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Latinos in the Heartland: by Robert Aponte and Marcelo Siles The Julian Samora Research Institute
Research Report No. 5 November 1994
About the Authors: Robert Aponte and Marcelo Siles Dr. Aponte holds a joint appointment with the James Madison College and the Julian Samora Research Institute. His research focuses on urban poverty, particularly among minorities, Latinos in the United States, social policy, and social demography. Dr. Siles is a Research Associate at the Julian Samora Research Institute. He holds a Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics from Michigan State University with majors in Finance and International Development. His research interest focuses on the role of social capital in financial markets.
SUGGESTED CITATION Aponte, Robert and Marcelo E. Siles, "Latinos in the Heartland: The Browning of the Midwest." JSRI Research Report #5, The Julian Samora Research Institute, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, 1994.
Acknowledgements The authors gratefully acknowledge the collaborative assistance of the Midwest Affiliates and National Office of The National Council of La Raza (NCLR) which laid the groundwork for the analyses presented herein. Preliminary findings from this research were presented at the NCLR's Silver (25th) Anniversary Conference in Detroit, Mich., July 18-23, 1993. The authors gratefully acknowledge the particularly critical assistance of John Fierro (of Guadalupe Center, Inc., Kansas City, Mo.), Dierdre Martinez and Sonia M. Perez (of NCLR, Washington, D.C.), and the invaluable input of Linea Nicholls and Jeff Wilson of Michigan State University's Computer Centers and Sylvia Puente of the Latino Institute of Chicago. Finally, we most especially thank the Ford Foundation and the Anheuser-Busch Companies for providing financial support to this undertaking. The Julian Samora Research Institute is committed to the generation, transmission, and application of knowledge to serve the needs of Latino communities in the Midwest. To this end, it has organized a number of publication initiatives to facilitate the timely dissemination of current research and information relevant to Latinos. The Julian Samora Research Institute Research Report Series (RR) publishes monograph length reports of original empirical research on Latinos in the nation conducted by the Institute's faculty affiliates and research associates, and/or projects funded by grants to the Institute. Table of Contents
Growth and Demographics * Latinos (Hispanics) captured the bulk of population growth in the Midwest over the 1980's. More than 56% of the region's total population increase of over 800,000 persons was accounted for by Latinos. Non-Hispanic Whites dropped by over 330,000; slow growth characterized most others. * The profiles in size, growth, and distribution of Latinos in the Midwest also vary by national origin. Mexicans, the largest group, experienced the most intercensual growth in the last decade and account for virtually 70% of all Midwestern Latinos. * The state with the largest number of Hispanics, Illinois, also led the region's states in Latino population growth over the last decade. Moreover, the state's Hispanics are highly concentrated in the key city of Chicago, a pattern not found in other states in the region.
Social and Economic Characteristics * Latinos sustained major losses in real income (adjusted for inflation) over the decade, Whites lost somewhat less, and Blacks sustained a devastating loss. This has widened the substantial gap in well-being separating these groups, with the best off Whites further ahead of the others and the worst off Blacks further behind. * Correspondingly, a substantial proportion of Hispanics, greater than one in five, were below the poverty line at the end of the decade, while Whites sustained a poverty rate of less than one in ten and Blacks' rate approached the catastrophic figure of one in three. * Poverty Rates among Latinos, however, varied a good deal by nationality group. Puerto Ricans, the poorest group, sustained a rate of greater than three in ten, virtually matching that of Blacks. Cubans and Mexicans showed rates close to that for all Hispanics. * Latino educational attainment lags that of non-Latinos in the Midwest to a substantial extent, especially in Illinois, the state with the most Hispanics and the one that hosted the most Latino growth. Despite this, Latino labor force participation is higher than that of Blacks or Whites in the region, among both men and women, but most especially so among men. However, their exemplary work efforts have not paid off because, as noted above, Latinos have increasingly fallen behind Whites in indicators of well-being. Selected Highlights | Executive Summary | Introduction | Growth and Distribution | Social and Economic Indicators | Magnet City Hypothesis | Summary of Key Findings | References This report provides a Latino-focused assessment of the changing demographic and economic landscape of the Midwest between 1980 and 1990. The key findings include the fact that Latinos (Hispanics) captured the bulk of population growth over the decade, while sustaining a major loss in real income and experiencing significant increases in poverty. Whites and Blacks also lost out economically, but Whites' losses were less extensive, while Blacks' were devastating. As a result, an increasing gap separates Whites from Latinos and Blacks on indicators of well-being in the Midwest. The key demographic finding is that over 56% of the region's total population increase of over 800,000 persons was accounted for by Latinos. This greater growth belies the group's vastly smaller population in the region. The remainder of the growth was evenly divided between non-Hispanic Blacks and non-Hispanic "other" (e.g., Native American, Asian American, etc.), with non-Hispanic Whites sustaining a loss of over 300,000 persons. The report also shows that Mexicans continue to account for the largest proportion of the region's Latinos. Over two-thirds of the group are of Mexican origin. Mexicans also accounted for roughly three-quarters of the Latino growth in the region. Among states, Illinois showed the most Latino growth, accounting for some 60% of the increase. Illinois also holds the largest number of Hispanics, with just over half of the region's Latinos. Michigan holds the second largest contingent and also ranked second in Latino intercensual growth, but accounts for only about 12% of the region's Latinos. On indicators of well-being, however, Hispanics were among the major losers. In a dramatic across-the-board reversal, Whites, Blacks and Latinos all sustained significant real income declines over the period, although Whites maintained and even expanded the gap between themselves and the other groups in the process. While Black median household income registered at under $20,000 in 1989, the figure for Whites was over $30,000 and that for Latinos about $26,000. The loss for Whites averaged under $900, that for Hispanics $1,100, and that for Blacks over $2,100. Moreover, nearly a third of all the region's Blacks were in poverty at that time, and over one in five Latinos were poor, while less than 1 in 10 Whites were so impoverished. The report also makes clear that the patterns in social and economic indicators for Latinos are not uniformly shared by the various constituent groups comprising the Hispanic population. Of key significance in this regard is the economic status of the region's Puerto Ricans. In keeping with a long established national pattern, Puerto Ricans in the Midwest show rates of poverty at least as high as those of Blacks. On a number of additional indicators, such as central city residence and female headship, figures on Puerto Ricans mirror or exceed those of Blacks. The figures on Hispanic educational attainment in the region are perhaps the least favorable of all, at least in relative terms. On nearly all attainment indicators, Latinos trail the others, including Blacks, by wide margins. Despite this, Latino labor force participation exceeds that of Whites and Blacks as a whole, as well as among men and women taken separately. A paradoxical finding explored in the report concerns per capita income. On that measure, Blacks actually fare better than Hispanics, albeit minutely. This is explained by two separate factors. First, Hispanics exhibit higher labor force participation and lower unemployment than Blacks. Second, Hispanic households have substantially more members. The larger households, in combination with higher rates of labor force participation, translate into more workers per household and, hence, higher median earnings per household. However, more persons per household also means that the larger number of dollars must be shared by a larger number of persons. On balance, this results in the two minority groups faring equally well on income per person. Selected Highlights | Executive Summary | Introduction | Growth and Distribution | Social and Economic Indicators | Magnet City Hypothesis | Summary of Key Findings | References As the United States approaches the 21st Century, few societal changes in sight match the coming demographic shift, commonly known as "the Browning of America." By the mid-21st Century, minority groups "will outnumber whites for the first time" and this "will alter everything in society, from politics and education to industry, values and culture" as the popular press began noting with the beginning of the current decade (Henry 1990). Significantly, the prime force in this transition is the Hispanic population, by far the nation's fastest growing minority in absolute terms. Indeed, the evidence indicates that Latinos (Hispanics) will easily surpass African-Americans in numeric strength by 2020, if not sooner (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1992). The Hispanic or Latino population, actually a hybrid aggregation of diverse nationalities, has traditionally maintained a settlement pattern in the U.S. mainland that, in relative terms, all but excluded the Midwest, excepting Chicago. This has resulted in the utter neglect of scholarly and related attention to those who were in the Great Lakes region. This dearth of study can no longer be justified. The Latino population in the region is now two million strong and accounts for about 8% of the nation's Hispanics. It is growing far faster than the non-Latino population of the region. Consider, for example, the region's six Great Lakes states (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin). Figures in this report show that between 1980 and 1990, the Latino population in this area actually outgrew the entire remainder of the population by over 150,000 people (391,537 vs. 240,317), despite being vastly of outnumbered by the non-Latino group (by more than thirty to one) at the start of the decade. Moreover, in the states where Latino growth has been above average, the impact has been even more substantial. In the combined states of Michigan and Illinois, for example, where the total non-Hispanic population declined by more than 270,000 people, the Hispanic population grew by over 300,000 persons. Furthermore, the relative impact of these shifts will be even sharper among the school-aged and among younger workers, a result of the relative youthfulness of the Latino population. Needless to say, such sweeping changes raise a host of questions for educators, government, and businesses alike, with respect to the challenges and opportunities these changes present. In this context, the Julian Samora Research Institute is developing a series of reports focusing on the Latino population in the Midwest. The present document, deriving from data from the 1990 Census, is the first of this new series. It follows an earlier Institute report (Santiago 1990) prepared prior to the release of the 1990 figures. The earlier report focused primarily on the 1970-1980 period, but included a scattering of intercensual figures on the 1980's deriving from survey data. That document was intended to provide an historical context upon which to build a knowledge base regarding the socioeconomic conditions of Latinos in the Midwest. This report provides the cornerstone for that new knowledge base, providing an overall demographic profile of Latinos in the Midwest, and establishing a baseline model for the reports to come. It documents the growth (1980-1990), distribution, and characteristics of the region's Hispanics. Future reports within this series will provide a more detailed and/or specialized profile as the release of additional data by the Census Bureau permits. As indicated in the title, the scope of this report, and the series in general, are the 12 states of the Midwest region, officially designated by the Bureau of the Census as: Illinois (IL), Indiana (IN), Iowa (IA), Kansas (KS), Michigan (MI), Minnesota (MN), Missouri (MO), Nebraska (NB), North Dakota (ND), Ohio (OH), South Dakota (SD), and Wisconsin (WI). Data will be presented here on these 12 states individually, as well as collectively for the region as a whole. Most of the individual state data to be presented will not include the Dakotas because of the small number of Latinos in those two states. Whereas all other midwestern states were found to include at least 30,000 Hispanics among their residents during the 1990 count, less than 30,000 Latinos were found in the Dakotas, even when combined. One important caveat about the figures reported here cannot be overemphasized and that is that the population dynamics reported here, whether concerning growth or decline, are not clearly attributable to any particular source. More specifically, this report does not explore what the components of growth or decline actually are in any given case. For example, where growth is reported, it may be due to natural increase (excess of births over deaths) or to net migration (more inbound migrants than outbound ones), or to both, but it cannot be said which of these (or what precise combination) is actually responsible for the population changes. That very important topic will be the covered in a future report. It should also be noted that the data is sometimes only reported for the aggregated category, "Hispanics," rather than for the individual Latino nationality groups (e.g., Mexicans, Cubans, etc.), due to the lack of more detailed information. In general, the data are mainly conveyed in text and figures. The statistics denoted in these figures derive from more detailed tables presented as appendices to the main text. In turn, full citations on the original sources of the indicators will be found in the Appendix Tables. Selected Highlights | Executive Summary | Introduction | Growth and Distribution | Social and Economic Indicators | Magnet City Hypothesis | Summary of Key Findings | References The midwestern portion of the nation's Latino population has, for historical reasons, experienced the slowest growth of the four regional portions (see Appendix Table 1) and remains to this day the least populous among them. Nevertheless, as of the 1990 census, it has reached a level sufficient to warrant far more attention that it has received up to now. Not only does the midwestern Latino population account for some 8% of the nation's Hispanics, they accounted for over half of the entire growth in population in the Midwest over the 1980-1990 decade. As Table 1 makes clear, the relative growth of Latinos in the Midwest has been strongly enhanced by negative growth among non-Hispanic Whites and relatively sluggish growth among non-Hispanic Blacks (African-Americans). The key figures in Table 1, graphically depicted in Figure 1A, reveal that while the population of the Midwest added slightly over 800,000 people over the 1980's, nearly 450,000 of the increase is attributable to the Latino population. Although the non-Hispanic population, as a whole, grew only by about 350,000 people, both non-Hispanic Blacks and non-Hispanic "others" (Asian, Native, Pacific Islander Americans, etc.) each experienced increases in the vicinity of 350,000. The dramatic increases in these components of the population are masked in the net change figures because of the concomitant decline of 350,000 persons in the non-Hispanic White population.
National Pattern To provide context for Latino population dynamics in the Midwest, Figures 1B to 1F show the overall growth of the Latino population between 1980 and 1990, both for the United States and for the four individual regions. As shown in Figure 1B, the nation's Hispanics numbered more than 22 million in 1990, up from approximately 14.6 million in 1980. Over 13 million of this total, some 60%, are Latinos of Mexican origin. The next largest group, Puerto Ricans, accounts for about 12% of the total and numbers around 2.7 million. Cubans, the third largest group, account for slightly over 1 million persons of Latino heritage, or roughly 4.5% of the total. Figures on "other" Hispanics are included, but the nationalities actually represented are so many and varied that it makes little sense to generalize from them (subsequent reports will attempt to discern major patterns within this grouping). Still, this category accounts for a larger number (over 5 million) and proportion (22.8%) of the nation's Latinos than any of the larger groups except for Mexicans, the largest (see Appendix Table 1 for detailed figures).
Figures 1C to 1F make clear that of the four population areas, the Midwest continues to have the least number of Latinos. In addition, the figures show the numerical dominance of Mexicans in all regions except for the Northeast, where they are few in number and where Puerto Ricans have traditionally maintained their major settlements. The three regions outside the Midwest have also experienced the most absolute growth in the number of Latinos, particularly the West. However, the Midwest does come closest to simulating the nation's patterning of Latinos in relative shares by the three major categories, as noted.
Midwest Pattern in Detail Figure 1G provides a graphic breakdown of the Midwest's population by proportional representation. Whites clearly dominate overall, accounting for over 85% of the region's people, while African-Americans comprise nearly 10% of the total. Hispanics, who account for nearly 3% of the total, are shown to be composed of Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans in proportions that closely match the pattern for the nation's Latinos. Slightly over two-thirds of the region's Latinos are of Mexican origin (as compared with 60% for the U.S.), nearly 15% are Puerto Rican (as compared with 12%), about 2.1% are Cuban (as compared with 4.5%), and "other Hispanics" account for a greater percentage than do Cubans or Puerto Ricans. Figure 2 provides a graphic view of the intercensual growth in the region's Hispanics, by state. Quite clearly, the state with the most Latinos in both time periods, Illinois, also experienced the most Latino growth over the period. Michigan, a distant second at both periods, also comes second in terms of growth, measured in absolute terms. Ohio, which ranks third in sheer numbers, is the only other state with at least 100,000 Hispanics in both 1980 and 1990.
Figure 3A depicts the numbers of Latinos, by state and by national origin group, for the midwestern states (excepting the Dakotas). Two very clear patterns are evident. First, Mexicans constitute the largest group in every single state. In fact, with the exception of Ohio, Mexicans constitute over half of the entire Latino population in all of the midwestern states. Second, in absolute terms, Mexican dominance is most pronounced in the key Latino states of Illinois and Michigan, especially the former. The preponderance of Mexicans among midwestern Latinos is even more striking when the focus is growth viewed independently of current or past size, as is clear in the next section.
Figure 3B denotes Latino population growth, by state and by group. Cubans are excluded because they have experienced virtually zero growth. However, "other" Latinos, a group consisting largely of South and Central Americans, is included and the figures indicate a fair amount of absolute growth, especially in Illinois. Nonetheless, Mexican growth overwhelms that of all others, with the growth concentrated mainly in Illinois. Put another way, the highly skewed distribution which finds most of the region's Latinos in the key state of Illinois is largely the result of Mexican settlement patterns. The implications of this finding are explored in later sections.
Figure 4 compares the total population in the region with the Latino population with respect to their proportional distributions across states. The skewing of Latino settlement patterns towards particular states is quite apparent. For example, whereas some 19% of the region's total population resides in Illinois, fully 52% of the region's Latinos so reside. In all the other states, including the state of Michigan, Latino representation trails that of the general population, except for Kansas, where the respective proportions are quite close.
Figure 5 provides a comparison in terms of type of residential area by race and type of Hispanic origin. The most striking finding is that relatively few Latinos in the region are rural dwellers, despite the agricultural-labor origins of much Latino immigration. Blacks also are underrepresented among rural residents. Only Whites maintain a substantial rural presence, although they, too, are predominately urban dwellers. However, when the analysis focuses only on city versus suburban residence in the metropolitan areas of the central (large) cities, Whites stand in sharp contrast to the others: whereas Whites are about equally likely to reside in either the cities or their suburbs. The Latino groups and African-Americans are far more likely to be central city residents. This is most especially the case among the Puerto Ricans, who are the most likely of all to be city residents, and among Blacks, the second most likely. These relationships will be explored later with an eye to the degree to which these patterns of residence correspond to differences in economic status.
Selected Highlights | Executive Summary | Introduction | Growth and Distribution | Social and Economic Indicators | Magnet City Hypothesis | Summary of Key Findings | References Social and Economic Indicators
Education Figures 6A through 6E provide graphic representations of educational attainment indicators for Hispanics and others. Figure 6A shows that in 1990, as in 1980, midwestern Latinos trailed both Blacks and Whites in educational attainment in terms of both high school and college (at least four years) completion. Whereas roughly two-thirds of Blacks and three-quarters of Whites had completed high school, only slightly more than half of Latino adults had obtained high school degrees, as of 1990. Rates of college completion by group are shown in Figure 6B to be more closely distributed. About 10% of both Blacks and Hispanics had obtained at least a four-year college degree by 1990, while nearly 20% of midwestern White adults had obtained such degrees. As Figure 6C shows, all groups increased their educational attainment over the 1980-1990 intercensual period on both measures, but in each case, the increases among Hispanics were lowest in magnitude. However, this should not be taken to indicate with certainty that midwestern Hispanics have not been increasing their educational attainment over time as much as the other groups. The discrepancy in the figures could be an artifact of migration patterns; that is, it could be that new Hispanic immigration accounts for the group's lower gains overall. Such a possibility is in line with the findings discussed below. Figures 6D and 6E present educational attainment data using the standard educational indicators, high school and college completion, for Latinos, Blacks, and Whites by individual midwestern states for 1990. The overall pattern noted for the Midwest as a whole basically holds, but with a few caveats. First, whites clearly exhibit the highest levels of educational attainment in all states. However, although Blacks tend to exhibit higher levels of attainment than Hispanics in most instances, in some individual states, Latinos lead Blacks on one or the other indicator, or both.
This reversal is most notable in the state of Missouri, where Latinos show slightly higher levels of educational attainment on both indicators. In each remaining state, Blacks clearly exhibit higher rates of high school completion than Latinos, but in Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin, Latinos show higher rates of college completion. The most telling statistics, however, are the ones denoting high school and college completion among Hispanics in Illinois. In each case, they are the lowest shown for any of the groups in any of the states. Considering the pattern of Latino population growth noted earlier, with its heavy skewing to Illinois, the clear inference is that a substantial portion of the growth stems from immigration. That is, the influx of immigrants with lower levels of educational attainment may well account for the relatively slower growth in educational attainment reflected in the data for the region's Latinos.
Labor Force Participation Figures 7A to 7H report the labor force status of midwestern Latinos, Blacks, and Whites, although lack of data precludes the inclusion of information on earnings. One important issue is the relationship between educational attainment and labor force status, i.e., are groups with the most years of education more often employed or more likely to be employed. The answer, apparently, is no. Rather, the labor force statistics suggest that Latinos are the most likely to be employed, for both men and women (taken together or separately), despite having the lowest levels of educational attainment. Alternatively Blacks are the least likely to be employed, despite being more highly educated, on average, than Latinos. Figures 7A and 7B show rates of labor force participation, which refers to being employed or seeking employment, by group and by sex. Latino men and women are shown to exhibit higher rates of participation than either of the other groups in 1990, although this was true only for the men in 1980. At the earlier time, Black women participated slightly more than Hispanic women. Consistent with national trends, the women of all groups show increased participation over the intercensual period, and at approximately the same pace, while changes among men are minor and inconsistent in direction. Roughly four out of five midwestern Latino men participated in the labor force in 1990, while only about two-thirds of Black men and three-quarters of White men so participated. Moreover, while Latino men show a slight rise in participation over the intercensual period, Blacks and Whites show slight decreases (Figure 7A). Among women, the 1980 figures were all in the 50.0 to 50.3 range in 1980, while in 1990 all were in the 57.0 to 60.0 range (Figure 7B). However, as shown below, labor force participation figures do not correspond well to unemployment figures.
Unemployment Figures 7C and 7D depict unemployment rates by group and by sex. Among both men and women, Whites consistently show the lowest unemployment rates and Blacks the highest, with Latinos in-between. In addition, rates for Whites and Hispanics, among both men and women, dropped over the intercensual period, while rates for Blacks of both sexes rose slightly. However, it is important to note that unemployment rises and falls with national and local business cycles, which are highly dynamic. Thus, there were likely to be several instances of increases and decreases in unemployment over the decade that are not captured in the data for the two points in time singled out here. By contrast, labor force participation rates change far more slowly, hence the patterns shown here probably do capture more reliable, longer-term trends. In general, unemployment among Whites registers at around 5%, that of Latinos at around 10%, and that of Blacks from 15 to 18%. Although the favorable employment indicators among Whites may be explained by their favorable standing in educational attainment, the low standing of Blacks is not explainable on those grounds, given that Blacks' generally have better educational credentials than Hispanics do. An explanation of the reasons for this discrepancy must await future reports. One clue, aside from the obvious factor of discrimination which has traditionally hampered Blacks more than any other group in our society, is Blacks' residential concentration in central city areas, noted earlier. Such areas have experienced substantial economic decline in recent years, particularly in the Northeast and Midwest, a fact likely to have significant consequences for employment opportunities.
Figures 7E through 7H provide labor force status information on Latinos and others for the Midwest by individual states. As even the most cursory glance makes evident, the pattern among states varies little from that for the region as a whole. Hispanics tend to have higher labor force participation rates than the others, while Blacks tend to show the lowest such rates. Alternatively, Whites of both sexes tend to show the lowest unemployment rates, Blacks the highest, with Latinos falling into the middle position. A small number of deviations from the pattern do exist, but these are minor. The most notable deviations from the general pattern concern the states of North and South Dakota where Black labor force participation exceeds that of the others, for both sexes, and Black female unemployment is lower than that for Latinas. However, the total number of Hispanic and Black persons in both of these states combined is far lower than the comparable number in any other midwestern state, hence, the figures for these places are less reliable. In addition, many of the Blacks residing in these areas may simply be stationed there with the armed forces, thereby upwardly biasing the employment indicators since all such personnel would necessarily be employed. A more serious finding is depicted in Figures 7E through 7H in the data for the state of Michigan. The unemployment rates in the state of Michigan, with few exceptions, were the highest of any midwest state for all three population groups. The figures for both Black men and Black women there were especially startling. Black male unemployment in Michigan registered at greater than one in five, with Black female unemployment approaching a rate of one in five. By contrast, Hispanic men and women showed unemployment rates of between 13 and 14% in the state. Although manifesting significantly lower rates than those found among Blacks, Hispanics in Michigan were clearly enduring substantial hardship at the time of the census.
Household Structure Figure 8 shows the varying proportions of families headed by women (with no spouse present), by race and Hispanic origin, for 1980 and 1990. Although growth in the proportional representation of such families is in evidence for all groups, by far the respective proportions are highest among Blacks. Nearly half of all Black families in the Midwest were so headed in 1990, up from under 40% in 1980. For Whites, the corresponding change was nominal: about 10% were so headed in both periods. Among Hispanics, the increase was also modest. About 20% of Latino families were headed by women in 1990, roughly three percentage points higher than in 1980. Figure 8 also provides data on family type by national origin. These data show that, in 1990, between 16 and 18% of Mexican and Cuban families were headed by women with no spouse present, while nearly one-third of all Puerto Rican families were so headed at the time. Hence, however prevalent among Blacks, the rise of such families has ensued to only a moderate extent among Hispanics, with the exception of Puerto Ricans. The latter's figures come closest to those of Blacks, but do not close the gap.
Poverty Figures 9A and 9B denote rates of poverty in the Midwest, by group, for both 1979 and 1989. The first and most striking finding is that poverty has risen substantially across the board! In every single category - individuals or families - and for all groups shown, poverty is up. The patterning of poverty across groups is, consequently, similar for both periods. In each period, Blacks have been the worst off, and they have experienced larger increases in poverty than Latinos (as a whole) or Whites over the interim. The poverty gap between Blacks and the others, a gap already in evidence in 1979, has increased substantially. In 1989, for example, nearly one in three Blacks were under the poverty line, while less than one in ten Whites were poor at that (or the earlier) time. At both times, Latinos took the middle position, in the 20% range, though their rate increase also exceeded that for Whites. They sustained a rate of greater than 21% in 1989. Hence, over one in five Midwestern Latinos were in poverty at the latter time despite exhibiting the highest work efforts of all the groups!
Figure 9A also reveals changing rates of poverty among the individual Latino nationality groups. It shows that the rate of impoverishment among Puerto Ricans, the poorest of the Latino groups, is as devastating as that of African-Americans. Like Blacks, Puerto Ricans sustained a poverty rate of over three in ten. The poverty rates among Mexicans and Cubans closely follow those among all Hispanics, although Cubans consistently show lower rates than Mexicans. In contrast to the general pattern, however, Cubans are shown to have experienced the largest absolute increase in poverty among individuals between 1979 and 1989. Still, their poverty rate remained the lowest among Latinos at the terminal time.
Finally, Figure 9B provides rates of poverty among families, rather than persons. The pattern revealed is virtually identical to the one for individuals, except that the rates shown are uniformly lower. As was the case with female headship rates and central city residence, Puerto Ricans and Blacks reflect similar indicator profiles which are far out of line with the others. Although a consideration of explanatory hypotheses for these similar Black/Puerto Rican profiles must await further work, it is worth noting the likelihood that these patterns are related in some way(s).
Income Figure 10A shows median household income by group over the 1979-1989 period in constant (inflation-adjusted) dollars, while Figure 10B reveals the changes in precise dollar amounts. The revelation is startling. in a sharp reversal of fortunes, Blacks, Whites, and Latinos sustained substantial losses in "real" (constant dollar) income over the decade. At the terminal time (figures are for 1989) Black median household income registered at under $20,000, while the figure for Whites stood at over $30,000 and that for Latinos at about $26,000. Moreover, as shown in Figure 10b, not only have all three groups sustained significant losses in real income over the decade, but the changes have widened the income gaps separating them. Whites, the group with the highest income, lost the least (under $900), while Blacks lost over twice as much (over $2,100). Latinos incomes feel by over $1,000 over the period, a substantial setback, but a moderate one relative to Blacks' devastating real income reduction.
Figure 11A conveys the final set of economic data in the series, per capita income. Figure 11B portrays average household size among Latino and others in the Midwest and is included to help interpret figures shown in Figure 11A. The indicators shown in Figure 11A reveal that, consistent with earlier noted indicators, Whites are far better off than Latinos or Blacks in terms of per capita income. Whites show a per capita income of over $14,000 while Blacks and Latinos each show less than $9,000. However, in contrast to the earlier indicators, which consistently showed Latinos better off than Blacks, Hispanics are actually worse off, in per capita terms, albeit to a very small amount ($8,492 vs $8,775). This is largely explained by two factors.
First, as earlier noted (Figures 7A through 7H), Latinos experience higher labor force participation and lower unemployment. Second, as shown in Figure 11B, Latinos have larger households. The larger households of Latinos, in combination with their higher rates of employment, translate into more workers per household and, hence, higher median earnings per household. However, more persons per household also means that the larger number of dollars must be shared by a larger number of persons. On balance, this results in the groups faring about equally well on income per person. In summary, the economic well-being of midwestern households, families, and individuals have taken a beating over the 1980's. This is particularly surprising in view of the generally improved educational credentials and work efforts of the region's adults. Hispanics and Blacks have sustained the sharpest setbacks, particularly the latter. In the end, Blacks and Puerto Ricans - the poorest of the Latino groups - emerged at the bottom of the economic ladder. Selected Highlights | Executive Summary | Introduction | Growth and Distribution | Social and Economic Indicators | Magnet City Hypothesis | Summary of Key Findings | References Given the population changes noted above and the demographic profile of midwestern Latinos, their longer term growth in the region along with their patterns of concentration in key cities become important for public policy and planning purposes. This section will consider important issues of Latino population change in the Midwest that cannot be captured in the typical comparisons to provide indications about the sources of Latino growth in the region and the prospects for long term growth. Figure 12 reveals the concentration of Latinos and others in the key cities (Chicago, Detroit) of the two states (Illinois, Michigan) with both the most Latinos and the most Latino growth over the 1980-1990 period. The results of the comparison are startling. Whereas only about 14% of the Hispanic population in Michigan resides in the city of Detroit, over 60% of Illinois Latinos live in Chicago. For the population as a whole, the respective figures are 24% (Chicago) and 11% (Detroit). Thus, the 45 percentage point gap separating the relative concentration of Latinos across these states corresponds to a mere 13 percentage point gap for the whole population. The proportions are roughly the same across the individual Hispanic nationality groups with the exception of Puerto Ricans. They are especially concentrated in the key cities, but the pattern for them is the same - they are far more concentrated in Chicago (82.1%) than in Detroit (29.4%).
The major concern here, however, is with Mexicans. They are the largest group and have realized the most growth in recent years. Although an in-depth analysis of the components of growth with which to interpret these finding must await further work, a straightforward hypothesis on this issue is eminently apparent: that the state of Illinois is the only major midwest receiver of cross-national immigrants of Mexican origin, and they tend to concentrate in Chicago, channeled there by kin and acquaintance networks. Such a scenario would be consistent with earlier noted findings in this work: Illinois is the major growth state, yet it manifests the lowest average educational indicators for Hispanics among any of the groups in any of the midwestern states. As a whole, these findings suggest that Illinois' rapid Latino growth is fueled primarily by Mexican immigrants with relatively low educational credentials, while the more sluggish Latino growth in other areas stems mainly from natural increase and/or less intense internal migration (from other parts of the U.S.). This important issue will be more thoroughly pursued in subsequent reports. Finally, Figures 13A through 13C provide graphic representations of two decades of Latino growth in the Midwest, 1970-1980 and 1980-1990, by state and by group (no data on Latinos as a whole is provided there because the 1970 census returns on the broader category proved unreliable). The most clear finding is that for all three groups, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans, Illinois was the major Midwestern state of residence at all three times (1970, 1980, 1990). But, even more importantly, the graphs clearly show that for all three groups, population growth has actually slowed down (or reversed in the case of Cubans) between the first and second decades in the state of Illinois (see Appendix Tables for precise figures). Hence, even the relatively rapid growth of Mexicans in Illinois, which is likely to have gained the most from immigration, is slowing. Moreover, the figures may understate the full extent of the slowing of growth. This is because the broader population bases in place in 1980, as compared with 1970, should have provided a larger absolute population increase than the same rate of growth would have provided in the 1970's, given the smaller population base in place in 1970.
Selected Highlights | Executive Summary | Introduction | Growth and Distribution | Social and Economic Indicators | Magnet City Hypothesis | Summary of Key Findings | References The Latino population in the Midwest is currently about 2 million strong and accounted for most of the region's growth over the 1980's, but this growth was mainly attributable to Mexicans and heavily skewed to Illinois' key city of Chicago. The patterning of the data suggest that much of this growth is attributable to Mexican immigration. In addition, substantial growth came unaccompanied by good fortune. Latinos sustained major hikes in poverty and corresponding losses in real income over the 1980's, like others in the region, despite exemplary work efforts. Among Latino nationality groups, Puerto Ricans stand out as the least well-off, their dismal indicators rival those of the region's Blacks, traditionally the poorest group. The research implications are clear cut. One task is to determine just what macroeconomic factors have accounted for such an across-the-board downturn in income, and why Latinos and Blacks have been hit so hard in the process. It is well known that the nation's deindustrialization has had its greatest impact on the Midwest, but it is not so clear that Latinos and Blacks were disproportionately represented within the highly unionized heavy industries (automobiles, steel) that sustained the largest cuts. Whatever the overall causes, the factors that most heavily affected Latinos need to be clearly understood so they may be addressed. In particular, we need to isolate those factors that are amenable to public policy influence, such as educational attainment, that might be effective in reversing the tide of misfortune. Subsequent reports in this series will tackle some of these questions. Selected Highlights | Executive Summary | Introduction | Growth and Distribution | Social and Economic Indicators | Magnet City Hypothesis | Summary of Key Findings | References Henry, William III. 1990. "Beyond the Melting Pot" Time 135:28-31 (April 9). Santiago, Anne M. 1990. "Life in the Industrial Heartland: A Profile of Latinos in the Midwest." Research Report No. 2, Julian Samora Research Institute, Michigan State University. U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1992. "Population Projections of the United States, by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1992 to 2050." Current Population Reports Series P-25, No 1092. Selected Highlights | Executive Summary | Introduction | Growth and Distribution | Social and Economic Indicators | Magnet City Hypothesis | Summary of Key Findings | References Please Note: The Appendix (which contains tables referenced in this report) is available with the hardcopy of this publication, at the price listed on the Institute Research Reports page. For any orders or further information on JSRI Publications please email to: info@jsri.msu.edu. |
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