Latino population growth in those areas. This may also suggest that employment opportunities are greater in those new destinations. However, a closer look at types of jobs finds that primary occupations, which on average pay more than secondary/farm occupations, were on average higher in Rapid Growth Non-

Latino counties, followed by Rapid Growth Latino, than in Slow Growth or Loss and in Established Latino counties. Secondary or farm occupations were, on average, found more in Slow Growth or Loss and in Established Latino counties than in Rapid Growth Latino and Rapid Growth Non-Latino counties.

The types and quality of available jobs found in communities matter. Employment opportunities in core industries were lowest in Rapid Growth Latino compared to other community types. Not surprisingly, employment opportunities in periphery industries were also highest in Rapid Growth Latino counties. This is consistent with the economic restructuring of occupation and industries of recent decades which suggest that the newly created jobs that attract Latinos to new destinations in the rural Midwest are those requiring lesser skills and offering relatively lower wages and are concentrated in periphery industries which may do little to alleviate Latino economic disadvantage.

Latino population growth is also affecting the ethnic makeup of Midwestern communities. The Latino population is relatively young compared to non-Latino populations and is likely to continue to increase, given their high fertility levels, even during times of reduced international migration. These results suggest that continued Latino population growth in new destination communities as in the Midwest will likely require assistance programs to promote their integration, including information regarding schools, childcare, churches, hospitals, banks, state service agencies, and immigration laws, etc. The increasing number of Latinos in new destination communities contributes to the local economy through payroll taxes, social security withholdings, spending in local businesses and, importantly, new business startups. Work policies that emphasize creating good jobs (i.e., jobs that pay a living wage) would help alleviate poverty and overall social and economic disadvantage, thereby improving community well-being. Finally, work policies that give workers the bargaining power to negotiate the terms of their employment are beneficial to both workers and companies.

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GAO Study Finds Latina/os are Underrepresented in Media Industries

by Richard Cruz Davila

On October 1, 2020, members of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC) and the House Committee on Oversight and Reform (COR) directed a letter to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) requesting that the GAO “issue a report on the representation of Latinos in employment and management positions in the film, television, and publishing industries, and the enforcement of federal equal opportunity requirements on those industries by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Department of Labor (DOL)” (2020, p. 1). On September 21, 2021, the GAO returned its report, *Workforce Diversity: Analysis of Federal Data Shows Hispanics Are Underrepresented in the Media Industry*, which concluded that in 2019 Latina/os made up only 12 percent of the media workforce, compared to 18 percent of workers in the rest of the workforce. The impetus behind the CHC and COR’s request and the results of the GAO’s report are summarized here.

The CHC/COR letter cites two university studies to support its claim that “nearly one in five Americans is Latino, yet Latino Americans are dramatically underrepresented in employment in and representation by the film and television industry” (2020, p. 1). The first study, *Latinos in Film: Erasure On Screen & Behind the Camera Across 1,200 Popular Movies*, developed by members of the USC Annenberg Inclusion Initiative, the National Association of Latino Independent Producers, and Wise Media, was released in August of 2019. Among the study’s several key findings were: 1) that only 3 percent of the 100 top grossing films from 2007-2018 featured Latina/os in lead roles, whereas Latina/os made up 18.3 percent of the population in

2018; 2) that 47 percent of the 1,200 movies sampled had no Latina/o characters with speaking roles; 3) that only 11 percent of the 200 top films of 2017-2018 had two Latina/o actors in top-billed slots and that Latina/os were often cast in stereotyped roles as poor or criminal; and 4) that Latina/os were significantly underrepresented in creative roles such as producer, director, and casting director, and that films with Latina/o producers, directors, and casting directors had a significantly higher percentage of Latina/o characters. The study concludes with suggestions on how individuals, organizations, and companies across the media ecosystem, including talent agencies, studios, casting directors, film festivals, philanthropists, corporations, and legislators, should enact steps to increase representation of Latina/os.

The second study cited in the CHC/COR letter is the *Hollywood Diversity Report 2020: A Tale of Two Hollywoods*, written by Darnell Hunt and Ana-Christina Ramón of the Division of Social Sciences at UCLA. The study’s key findings were fourfold: 1) that members of racial/ethnic minority groups accounted for over 40 percent of the U.S. population in 2019 but only 27.6 percent of film leads (and 32.7 percent of all characters), 15.1 percent of directors, 13.9 percent of writers, and 9 percent of studio heads; 2) that women, who constitute slightly more than half of the U.S. population, were likewise underrepresented as lead and total actors (44.1 and 40.2 percent, respectively), directors (15.1 percent), writers (17.4 percent), and studio heads (18 percent); 3) that films with minority leads and/or directors gained ground in terms of Academy Awards recognition compared to a similar study conducted in 2015, while films with women leads lost ground and no films with women directors won an Oscar for the fourth year in a row; and 4) that in 2018 and 2019 films with more diverse casts generated greater box office revenue than films with less diverse casts and were released in more international markets—though films with Black actors in lead roles or with majority-minority casts were released in the fewest international markets. The report concludes with a list of best practices drawn from a previous UCLA study, “By All M.E.A.N.S. Necessary: Essential Practices for Transforming Hollywood Diversity and Inclusion,” which calls on persons in positions of power to take affirmative steps to increase diversity in both on-screen and creative roles.

Based on the findings of these studies, the CHC and COR conclude that “persistent and systemic underrepresentation of



Germaine Franco
Film Score Composer



Bad Bunny & J Balvin
Musicians


Latino Americans in the media distorts the media's depictions of Latino communities and perpetuates harmful stereotypes" (2020, p. 1). To better understand issues of diversity in media, the CHC/COR letter requests that the GAO analyze the film, television, and publishing industries with attention to the following topics: the numbers of Latina/os working in these industries and the roles they play, broken down from executive- to entry-level; the number of projects with Latina/o writers, showrunners, producers, directors, and leads, as well as Latina/o authors and editors in the publishing industry; the number of Latina/os at casting agencies and related barriers for Latina/o talent; the numbers of Latina/os in relevant labor unions and how membership policies impact diversity in media productions; gaps in Latina/o representation in the film and television industries; and records of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission enforcement relating to Latina/os in media industries. They further request that data collected be disaggregated by race, ethnicity, and gender.

In response, the GAO conducted an audit of media industries from June 2021 to September 2021 using 2014-2019 data from the annual American Community Survey (ACS) Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS), generated by the Census Bureau, and 2014-2018 data from the annual Employer Information Reports (EEO-1), generated by the EEOC. The results of their analyses are presented in two forms: 1) percentage estimates of Latina/os in specific media occupations drawn from the ACS data sets, and 2) percentages of Latina/os in 10 job categories drawn from the EEOC data. The categories used in the EEOC data are, the report states, "broader categories that cover media and non-media occupations from entry-level to management-level positions" (2021, p. 2).

The chief findings of the GAO report are that Latina/os are underrepresented in media industries, and that Latina/o representation varies by occupation. The report states that Latina/os accounted for only 12 percent of media industry workers in 2019, according to ACS data, but 18 percent of

workers in the remainder of the workforce, meaning "workers in all industries outside of the media industry combined" (2021, p. 3). Further, Latina/o representation in the media workforce did not show a significant increase in the period under analysis, remaining between 11 and 12 percent from 2014 to 2019. The report also finds significant differences in Latina/o representation between sectors. While Latina/os accounted for 16 percent of workers in the motion picture and video industries in 2019, 15 percent of workers in sound recording industries, and 14 percent in radio/television broadcasting, cable, and other subscription programming, they accounted for 8 percent of workers in newspaper, periodical, book, and directory publishing industries, and 9 percent in other information services.

In addition to variation in Latina/o representation by sector, both ACS and EEOC data show significant gaps in representation by occupation. The ACS data indicate that Latina/os account for 16 percent of music directors and composers, and 14 percent of camera operators and other equipment workers, but only 10 percent of producers and directors, 8 percent of writers and authors, and 7 percent of editors. EEOC data likewise show Latina/o media workers concentrated in technical, administrative, and service job categories, and a dearth of Latina/os in upper- and mid-level management and positions requiring bachelor or graduate degrees and/or professional certifications. Most notably, while Latina/os accounted for 22 percent of service workers in media industries in 2018, they accounted for only 4 percent of those in senior and executive management positions. Further, from 2014 to 2018, there was no change in the percentage of Latina/os in senior and executive management while there was a six percent gain in the percentage of Latina/o service workers.

The GAO's initial report is largely concerned with presenting the data and does not draw conclusions beyond acknowledging that Latina/os are underrepresented in media industries. It also does not address the question of EEOC enforcement posed by the CHC and COR—as the CHC/COR letter acknowledges, in 2015 the EEOC began an investigation into discrimination against women in the film and television industries. A follow-up GAO report is expected in the spring of this year that may address these questions. The initial report makes clear, though, the degree to which Latina/os are particularly underrepresented in positions of influence in media industries. If it is true, as the CHC/COR letter suggests, that the persistence of discrimination in media industries has "uniquely harmful effects on society [as] the media can influence the broader culture and shape the public perception of entire groups," (2020, p. 1), then immediate action should be taken to rectify these disparities. 

New Faces



Zereth Bustamante Luevano is a second-year graduate student pursuing her master's degree in Human Resources and Labor Relations. In 2020, Zereth obtained her Bachelor's degree in Business Administration at Eastern Michigan University with a major in Human Resources Management. She is a sister in the Sigma Lambda Gamma National

Sorority, Incorporated, and serves as the Academic Advisor for her home chapter at Eastern Michigan University. After graduating, Zereth plans to have a career in the field of human resources specializing in either Diversity, Equity and Inclusion or Talent & Development. 🌱

Send Offs



David Figueroa Martin, Office Assistant, graduated with a Master of Arts degree in Human Resources and Labor Relations in December. In January, he left JSRI and MSU for a position with Marathon Petroleum Corporation as a Human Resource Business Partner. His employment resulted from a paid internship in El Paso, TX with Marathon Petroleum in

the summer of 2021. David joined JSRI as a graduate research assistant in January 2018 and was hired by JSRI in October 2019 as a full-time office assistant. His penchant for accuracy was greatly appreciated. He was a dedicated and enthusiastic employee who already is greatly missed. 🌱

The Search for a New Director



October 31, 2021 was the last day that Dr. Rubén Martínez served as director of the Julian Samora Research Institute after leading the unit for 14 years. A search committee has been formed with Dr. Mary Finn, Dean of the College of Social Science, as the chair. It is expected that Latino Community Leaders throughout Michigan will be consulted so that the type of Institute

Leadership will align with the interests and needs of Latino communities. 🌱



Marcos Martínez, Student research assistant, graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics with a minor in Chicano/Latino Studies in December. Offered employment by a couple of firms, in January he accepted a position with the Lansing Lugnuts as a Group Sales Account Executive based on his interest to one day work in the professional sports sector. Marcos

worked at MSU Outreach and Engagement as a student tech assistant from March 2015 to December 2021. He will continue as an on-call employee to assist with JSRI's newsletter, *NEXO*. His friendliness and energy are contagious. He loves sports and cats! 🌱

Erratum to NEXO Issue, Vol. 25, No.1

Corrections to "The Role of Social Capital Motives in the Adoption of Appropriate Technology by Latino Farmers"

Figures in Table 2 on page 26 are based on responses to the statement: "During the last year, how many times have you received advice for your agricultural operations from the following sources:"

Figures in Table 3 on page 26 are based on a Likert scale ranging from 0 (not important) to 10 (very important).

Corrected Table 7 is provided here.

Table 7. Farmers' Motivations When Making Important Investments

Motivations	Number		Min.		Max.		Mean		Standard Deviation	
	S1	S2	S1	S2	S1	S2	S1	S2	S1	S2
To save money and time – <i>Own Consumption</i>	26	35	30	25	100	100	87.3	74.1	19.1	19.4
To show to my friends – <i>Self Respect</i>	2	11	5	5	10	80	0.6	5.4	3.5	21.2
I always should use the best – <i>Good-will</i>	11	26	10	10	50	100	10.8	16.8	13.1	18.2
To join a community of efficient agricultural producers – <i>Belonging</i>	1	1	10	10	10	10	0.4	0.3	0	0
To support the business that sells it – <i>Sharing</i>	1	9	25	5	25	25	0.9	3.4	0	7.04

Source: Estimated by the authors.

S1 (Scenario 1)

S2 (Scenario 2)

Access to Farmworker Labor Camps: A Case Study of *Folgueras v. Hassle*

by Elizabeth McClain*

Farmworkers have the right to receive visitors at their agricultural labor housing in Michigan and service providers have the right to enter and leave property that has agricultural labor housing without the knowledge or permission of the property owner or the farmworkers' employers. The case *Folgueras v. Hassle*, 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. 1971) is an important case to remember when discussing the rights related to agricultural labor camp access for persons providing information or services to farmworkers and for private citizens who have been invited by a resident living at an agricultural labor camp. The *Folgueras* case in Michigan was decided after two separate lawsuits, one involving outreach workers of a service provider and a migrant farmworker family and the other involving the United States, were brought against farmer Joseph Hassle for denying access to the farmworkers residing in his labor camps.

The court considered two separate questions: (1) Do farmworkers residing in agricultural labor camps that are privately owned by an agricultural employer, labor camp owner, or other labor camp operator have the right to receive visitors, and (2) do agencies that provide services to farmworkers have the right to enter the camps and otherwise access the workers in the camps without interference by the agricultural employer, labor camp owner, or other labor camp operator? The court answered yes to both questions as detailed below.

The facts giving rise to the lawsuits originated in the summer of 1969. Hassle owned various agricultural labor camps, including around 220 housing units, throughout Western Michigan. The camp at issue in this case was secluded and

could only be accessed by a solitary private roadway. The only mode of transportation for the majority of the families residing in this camp was through the crew leader. The Gutierrez family had been recruited from out of state to work for Hassle and had been fronted travel and living costs by Hassle's crew leader which were deducted from their initial pay. The family attempted to apply for food stamps to supplement their income, but Hassle refused to sign the required paperwork.

After being unable to apply for food stamps, the family reached out to United Migrants for Opportunity, Inc. (UMOI) for food assistance. UMOI was a private nonprofit organization that provided numerous services to farmworkers, including legal aid, food assistance, and education assistance. Two student coordinators for UMOI, Donald Folgueras and Violadelle Valdez, went to visit the Gutierrez family in Hassle's camp at their request. The day before this visit, Folgueras had been forcibly removed from the camp after taking a water sample as part of UMOI's research of camp conditions. Hassle had received numerous complaints regarding minimum wages and an injury to a worker which crew leaders blamed on visitors coming into the camp to talk to the farmworkers residing there. As a result, Hassle had informed his crew leaders that any visitors to the camp should be arrested for trespass.

Valdez had been invited by the Gutierrez family and Folgueras accompanied her. Hassle saw them drive into the camp and arrived shortly after they did. Hassle immediately attacked Folgueras, including knocking him down and kicking him. Hassle kept Folgueras pinned to the ground with a shotgun for around two hours in front of numerous witnesses. The police were eventually called and Folgueras and Valdez were given the opportunity to leave the camp. When they refused to leave, they were arrested for criminal trespass.

The following summer, Hassle continued to deny access to all visitors at all of his labor camps. He prevented church affiliated organizations from entering his camp to provide spiritual or religious services, and violently attacked another UMOI employee. He denied access to one of his camps to a migrant health clinic worker from the Berrien County Health Department who sought to inform a worker that his son had been admitted to the hospital and that his wife had a miscarriage. Hassle threatened the clinic worker and the farmworkers if he found her at any of the camps. Further, he denied access to, and threatened physical violence against, an employee of Dowagiac Public School District who was recruiting children for migrant



summer school.

As a result of these facts, the United States brought a lawsuit, which the State of Michigan joined as a plaintiff, to prevent Hassle from denying access to his labor camps to representatives of federal, state, local, and private assistance programs. The rationale behind this lawsuit was that the United States Congress created programs designed to assist migrant farmworkers by providing financial assistance to agencies designed to improve the living conditions and skills of migrant farmworkers through the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. The Act includes providing financial assistance for activities such as education, health services, and legal advice and representation, to name a few. The United States also sought to prevent Hassle from denying entry to persons who had been invited on the property by those living in the labor camp and other people seeking entry on reasonable terms and conditions.

The United States and Hassle entered into a consent decree, which the Court signed and approved based on its analysis and opinion in this case. The Court discussed how the majority of farmworkers live in extreme poverty and how the current system leaves them without real bargaining power and actually incentivizes crew leaders to bring in workers for the lowest wages for farmers. It also discussed the often inadequate and overcrowded housing conditions, isolation of labor camps, language barriers for workers, unfamiliar geography, lack of transportation, and how long hours and low wages made leaving the camp difficult. The service programs and funding by Congress requires being able to access the workers to provide them services and to break the isolation and poverty that farm work perpetuates. In addition to the lawsuit by the United States, Folgueras and Valdez and members of the Guiterrez family also filed a lawsuit against Hassle claiming denial of equal protection and the deprivation of their privileges and immunities of citizenship under color of law.

The *Folgueras* Court considered and weighed the different rights in play regarding access to labor camps, including those of the camp owner, the farmworker, and the visitor. The labor

camp owner claimed property rights in the land. The farmworkers claimed their Constitutional rights of freedom of speech, religion, and association and their rights as tenants. Visitors claimed their Constitutional rights as well. After weighing all interests, the Court held that a labor camp's private property rights did not outweigh the rights of farmworkers and their visitors and that labor camp owners cannot bar access to visitors or representatives of assistance groups at labor camps.

The Court then analyzed the various rights asserted by all parties that supported its holding. It first analyzed the Constitutional rights claimed by both farmworkers and visitors. The Court found that constitutionally Hassle could not deprive farmworkers living in the camps, assistance organizations, or visitors of farmworkers reasonable access to the camps because he opened portions of his land for use by farm working families.

“[T]he court held that... labor camp owners cannot bar access to visitors or representatives of assistance groups at labor camps.”

In April of 1971, the Michigan Attorney General filed an opinion answering the question of whether public and private organizations may enter a labor camp to visit farmworkers without violating Michigan's criminal trespass statute. In Opinion of the Attorney General #4727, filed April 13, 1971, the Attorney General stated that when owners of labor camps permitted agricultural workers and their families to occupy the camp, the camp became public. Therefore, “the freedoms of religion, speech, press, and assembly guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution are operative throughout the length and breadth of the land” (p. 38) and do not stop existing inside of a labor camp.

Given the Michigan Attorney General's opinion, the Court analyzed whether enforcing the Michigan criminal trespass statute against labor camp visitors would be an unconstitutional state action under the First Amendment. The answer to this question was dependent upon the “nature and use of the property involved.” An older Supreme Court case, *Marsh v. Alabama*, dealt with a similar situation when it decided that private ownership in land was not enough to deprive workers living in a company town of their First and Fourteenth Amendment liberties because once privately owned land is opened to the public, it is no longer “private.” In *Marsh*, the Supreme Court reasoned that even though the workers lived on private land owned by the employer, they were still free citizens of the state and therefore had the right to remain informed and uncensored. Therefore, when a private landowner opens the property up to the public, their rights become limited by the rights of those using the property.





In *Folgueras*, the Court cited additional cases that used the principle used in *Marsh*: “the more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it” (1945, 506). Based on this analysis, the Court held that labor camp owners/operators, including Hassle, cannot constitutionally deprive service organizations or visitors reasonable access to the labor camps of farm workers because the land had been opened to the public once he allowed farmworkers to reside there. According to the Court, “[O]wnership alone [cannot] give him [Hassle] the right to censor the associations, information and friendships of migrants living in his camps. His rights of ownership of the land in question must bend to the countervailing rights of those persons rightfully living on his land.”

The *Folgueras* Court then analyzed the argument of whether property rights give a labor camp owner/operator the right to prevent access to farmworkers residing in their labor camps. The answer to this question is no. This discussion involved a common law school property textbook case example, *New Jersey v. Shack*. In *Shack*, the court found that property rights did “not include the right to bar access to governmental services available to migrant workers” even when an outreach worker and a staff attorney of a legal services organization had been previously convicted of criminal trespass after refusing to leave a privately owned migrant camp. The takeaway textbook holding established in this case was that: An owner/operator of a private labor camp does not have the right to dispense with the fundamental rights of those who reside there under property law. The *Folgueras* Court concurred with the Court in *Shack* that property rights of private camp owners/operators do not allow them to deny access to people or agencies that have the “primary objectives of the health, welfare or dignity of the migrant workers as human beings.”

Finally, the *Folgueras* Court analyzed whether farmworkers have rights to visitors under Michigan landlord-tenant law. The Court held that farmworkers residing in labor camps were tenants under Michigan law, and therefore were allowed to have guests and service provider organizations visit them at the agricultural labor camp. The Court reasoned a landlord/tenant relationship exists because the housing was part of the migrant worker’s compensation that provided a justification for the low wages that they are ultimately paid (the workers essentially pay for the housing via their low wages), the housing is required to meet specified minimum safety standards (the agricultural labor camp operator, acting as a landlord, maintains a fixed quality of the housing), and the workers receive exclusive possession of the unit so long as they work for the agricultural employer (a specified term of exclusive occupancy). Therefore, migrant farmworkers receive all the benefits of tenancy, including the right that a landlord (or agricultural employer/labor camp operator) not interfere with the tenants’ rights to associate with and invite guests of their own choosing.

The *Folgueras* Court found that owning real property does not give a property owner/operator the ability to control the lives of those who reside on that property. This conclusion was the same regardless of whether answering the question based on a constitutional analysis, a property rights analysis, or a landlord/tenant analysis.

Folgueras v. Hassle has a lasting impact for today’s farmworkers. It established that farmworkers have a Constitutional right to the freedoms of speech, religion, and association and as such a labor camp owner/operator cannot prevent service providers or guests from entering a labor camp to visit with farmworkers residing there. It also established that farmworkers residing in labor camps are tenants under Michigan’s landlord tenant law and they are entitled to the tenants’ rights to associate with, or invite, guests of their own choosing. Finally, it established that agencies that provide services to farmworkers have the right to enter and otherwise access the workers in the camps, without permission or interference by the camp owner or operator. 🌱

*Elizabeth McClain is an attorney with Farmworker Legal Services of Michigan

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Texas Abortion Policy: To Choose or not to Choose?

by Yoshira Macías Mejía

Abortion has been a contentious debate for over a hundred years. One side of this debate is often rooted in patriarchal perceptions, misguided religious views, and right-wing partisan politics. The other side is grounded in a discussion of freedom, women's right to choose, and decreasing government intervention. This debate arises every national election cycle and at various levels of government. Overall, this issue is never-ending despite the landmark decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1973 in *Roe v. Wade*. Today, increasingly restrictive abortion laws are being passed and signed into law at the state level as we have seen in the recent abortion ban in Texas. This approach prevailed for a hundred years until the decision in *Roe v. Wade*.

When examining abortion laws and practices there needs to be a discussion of the American Medical Association (AMA), an association of mostly male doctors which was established in 1847. The AMA, whose members believed only doctors should decide when abortions could be performed legally, scrutinized and sought to phase out reproductive health services offered by midwives and nurses (Planned Parenthood, 2022). By 1880, all U.S. states had implemented laws to restrict abortion and the only exception was to save a woman whose life was in danger (Planned Parenthood, 2022). However, a problem with this was the doctors and legislators were men, creating problems for the inclusion of women's views and concerns.

In 1910, abortion was not only restricted but was illegal. Some would argue that these restrictions were rooted in racism and nationalistic views. During 1910 there was an increase in immigration, which led upper-class White males to find ways to assure upper-class White women would have more children and thereby increase the number of Whites in America. In the 1930s, abortions were conducted underground and as expected there was an increase in the number of deaths by women undergoing these procedures, with illegal abortions continuing to occur (Planned Parenthood, 2022). In 1955, Planned Parenthood Federation of America organized the first conference seeking to legalize abortion in this country and allow doctors to provide these services. In 1964, abortion law reform activists organized the Association for the Study of Abortion (ASA).

As the fight for legal abortions continued more women sought abortions for birth defects as doctors who performed abortions faced criminal charges. One important instance was the case of the San Francisco Nine in 1966, when nine doctors faced charges for performing abortions on women who had been exposed to Rubella, a disease that can cause birth defects

(Planned Parenthood, 2022). In the following year, states began to pass abortion reforms laws, with Colorado, in April 1967, being the first state to liberalize access to abortion, permitting abortion in the case of rape, incest, or other specified conditions. Three months later, Governor Ronald Reagan signed the California Therapeutic Abortion Law, and in April 1970, New York became the first state to offer abortions on demand.

In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court declared state criminal abortion laws unconstitutional in *Roe v. Wade* which spurred an anti-abortion movement. In *Roe v. Wade* the Court found that state laws like that in Texas which criminalized abortion "without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" (p. 164). In short, by law women and their physicians in all 50 states can decide if they want to terminate a pregnancy as specified.

The passage of *Roe v. Wade* was not the end of abortion debates, restrictions, or legal fights. In 1976, with the passage of the Hyde Amendment federal dollars could not be used by Medicaid for abortion services, except in cases of incest, rape, or risk to the life of the mother (Planned Parenthood, 2022). Proportionately, the populations that are more likely to use Medicaid are racial and ethnic minorities, which makes the Hyde Amendment a law that negatively impacts both the poor and ethno-racial minorities. Yet, some states still decide whether they will include or exclude funding for abortion services for Medicaid recipients.

As seen in the implementation of the Hyde Amendment, states still have considerable authority in deciding whether or not to support abortion, restrict abortions, and/or restrict funding to Medicaid recipients. The most recent history of abortion in Texas shows how abortion is restricted in that state. For instance, the



Women's Right to Know Act in 2003 was passed in an effort to stop abortions. This law provides misleading information to patients seeking to terminate pregnancies and instead persuades them to seek other alternatives (ACLU TX, 2022). In 2005 the State of Texas banned abortions after 24 weeks and required parental consent for patients under the age of 18 who wanted an abortion (ACLU TX, 2022). This was not the end of restrictive abortion laws in Texas, where in 2011 the State required that patients receive a sonogram 24 hours before an abortion that includes viewing an ultrasound image of the fetus and listening to its heartbeat, as well as a private consultation with a physician on abortion (ACLU TX, 2022). That same year, Texas defunded Planned Parenthood and appropriated funds for an Alternatives to Abortion program. In 2013, Texas passed House Bill 2, which added more restrictions on abortion. Stipulations in the bill include:

Doctors must have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of an abortion facility; Abortion after 20 weeks post-fertilization is banned, unless a patient is at risk of death or the fetus has a severe medical problem; Doctors administering medication must follow a state-mandated protocol; All abortion facilities must meet the standards of ambulatory surgical centers (mini-hospitals), even if a facility only provides abortion by providing pills to swallow. (ACLU TX, 2022: para. 5)

Several reproductive groups challenged the law, and their case was ultimately heard by the U.S. Supreme Court which struck down admitting privileges for doctors and surgical center requirements, but other portions of the law remain.

Over time the State of Texas has made it increasingly more difficult for women to have abortions. New laws have been passed that make it difficult for minors without parental consent to seek an abortion; require health clinics to pay to bury or cremate tissue from the abortion; ban safe second-trimester abortions; ban insurers from including coverage for abortion in health plans; criminalize abortion providers who do not provide medical treatment for a fetus that was born after an abortion; and cut off support for clinics that are affiliated with abortion centers. Some of these new laws have been struck down by the courts while others remain in effect.

On September 1, 2021, we saw the implementation of a Texas 6-week abortion ban by Senate Bill 8 (SB 8), the Texas Heartbeat Act. This law bans abortion at six weeks for women in Texas and, further, it allows anyone to file a civil suit against a person who aids or assists in an abortion after 6 weeks of gestation. For example, a partner can file a lawsuit against a provider of abortions and can seek at least \$10,000 with the defendant paying the plaintiff's court costs. This creates



a chaotic scenario for both women seeking an abortion and abortion providers in Texas.

Some argue that the 6-week abortion ban is a racist, classist, and sexist policy aimed at women of color and poor women, and at controlling women's bodies. For instance, banning abortion will maintain women in poverty who might not have direct access to contraception or who will be forced to have more children from unintended pregnancies. Women who belong to the working class or are low income will face the most barriers with regard to seeking an abortion if they have to travel outside of the state of Texas. The costs of travel, food, lodging, and the procedure to terminate the pregnancy are prohibitive for many. This is less of a barrier for women from wealthier backgrounds who have the resources to terminate a pregnancy outside of Texas. This law, then, perpetuates economic inequalities among women in Texas and especially in relation to women of color who tend to be from working class backgrounds.

In addition to the negative impacts on the individual are the impacts on clinics based on the threat of a civil suit by private citizens. SB 8 not only makes anyone assisting a woman who gets an abortion subject to a civil suit, it expands policing of women's health to anti-abortion parties. The threat of civil suits has resulted in the closure of abortion clinics that provide important services other than those having to do with abortion. In cases where life threatening emergencies arise, women's lives are jeopardized.

As described by several scholars and media sources, today's abortion debate is heavily rooted in religion, politics, propaganda, and institutional control. Evangelicals and the Religious Right used anti-abortion views as a way to mobilize followers after the *Green v. Connally* decision in 1971 that denied tax-exempt status to segregated private schools. Anti-abortion became the rallying call to action that promoted their political mobilization. Many conservative legislators at various governmental levels proposed and implemented abortion restrictions and bans.

Latinos and the United States Banking System

by Marcelo E. Siles

Introduction

For more than forty years the number of Latinos living in the United States has been increasing, reaching 19% of the U.S. population according to the 2020 Census, and it is expected to reach 25% by 2030. Their economic and financial influence within the U.S. economy is usually measured by their purchasing power, which attained over \$1.7 trillion per year in 2021. According to the U.S. Small Business Administration, “There are 4.65 million Latino-owned businesses currently operating in the country making them the fastest growing segment of US small businesses, up 34% in the last 10 years” (SBA, 2021: para. 2). Latino-owned businesses create 3.4 million jobs and generate over \$700 billion in sales per year (Arora, 2020).

Despite these impressive gains, Latino households and businesses continue facing challenges participating in the formal financial system, especially with gaining total access to banks and the services they provide. For more than a decade, the U.S. government through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve System (FRS) has been asking banks to foster the diversification and inclusion of their customers, especially Latinos and Blacks as they have the lowest rates.

Unbanked and Underbanked Households

Studies by these Federal organizations have identified three clearly distinct categories in terms of the relationships between households and the banking system: 1) unbanked, 2) underbanked, and 3) totally banked. Unbanked households are those with no relationship with banks and that do not have accounts with banks. Their financial transactions tend to involve cashing checks, buying money orders to pay bills, making domestic and international transfers, among others, and are conducted outside the banking system. Underbanked households usually have some type of relationships with banks such as having a checking or savings account, but at the same time they continue using the services of the Alternative Financial System (AFS) for most of their financial transactions. These services are the same used by the unbanked households. Finally, totally banked households perform all their financial transactions within the banking system.

According to several surveys conducted by the FDIC and FRS, minority groups with low participation rates in the banking system have identified several reasons for not having a bank account. Among those that they cite as the most important are: a) not having enough money to keep in account, b) not trusting banks, c) avoiding banks gives more privacy, d) account fees

that are too high and unpredictable, e) former bank account problems, and f) lack of preferred products or services by banks. Clearly, banks in this country need to make a series of adjustments to the way they perform their operations and utilize more proactive approaches to facilitate the incorporation of Latinos and Blacks into their customer base.

Table 1 shows the percentage and number of U.S. households that were unbanked and underbanked from 2009 to 2019. Approximately 7.7% of U.S. households, equivalent to 9.0 million households, were unbanked in 2009. This number increased slightly in 2011 to 8.2%, or 10.0 million households. We assume the increases were due to the Great Recession of 2007-2009, when many people lost their jobs and were unable to maintain the minimum balances in their accounts required by banks. Since 2011, the percentage and number of unbanked households declined from 8.2% in 2011 to 5.4% in 2019, reflecting a decline of 2.8 percentage points and a reduction of 2.9 million unbanked households. During this period, the number of the unbanked adult population declined by 5.7 million from 17 million in 2009 to 11.3 million in 2019, which represents a 33.5% drop in the number of unbanked adults.

Table 1. Unbanked and Underbanked Households and Adult Population in the United States

Year	Description	Unbanked		Underbanked		Total	
		Pct.	Number (Millions)	Pct.	Number (Millions)	Pct.	Number (Millions)
2009	Households	7.7%	9.0	17.9%	21.0	25.6%	30.0
	Adult Population	17.0 million		43.0 million		60.0 million	
2011	Households	8.2%	10.0	20.1%	24.0	28.3%	34.0
	Adult Population	17.0 million		51.0 million		68.0 million	
2013	Households	7.7%	9.6	20.0%	24.8	27.7	34.4
	Adult Population	16.7 million		50.9 million		67.6 million	
2015	Households	7.0%	9.0	19.9%	24.5	26.9%	33.5
	Adult Population	15.6 million		51.1 million		66.7 million	
2017	Households	6.5%	8.4	18.7%	24.2	25.2%	32.6
	Adult Population	14.1 million		48.9 million		63.0 million	
2019	Households	5.4%	7.1	16.0%	21.0	21.4%	26.4
	Adult Population	11.3 million*		42.7 million*		54.0 million	

Source: 2009 to 2019 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and underbanked Households.
*Not published by FDIC, estimated by the author.

The analysis of underbanked households shows similar trends as for unbanked households. Approximately, 17.9% were underbanked in 2009, representing 21 million households. This figure increased to 20.1% in 2011 for the same reasons provided

above for unbanked households. Since then the percentage of underbanked households steadily declined to 16% in 2019, a decline of 4.0% points. From 2013 to 2017, the number of underbanked households remained relatively constant at around 24.4 million. In 2019, the number of underbanked households was at 21.0 million, similar to the figure in 2009, but 3.8 million less than in 2013.

Table 2 shows the percentages of unbanked, underbanked, and banked households by race and ethnic group from 2009 to 2019. During this period, Blacks had the highest figures for unbanked and underbanked households, which results in having the lowest figures for totally banked households among all the racial and ethnic groups. Only 46.7% of Black households were totally banked in 2009, but that figure declined slightly to 44.7% by 2011, then increased steadily to 54.2% by 2019, reflecting an increase of 9.5% points.

Table 2. Unbanked and Underbanked Households in the United States by Race and Ethnicity

Year	Description	Blacks (%)	Latinos (%)	American Indian/ Alaskan (%)	Asians (%)	Whites (%)
2009	Unbanked	21.7	19.3	15.6	3.5	3.3
	Underbanked	31.6	24.0	28.9	7.2	14.9
	Sub-Total	53.3	43.3	44.5	10.7	18.2
	Banked	46.7	56.7	55.5	89.3	81.8
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
2011	Unbanked	21.4	20.1	14.5	2.7	4.0
	Underbanked	33.9	28.6	26.8	16.6	16.1
	Sub-Total	55.3	48.7	41.3	19.3	20.1
	Banked	44.7	51.3	58.7	80.7	79.9
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
2013	Unbanked	20.5	17.9	16.9	2.2	3.6
	Underbanked	33.1	28.5	25.5	17.9	15.9
	Sub-Total	53.6	46.4	42.4	20.1	19.5
	Banked	46.4	53.6	57.6	79.9	80.5
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
2015	Unbanked	18.2	16.2	11.1	4.0	3.1
	Underbanked	31.1	29.3	27.5	21.0	15.6
	Sub-Total	49.3	45.5	38.6	25.0	18.7
	Banked	50.7	54.5	61.4	75.0	81.3
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
2017	Unbanked	16.9	14.0	12.8	2.5	3.0
	Underbanked	30.4	28.9	28.0	17.5	14.1
	Sub-Total	47.3	42.9	40.8	20.0	17.1
	Banked	52.7	57.1	59.2	80.0	82.9
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
2019	Unbanked	13.8	12.2	16.3	1.7	2.5
	Underbanked**	32.0	22.0	*	*	11.0
	Sub-Total	45.8	34.2	16.3	1.7	13.5
	Banked	54.2	65.8			86.5
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0


Source: 2009 to 2019 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and underbanked Households.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Consumers and Mobile Financial Services 2016.
*Not reported by FDIC.
**Reported by FRS.

The percentages of Hispanic households show a similar pattern as that for Black households, declining from 56.7% in 2009 to 51.3% in 2011, and then gradually increasing from 53.6% in 2013 to 65.8% in 2019, reflecting an increase of 12.2% points in totally banked Hispanic households. Whites have the highest percent of totally banked households of the three groups and have patterns similar to those observed for Black and Hispanic

households. Their percentages declined from 81.8% in 2009 to 79.9% in 2011, and since 2013 increased steadily from 80.5% to 86.5% in 2019, reflecting an increase of 6.0% points in 6 years and yielding a rate higher than that in 2009. In summary, Hispanic households show the highest increase in totally banked households of the three groups with a net increase of 12.2% in 6 years, but they were still 20.7 percentage points behind White households in 2019.

Figure 1 shows the increases in totally banked households by race and ethnicity from 2009 to 2019. We can observe gradual increases for the groups, especially for Hispanic households, which have the second highest percentages of unbanked and underbanked households resulting in the second lowest percentage of fully banked households. It also shows the large gaps that persist between Whites and Latinos and Blacks.

Figure 1. Increases in Totally Banked Households by Race and Ethnicity, 2009-2019 (Percent)



There are many reasons why minority groups have the lowest percentages of totally banked households. Language barriers are perhaps among the most important, while others are the lack of trust these groups have in banks, especially due to previous bad experiences, banks' physical facilities, and the minimum balances required to maintain accounts, among others.

To overcome these cultural barriers, minority groups and especially Latinos have been using banking products based on new technology offered by banks. In particular, online and mobile banking have allowed increased access to banking products and services by everyone, but especially by minority groups. According to Frankenfield (2020), "Online banking offers customers almost every service traditionally available through a local branch including deposits, transfers, and online bill payments. Virtually every banking institution has some form of online banking, available both on desktop versions and through mobile apps" (para. 2). Chen (2020) defines mobile banking as "the act of making financial transactions on a mobile device (cell phone, tablet, etc.). This activity can be as simple as a bank sending fraud or usage activity to a client's cell phone or as complex as

a client paying bills or sending money abroad” (para. 1). Chen identifies as disadvantages of mobile banking “security concerns and a limited range of capabilities when compared to banking in person or on a computer” (para. 1), but the ability to bank from anywhere at any time removes barriers to access faced by segments of minority groups.

Table 3 shows the use of online and mobile banking for households by racial and ethnic group. Close to one-third of all banked households were using online banking from 2013 to 2017, but these figures dropped by almost 14 points by 2019 when a shift occurred toward the use of mobile banking to access bank services. In 2013, only 5.7% of U.S. households were using mobile banking, but this figure increased steadily by 2019, reaching 34.0% and reflecting an increase of 28.3 percentage points in just six years.

Table 3. Households Use of Online and Mobile Banking by Race and Ethnicity

Year	Race and Ethnicity	Online Banking [%]	Mobile Banking [%]
2013	All	32.9	5.7
	White	35.8	5.0
	Black	21.3	7.8
	Hispanic	23.0	8.3
2015	All	36.9	9.5
	White	40.0	8.6
	Black	25.1	11.3
	Hispanic	27.2	12.6
2017	All	36.0	15.6
	White	39.2	14.5
	Black	24.0	17.2
	Hispanic	25.7	19.2
2019	All	22.8	34.0
	White	26.7	31.4
	Black	12.0	37.2
	Hispanic	11.1	41.3

Source: 2013 to 2019 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and underbanked Households.

Of interest, the use of mobile banking by minority groups and especially Latinos was higher than their White counterparts during the same period. In 2013, the percentage of Latinos who reported using mobile banking was 8.3%, which was 3.3 percentage points higher than that for Whites. In 2015, the difference was 4.0%, and in 2017 and 2019 the gaps were 4.7% and 9.9%, respectively. As shown in Table 3, Hispanic households had the highest percentage use of mobile banking among all considered groups.

In summary, Hispanic households have high unbanked and underbanked rates, which result in low totally banked rates. Only Black households have higher rates for unbanked and underbanked and the lowest for totally banked rates. Comparing these rates with the rates of mobile banking use by the same groups we see that Hispanic households have the highest rates for the

use of mobile banking, which should prove very interesting and useful to government agencies and banks as they seek to attract more minorities and diversify their customer base in the context of designing new policies and developing new technology-based products.

Conclusion

The landscape of the U.S. banking system has experienced immense changes over the last decade. On the one hand, there has been enormous pressure by government agencies such as the FDIC and FRS to promote the inclusion of minority groups and the diversification of their customer base. On the other hand, there are many factors that make it very difficult for banks to comply with these pressures, including high banking fees, minimum account balances and, importantly, the low levels of trust that minority groups have for banks.

Banks have been working hard to develop special products aimed toward minorities, implementing more flexible policies and requirements, and hiring bilingual staff to facilitate communication with these groups. These are some of the changes that have been made to attract minorities. In the last decades, the development of new technologies such as computer networks, smartphones, and technology-based bank products have facilitated access to banking services to ethno-racial minorities that in the past had difficulties accessing bank accounts and products.

Ethno-racial minority groups, especially Latinos, have increased their rates of fully banked households that allow them to have access not only to their bank accounts and services such as credit, which occurs on more favorable terms than the ones they were obtaining in the alternative financial services (AFS) system. Clearly some progress has been made for the inclusion and diversification of customer bases of banks, but there is still a long way to go to achieve parity in fully banked rates with those of White households. 

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Latino Fatherhood and Criminal Justice

Yoshira Macías Mejía

Conducting research on Latino fatherhood as a woman has gotten me mixed results. For some, it seems odd for a woman to conduct this research and for others it seems like a great study. But for me this research is about more than just the research itself. It began with an inquiry stemming from my own life. This is also not viewed positively in academia, especially for women of color, but it was like an itch I needed to scratch. I wanted to know why some Latino men were more likely to be engaged with their children as opposed to other men. I wanted to know what barriers and facilitators influenced engagement. Returning to my own life, these questions arose from my own experience with my Mexican immigrant father, a man who does not fit the traditional stereotypes of Latino fathers being less engaged, less loving, and, most of all, less involved. My father differs from the stereotype by always being supportive, loving, caring, demanding (with regards to our own life pursuits), but to this day remains involved in the lives of his three adult children. By involved I mean he provides us with good advice, listens to us, and helps us with tasks. This relationship with my father is why I pursued this research. I did it as a way to explore

the relationships between Latino fathers and their children to see how common the one described above is in the Latino population.

For purposes of this brief research note, I focus on native-born fathers and the impact the criminal justice system has on their paternal involvement. I focus on this area of research because of insights I gained from interviews I conducted that gave rise to new understanding on how and why Latino native-born fathers are engaged with their children. Much of what I believed or thought prior to this study pointed me to examine how the criminal justice system shapes these relationships and the impact it has on healthy child development outcomes. Thus, I focus on answering the following research question: What are the facilitators and barriers to Latino fatherhood among previously incarcerated fathers in New Mexico? Through this research note, it is my hope that readers will gain a deeper understanding of the impact incarceration has on fathers, children, and future generations. This is particularly important given that the U.S. has the highest number of incarcerated persons in the world.

Why New Mexico?

The state of New Mexico (NM) has some of the highest rates of incarceration for Latinos when compared to other racial and ethnic groups in the state (Vera Institute of Justice, 2019). New Mexico is a fascinating case because it is a majority-minority state, with Latinos the largest population. Additionally, this state faces severe poverty rates among the Latino population. According to Moskowitz (2021), New Mexico ranked third with the highest poverty rates of all fifty states in 2019. The data show that 24.9% of those 18 years of age and under are impoverished and 13.5% of those 65 and older are impoverished. Said differently, one in four New Mexican children and one in seven elders experienced poverty in 2019 (Moskowitz, 2021). These poverty rates are important because many of the fathers who were interviewed and were former felons experienced poverty in their households. As is well known, household poverty is one of the principal factors associated with criminal behaviors; a precursor for seeking money through means that make the poor a regular fixture of the criminal justice system.

Another reason for focusing on New Mexico is the number of children in the state who have a parent who has been or is incarcerated. A report from 2016 prepared by New Mexico Voices states that roughly 52,000 children in New Mexico have had a parent incarcerated at some point in their lives. According to the report, 10 percent of the child population in New Mexico has experienced parental incarceration. The percentage of parents who are incarcerated in NM is also higher than the national average, lower only than in Indiana and Kentucky, which have higher percentages of incarcerated parents (New Mexico Voices, 2016).

Some consequences of parental incarceration among these children include living in poverty and dealing with homelessness, hunger, and emotional trauma. There is also a decrease in the parental connections between parents and children. These are examples of adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) that have been found to have detrimental effects on positive child development. ACEs have also been found to be more prevalent among Latino, Black, and Native American children. ACEs are also very high in New Mexico and not only impact child development but have effects well into adulthood. Some of the impacts faced in adulthood are poor health outcomes, including high incidences of mental health problems. Given these disparities in New Mexico, the state provides a context for understanding the impact of incarceration on Latino fatherhood.

Background

Most studies in the area of fatherhood tend to focus on White fathers. Only recently has research increased that

examines Black fathers, but the field is particularly lacking in studies on Latino fatherhood. In recent years, more researchers have been focusing on Latino fatherhood (Cabrera et al., 2009). Some disciplines that have added to our understanding of Latino fatherhood are psychology, sociology, and family studies. Research in these areas identifies ways to promote gender equity among partners, understand how to better serve fathers, especially those who are or were incarcerated, and to promote positive child development outcomes.

Research specifically focused on incarcerated fathers shows that Latino and Black children are particularly impacted by the incarceration of their parents when compared to White children (Swisher & Waller, 2008). This is especially the case with the high rates of Latino and Black fathers in prison (Garland, 2001). Some of the barriers that these families face with incarcerated fathers are logistics with regard to visitations. For instance, the prisons in which these fathers are held tend to be farther away from their families, have difficult procedures for scheduling a visit, and most are not able to accommodate child visitors (Swisher & Waller, 2008; Arditti, Lambert-Shute, & Joest, 2003). Given these visitation challenges, fathers and mothers might not be supportive of their children visiting them. With regard to mothers, there are studies that show that some mothers are not willing to engage with the incarcerated fathers of their children (Swisher & Waller, 2008). In their study, Swisher and Waller (2008) found that incarceration prevents father and child contact and that these nonresidential fathers support their children through informal agreements with their mothers (p. 1082).

Incarceration negatively impacts the incarcerated, their families, and the development of their children. A study by Geller et al. (2012) found that children with incarcerated parents develop increased attention problems and display greater bouts of aggression. They note that these effects are greater for father absence due to incarceration than other forms of father absence. Their study suggests that these children are at higher risk of poverty because the father is no longer able to provide for the family. In short, the negative impact of incarceration is not limited to fathers, but is widespread to children, partners, families, and communities.

Research Design

This project is ongoing and began with a pilot grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation for Health Policy at the University of New Mexico when I was a doctoral student in political science. The study went beyond the question of facilitators and barriers to involvement and examined if there were differences among Latino fathers as a result of nativity status. In other words, is there a difference between foreign-born

and native-born statuses in relation to patterns of fatherhood engagement and the activities in which fathers engage? This project took place from January to July in 2017. I conducted a total of 12 interviews with fathers, eight of whom were native-born and four foreign-born. Of the eight native-born fathers five were previously incarcerated. The interviews took place in Bernalillo County, New Mexico. The sampling method used for this study was a purposive snowball sample, which means that participants were asked if they knew anyone else who might be willing to participate in the study and if they would provide names for other participants to be contacted for an interview. There was extensive outreach done to include as many participants as possible. Recruitment strategies included going to organizations in Albuquerque, such as Abriendo Puertas, an organization aimed at helping Latino immigrants with family life, and PB&J Fathers Building Futures, which is an organization aimed at reintegrating into society Latino fathers who were previously incarcerated. Other strategies included posting flyers in various locations, such as grocery stores, convenience stores, and tire shops in the South Valley area of Albuquerque to recruit participants. Interviews lasted from 35 minutes to over an hour in some cases, depending on how comfortable and willing the participant was to engage in conversation. Overall, the study opened my eyes as a researcher and made me consider policies that might better serve this segment of the community.

Results and Analysis

Some notable findings from my study have to do with the influences of the criminal justice system, poverty, and growing up in single parent households on the participants. The findings are based on interviews with the fathers who were previously incarcerated. To analyze the interviews, I used content analysis and sorted quotes thematically. There were four main themes: 1) barriers to educational involvement with children, 2) custody battles for children while fathers were incarcerated, 3) parental involvement with children while incarcerated, and 4) gender

roles and child rearing. The impact of incarceration on their relationships with their children went beyond their time in prison and had consequences post release.

Barriers to Educational Involvement with Children

Participants mentioned how being previously incarcerated impacted their ability to engage with their children's educational journey. For instance, participant #1 stated the following:

At school? Yeah, I went to most of their things. Some of the things I wasn't like the volunteer or nothing because I'm a convicted felon. You know? But my daughter went to the aquarium and zoo, which I made sure my girl took those days off. So, we went together. And then, my son had little things at his class, and I went to two or three of them as a visitor and I brought stuff like juices and candies. For their birthdays, I brought [students in] the class things. My daughter wanted to take ring pops and I bought like 30 Ring Pops and took them in there for the kids. And then my son wanted Fun Dips. So, his class only had like 10 people, so I brought a bunch of Fun Dips for them.

This quote points to the efforts this participant made to engage with his children's education despite the limitations imposed by his former prisoner status. Participant #1 added to this by saying,

"Yeah, I try to let them pick whatever they want. Like I told them cupcakes or whatever, but they wanted candy. So, I think it's kind of easier too. Cake and all that stuff will make a mess, you know? They are probably just happy with the candy, and they got them at the end of the day so the teachers didn't mind."

This father could not engage in all activities at the school and, with regard to some events, he had to make sure his partner would take time off to engage in them with him or have her represent them as parents at these events. This father might not have been directly involved in all school activities, but he was involved in the process of giving the children treats to take to school and by asking them what types of treats they wanted to take for their birthdays.

Participant #3 described a similar experience with regard to school activities. He says "Uh, huh, I still do, every parent/teacher conference, I've always went to. Field trips? Not many, because they didn't accept felons to go. So, I wasn't able to



go.” Asked his reaction to not being able to attend field trips this participant responded, “I Think that sucks because there’s times that I wanted to go with them, and I wasn’t able to.” While participant #3 might not have been able to attend field trips, he who engaged in the educational aspects of his children by attending parent/teacher conferences. The comments by these Latino fathers indicate they want to be present in their children’s lives and want to be engaged in the important years of a child’s development but confront barriers. These barriers are linked to having been incarcerated and to the current educational policies that prevent felons from attending certain school activities.

However, these Latino fathers see both sides of the coin. Participant #5 stated the following, “I was trying to go to my daughter’s field trip and stuff but since I have a criminal background, they... I can’t do it, you know, it’s just the way it is.” He added, “I can see it both ways. I mean, people change, but like I wouldn’t want somebody with a criminal record, depending on what it is or whatever, but you know what I mean, around my daughter.” This father understands that in the case of violent felons and those who have been charged with sexual abuse that he would not be comfortable with these individuals attending school field trips. However, an important question that arises is whether educational policies should be modified to differentiate felons based on the type of crime they have committed. This might be something to consider that could promote paternal engagement in their children’s educational experiences if non-violent offenders could attend more school activities.

Custody Battles while Incarcerated

In addition to the post release experiences that felons face as parents some of these fathers also faced problems during their time in prison. Participant #2 described the following experience:

Like when I was in prison, she ... I was almost about to come out of prison, and she knew I was almost coming home, and she filed for sole custody of the child. While in there ... while I had been in prison, I was in the federal prison, and I knew a lot of people. There was an attorney in there who actually studied law. I would go to him to help me with this paperwork, and we would fill out motions and we would send them to the court. The court would receive my motions, but I wasn’t able to work because I didn’t go through the Sheriff’s Department to serve the paperwork. So, that’s why I can’t ... I had no access to that, but I did make the efforts to send motions for extreme circumstances.

I was in prison, so I couldn’t be there [for the custody hearing]. And the court date was set five days [prior] to my release date, and I think it was a shady move because she knew I was about to be there. But she knew I was not going to be at the court. So, she pretty much won because I didn’t show. But my paperwork did show up and the judge did acknowledge that I did make the effort. They did give me the right to an appeal as soon as I got out. And sure enough, when I got out ... as a matter of fact, while I was in there, she called me and told me I’m serving you papers.

He vividly discussed how his ex-partner was fighting for custody of their daughter while he was incarcerated. These men are at a disadvantage because they are not able to properly address custody battles while incarcerated. This participant was affected by this situation and details how even post incarceration his ex-partner still made it difficult for him to engage in his daughter’s life due to custody constraints.

Participant #2 stated:

Like with her, I was with her for four or five years and she left me when my daughter was one year old. And then things were bumpy between there and until my daughter was five years old. There were times when she wouldn’t even ever let me see my daughter. There was a full year that went by where I couldn’t communicate with her. She wouldn’t answer my calls. She just like took her away from us. You know what I mean? And she’s done some pretty bad stuff and I think ... I don’t like to talk about people, you know, but I think she’s cruel and I don’t know for what reason. Until this day, I’m still trying to figure it out, what it is. I just don’t know. I don’t know what it is, and she doesn’t tell me. I don’t know what it is or what I did or what.

This is just one of the many situations this participant described during the interview; how his relationship with his ex-partner is rocky and makes it difficult for him to spend time with his child. In some cases, these are expected reactions by mothers who are less likely to want their children to engage with fathers who have been incarcerated (Geller et al, 2012).

Parenting while Incarcerated

Other concerns raised by these fathers have to do with their



inability to parent their children and keep in touch with them while in prison (Geller et al. 2012). Participant # 3 discussed how he tried to stay engaged with his daughter:

No, no, it's never changed the relationship because she knows I always ... even when I was in prison, I was sending her money ... Even when I was in prison, I ordered a pair of Jordans for her and sent them in the mail. She got them. I sent her 200 dollars in the mail, you know. I was always sending her something. It was because I didn't know how she was or what they were doing, you know. But I was calling her every day. So, I had plenty of calling cards and everything, so it wasn't bad, you know. I didn't have any help from the street in here, but I made that work too.

Even though this father was incarcerated he still managed to stay engaged, to a limited extent, with his daughter. He maintained this relationship by sending her money and gifts for her birthday.

Another example of how fathers tried to maintain their relationships with their children or to parent from afar is depicted with participant #5 in the following response to my question, "Going back to the time you had to leave or split with your daughter's mom. Did that make it harder for you to get involved with her later?" He replied, "No, I mean no. I talked to her the whole time I was in prison. When I got out I started seeing my daughter all the time ... It's just me and her [mother] just didn't work out. But I still see my daughter whenever I want to and

stuff." For this participant, incarceration did not stop him from trying to be as involved with his daughter as much as he could, but it does highlight the barriers that mothers may set in place to prevent the development of these relationships.

Gender Roles and Child Rearing

Another dimension that is important to highlight is how being previously incarcerated impacts not only employment prospects but also child rearing and daycare needs. For instance, participant #1 discussed the difficulties in finding employment that has a flexible schedule and a supervisor who understands that on occasion he is the one who needs to stay home with the children. He also addressed the negative connotations that stem from societal norms that chastise former prisoners. He said the following:

And so, they would try to tell her like "Oh, does he work?" She'll be like "He takes care of the kids." That's a hard enough job. They'll be like, "What? That loser don't work? You just take care of him?" She'll be like, "I'd like to see you try to watch two [children]. A four- and five-year-old all day and deal with them and all that stuff." You know? She's like "He does work actually on my days off over here." I was working two days out of the week from 8 to 4. But now that it's summer and she had the baby, I've been able to work a little more. Plus, I'm on drug court, you know? So, I have to do counseling. I have to take random drug tests. I have to check in and I have to see the judge. I have pending cases. So, I have a lot of stuff also that I can't just start work somewhere and be like "Oh, I have to go do a UA today," or "I have to go see the judge. I have to go see my PO. I have counseling at 2." They're not just going to be all flexible with me when I'm first being hired, you know? So, that kind of irritates me that they always talk trash about that. But I always tell her, if you want to stay home with the kids, go ahead. But I can't really work full-time with little kids at home because like I said, I don't have a mom or somebody just to go drop them off at. There's nobody. We would have to pay daycare and as much money as she makes, we don't qualify for anything. They would want to charge us full price.

This detailed quote vividly taps into issues that Latino fathers face after being released from prison. They have difficulty finding

stable employment, which halts their reintegration into society. In the case of this father, he had to rely on his partner to be the breadwinner while he was the caretaker. One of the hardest issues with this is that in today's economy it is much harder to live on a single earner income or in a household where income is lower.

These men also face prejudices for being stay-at-home dads. Participant #1 continued by adding:

And that's one of the things too. Like women want all these rights and want to work and stuff too, but then pretty much, people's ... I don't know how to say it, but what they expect is like you said, the traditional [role]. They expect the man to work and the woman to be at home. Whenever they see me like pretty much a full-time dad, yeah, they're like "Oh, look at him. He's just using his chick" is what they pretty much try to say. I'm like that's not the case at all. I took care of her pretty much until my son was four. You know what I mean? And then, I caught all kinds of charges and that's when she started working when I was in jail. She got a good job and she likes her job.

This participant throughout our interview stated that he is supportive of his partner and knows that because of his felony record he is in this situation. He also commented that his partner is understanding of the fact that he has to stay home, but it is family members from his and her side of the family that criticize him for not being a provider. This situation signals how gender norms are continuously perpetuated in society by both men and women and families.

Policy Implications

As stated above, these fathers were recruited through the PB&J Fathers Building Futures (FBF) organization in Albuquerque which aims at reintegrating into society fathers recently released from prison. This program is unique in that it is run by former prisoners which provides greater understanding of what these individuals face once released from prison. This program intervenes before these fathers are released from prison. Six to nine months prior to their release these fathers participate in parenting classes, coached visits with their children, and counseling services. Later on, the program provides employment and the development of skills that can be used to secure employment or even start their own business. It also provides these fathers leadership skills that will benefit them in the labor market. Some of the involvement at this

organization includes creating handmade cutting boards or other products, such as table stands, that are sold to the public. Woodworking and carpentry skills are trade skills that can benefit these fathers in the pursuit of employment. Other work these men perform besides woodwork includes car detailing and power washing. Still, hectic probation schedules and drug court remain challenges for these men in finding stable and flexible employment after leaving prison.

Participant #1 provided a good description of how this organization has been beneficial for him. He stated:

They're real supportive, you know what I mean, with everything. Like they're willing to write my PO, my judge, my other case lawyer ... letters and everything just to give support and to let them know what's going on with me here and how good I've been doing. That type of stuff. I'm able to meet with my case worker once a week just to see how things are going and what I'm going to do next. All this type of stuff. Like pretty much everything I just told you, like my [case worker] ... she knows everything, my schedule and how I'm home with the kids.

This program has created a lot of opportunities for these fathers. For fathers, such as participant #1, who is on probation and needs to complete it in order to avoid returning to prison, employment opportunities that allow him to have a flexible schedule to see a probation officer or attend drug court are imperative for successful reintegration and for the reduction of recidivism rates. This program allows fathers who have young children to bring them to the organization if they cannot secure daycare and allows them to take time off to pick them up from school and take them to doctors' appointments, which are important demands parents with young children experience.

Another father, participant #5, discussed how this program benefited him and his family. He said:

It just helped me start living life right. It just ... like I said, I got out of prison and started working here. It just kept me working and out of trouble. I worked my way up from minimum wage, only 20 hours a week. Now I'm one of the main guys here. I run the mobile unit. That's what I was setting up interviews for. I need to hire a team for myself so that we could ... go off-site to different contracts and that's what I'm in charge of here. So, I mean it taught me more responsibility being in a management position and good skills on how to run a crew and get this to work and stuff.

This program and others like it help fathers by providing them with work experience and employable skills to avoid falling back into the carceral state. But this participant highlights how the program moves them up the work ladder by providing promotions and management skill sets they need to succeed. Some of these fathers obtain permanent employment at the organization or are given greater work responsibilities, similar to those of Participant #5, who continued his account by discussing other barriers that prevent him from securing employment:

Plus, I have tattoos everywhere. People say that I look intimidating and stuff. I don't try to be. But like whenever I'm doing the interviews for work ... I don't know, it's just hard for me to get a job. You know, this place gave me a chance. So, I'd like to give back and give someone else that chance that I was given, and you know, see where it takes them.

Here we see how public perceptions of felons impacts their ability to find employment due to having tattoos and how their criminal records consistently become barriers to successful reintegration. But most importantly, these individuals also face the possibility of returning to prison if they do not find housing or full-time employment, which are often conditions for maintaining parole.

Other programs that are also beneficial are fatherhood programs in which prisoners can participate while incarcerated that facilitate their reintegration. A brief from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) (2010) discusses several state level programs that promote father reintegration while they are still in prison. Similar to some of the services that FBF provides to incarcerated parents prior to release, there are other states with correctional facilities that also provide prisoners parenting/coparenting classes, child visitation opportunities, marriage courses, and many more supportive services in order to facilitate their reintegration upon release and to improve child health and developmental outcomes. The report from the DHHS provides evidence that these programs are beneficial for fathers who are former prisoners, their families, and the community at large.

The report evaluates Marriage and Family Strengthening Grants for Incarcerated and Reentering Fathers and their Partners (MFS-IP) to assess their benefits to the participants, in this case the fathers. Some states that received these grants and implemented several of these programs include: New Jersey, Minnesota, Tennessee, Michigan, South Dakota, Ohio, California, New York, New Hampshire, Indiana, and Maryland. For the most part, these programs have been successful and



integrated men in the process of constructively engaging with their children, but some programs need to be tailored for men who are incarcerated. Overall, these programs focused on promoting high self-esteem among children, disciplining children properly, behavioral goals, stimulating independence, family meetings, problem-solving skills, communication skills, parenting upon release, co-parenting, and rebuilding trust with children, among many others. These programs also vary in instruction style as they are not all based on lecturing parents but on engaging them through role playing, games, storytelling, and reflection. By involving fathers in these types of educational experiences there was greater responsiveness by those engaging in these programs.

However, one of the biggest barriers programs like these face is sustained funding. These programs have proven effective, but funding challenges make it difficult to continue them. FBF, according to NM News Port, received funding for a few years from DHHS, but funding was not sustained by the agency. This prompted FBF to find creative ways to fund the organization. Some of the funding is received from the purchases made from selling some of the woodwork products. Other funding is secured through donations, etc. But in order to expand the number of individuals FBF and other programs can serve more money is needed to pay those developing this curriculum and conducting the classes.

Besides programs that help fathers who are incarcerated or recently released from prison, emphasis must be placed on changing sentencing practices for non-violent offenders. Non-violent offenders sometimes face harsher sentences than violent or sexual offenders. Also, understanding how post-release requirements create hardships is important. For instance, many of these individuals, as stated in the interviews, find it very difficult to secure employment, which if not able to do so can



return them to prison. Thus, when examining ways to improve the chances of these fathers, there needs to be criminal justice reform that takes into consideration the negative impact on the individual and also on families.

Discussion and Conclusion

Several conclusions can be drawn from this study. For one, negative stereotypes of fathers of color and those who were previously incarcerated are questioned. The fathers in this study care about their children and are not disengaged with their children. On the contrary, these men want to be more involved with their children but face barriers from institutions, society, and in some cases from their own families. To summarize, with regard to institutions, some barriers include educational policies that prevent former prisoners from attending school field trips, courts that impose several requirements upon release that may contribute to recidivism, and correctional facilities that do not provide access to parenting courses tailored for incarcerated men nor visitation services that can accommodate children. When examining the role of society and its impact on the reintegration of these men other issues include negative stereotypes about felons or former prisoners. For example, the fact that one of the study participants had tattoos created immediate negative reactions and stereotyping. These are issues that several formerly incarcerated individuals face, as well as regular members of society that have similar appearances. Another barrier these individuals face has to do with unsupportive family members or non-cooperative partners. As one of the participants noted, his former partner

tried to take sole custody of his child while he was in prison. This creates obstacles for these men to be able to continue to have a constructive relationship with their children during their incarceration and after they are released. Thus, even with parenting programs or child visitation programs, if family members and partners do not constructively engage in the programs, there is little possibility of success for the former prisoners.

Based on these findings in New Mexico, there is a need to have better policies and improved funding for programs which reduce recidivism rates. As well, it is important to promote better child outcomes in order to reduce the probability of children also falling victim to the same cycles of incarceration as their parents. A whole host of factors are at play that negatively impact fathers who are former prisoners and which promote and maintain cycles of social disadvantage among future generations. The movement for criminal justice reform must address the needs of incarcerated fathers and their families to break the cycles of social disadvantage. 🌱

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Continued: Texas Abortion Policy


Today, there is a 6-3 majority of conservative justices on the U.S. Supreme Court. This is due to the procedural tactics used by Mitch McConnell and Senate Republicans in the appointment of the last three justices, all of whom were nominated by President Trump. The new conservative justices include Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett. Having conservative judges is extremely consequential in the abortion debates because when state legislators pass strict anti-abortion laws they may be upheld by a conservative Supreme Court. This situation makes it difficult to uphold *Roe v. Wade* and to strike down the controversial laws recently passed in Texas.

The Texas abortion ban is likely headed to the Supreme Court for a second time on different issues. Given the composition of the Court, there is concern by pro-choice groups and individuals that the Texas 6-week abortion ban may be upheld as constitutional. On January 20, 2022, in *Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson*, which challenged the enforcement part of the Heartbeat Act, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, known as a conservative court, which had upheld the law and where it might remain for months. More recently, several abortion providers from Texas requested that their case be referred to the federal district court, but ultimately their motion was denied and their case goes to the Texas Supreme Court.

Today there is great concern regarding the politicization of the courts, especially the U.S. Supreme Court. The handling of the challenges to SB 8 is a prime example of the impact political ideology has on the judicial branch of the U.S. government. As a result, there is much uncertainty as to what will happen to women seeking abortions and individuals seeking non-abortion services at community clinics.

When examining the impact of the 6-week abortion ban, we are also privy to policy diffusion effects. Policy diffusion in state politics and policy literature holds that states will adopt policies other states have implemented in their own given state, which initiates a diffusion of policies across states. Some states that are in support of following the 6-week abortion ban are Arkansas, Florida, South Dakota, Idaho, Indiana, and Oklahoma, which are in step with the Texas law.


As suggested, SB 8 will be most detrimental to women of color and poor women in Texas, especially Latinas, as they are nearly equal to the number of White women in Texas, each subgroup comprising approximately 20% of the population. Further, Latinas are more likely to come from low-income

backgrounds, which creates a burden to those women who are seeking abortions in other states. The cost to travel and pay for the procedure prohibit access to abortion in other states. Additionally, women who do not have the means to travel to get an abortion are disadvantaged into the future because they will have children that will place additional financial burdens on their families. Overall, this abortion ban does not protect the constitutional rights of women that the Supreme Court ruled they have in *Roe v. Wade*. Although the majority of Americans believe women should have the right to decide whether or not to have an abortion, a minority of Americans have taken control of the nation's governmental institutions and are imposing their religious and political views and values on the rest of the population. Due to the current membership of the highest court it does not seem likely there will be a change that will support pro-choice groups in Texas. 


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Continued: *The Plot to Change America*

While familiar with and citing a vast political and sociological literature, Gonzalez does not use it to understand the social and political features of the U.S. Instead, he uses it selectively, distorting views, making direct connections where there aren't any, and overgeneralizing relationships. In the end, the book constitutes a political diatribe filled with hyperbole against progressive movements that asserts conservatism as the solution. Apparently, he has learned nothing from the nation's past and contemporary history. 

Continued: *Immigration Matters*

Joe Biden promised to immediately reverse many of Trump's most damaging immigration actions. Now over a year into his first term, Biden has been unable to follow through on many of those promises, while obstructionist Democratic senators have tanked any attempt to take advantage of their narrow majority. One wonders how the authors of these chapters may now be rethinking the agendas and strategies put forth. 

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